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Abstract: In international organizations, states seek representation not only in decision-making and political fora but also in the administrative bodies, or secretariats. This article maps the representation of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the secretariats of 36 bodies of the United Nations (UN) system in the years 1996–2015. The CEE region is interesting due to the deep political divide between Russia and the Western-oriented new EU member states. Using new empirical evidence regarding the participation of CEE countries’ citizens on the professional staff of the UN bodies, we show that Russia has dramatically lost much of its representation in the UN administration over the last twenty years. In contrast, a number of other CEE countries have considerably improved their position in it. In spite of that, the countries of the entire CEE region belong to those with an overall weak representation in the administrative bodies of the UN.

Key words: staffing, United Nations, international organizations, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia.

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superpowers was positioned against the US-led Western group, formally known as the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). The CEE region is specific in that after the end of the Cold War it effectively split in two. On one side of the divide is Russia with several of its closer allies. On the other side is the group of Western-oriented countries of Central and Eastern Europe, today the new members of the European Union (EU). For convenience, and to avoid confusion with established abbreviations, we will refer to these eleven CEE states that became the new members of the European Union (EU) as CEEU. Of course, there are also several countries in the region that are not firmly attached to either Russia or the CEEU, but in general, today this split constitutes one of the key conflict lines in the UN system. What used to be the Soviet Caucus, and what today formally still is the Eastern European Group within the UN system, is now divided into two blocs. This fact has rather direct consequences. Most recently, in 2016 and 2017, the region proved unable to nominate a suitable candidate for the highest position of the UN SG in a situation in which the EEG was supposed to have its turn (Thakur 2017; Weiss – Carayannis 2017: 310; Standish 2016).

Russia, by far the most powerful member of the EEG, is not one of only two superpowers anymore. Yet, it pursues its interests with a renewed assertiveness, both bilaterally and multilaterally. It also retains one of the five gems in the institutional crown of the UN system, namely a permanent membership in the UN Security Council. At the same time, the CEEU countries have developed autonomous foreign policy orientations after the end of the Cold War. This autonomy is naturally projected also into their search for adequate representation in the UN staff. Representation in the staff of IOs is, globally speaking, a zero-sum game where states can only increase their representation share at the expense of others (Novosad – Werker 2018). Given the geopolitical divide cutting through the EEG region, which of the sides has been more successful over the last two decades? What is the result of the conflict between Russia and the CEEU states over representation in the staff of IOs?

To address these questions, we present in this article extensive new quantitative evidence on the representation of Russia and the CEEU countries in 36 UN system bodies over the last twenty years. The dataset covers the secretariats of most of the widely known global IOs, including the UN Secretariat, but also the administrative bodies e.g. of the World Health Organization, UNESCO, the International Labour Organization, and many others. The quantitative evidence on the compositions of the professional staffs of IOs is supported with evidence from a series of interviews with high-ranking diplomats in Geneva. Furthermore, to map Russia’s interest in the UN system, we supplement the analysis with an overview of the UN-related material recently made available via the online archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The most prominent finding of our inquiry is that there is a major declining trend in Russian representation in the UN administration, where by representation we mean the percent share of the professional staff positions held by the citizens of a country. The decline of Russian representation is visible throughout the period and across virtually all UN system bodies. At the same time, this trend is closely matched by the rise in the representation of the other CEE countries, clearly indicating a representation shift in favour of the smaller CEEU states. This is closely in line with the existing rules and principles of staffing in the UN, but clearly in opposition to Russia’s interests. While the Russian Federation retains its unique position at the apex of UN decision-making, notably in the Security Council, on the everyday working level it has lost tremendously over the last two decades. In spite of its (self-proclaimed) rising power status, salient economic growth throughout the 2010s, and increasingly assertive unilateral and bilateral, but also multilateral foreign policy, its representation in the professional bodies of the global bureaucracy has decreased by more than 40%. In some IOs, including the UN Secretariat, its representation declined by more than 60%. In contrast, the CEEU countries have gained
representation in UN bodies, even though they still belong to the lowly represented UN members in global comparison.

The paper starts with a section outlining, theoretically and empirically, the reasons for which states seek representation in IO administrations. Second, we present a brief outline of our empirical strategy. Third, the following section discusses the situation of Russia in administrations of the United Nations system bodies. Finally, an analogous analysis is performed on the CEEU countries, identifying common regional trends but also substantial variation across CEEU members’ staffing patterns.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF STATES

International organizations and their staff are to a large extent controlled by their member states, especially the most powerful ones (Stone 2011). Yet, in many regards they also enjoy considerable autonomy and influence of their own (Bauer – Ege 2015). Perhaps the best way to capture this complex relationship is through the principal agent framework (PA), which is widely used in the literature on IOs. The framework sees member states as the principals delegating specific tasks and authorities to IOs, and the IOs and their bureaucracies as the agents (Hawkins et al. 2006; see also, e.g., Conceição-Heldt 2010; Dijkstra 2012; Pollack 1997; Elsig 2011; Karlas 2015). The principals have the capability to set the political course for IOs by defining their mandate and policy guidelines. At the same time, the agents exercise possibly considerable discretion in how the mandate is implemented. Quite often, IOs are able to go beyond mere implementation and monitoring of policies agreed upon by states and become genuine agenda-setters and norm-shapers (Barnett – Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2013; Eckhard – Ege 2016). After all, the very purpose of the creation of IOs is that they develop unique, specialized knowledge and expertise. Thanks to the asymmetric information situation thus created, they obtain an advantage in the relationship with the states, their principals. This may be less so the case when it comes to the most powerful member states, which are able to monitor and control the work of the IOs most closely (Dijkstra 2015; Grigorescu 2010). But the perceived neutrality of the IOs, combined with their expertise, often gives them a definite advantage in establishing relevant facts of international cooperation (Abbott – Snidal 1998; Barnett – Finnemore 2004).

Central to the influence of IOs on political outcomes is the autonomy and discretion of their bureaucratic bodies, the staff of IOs (Reinalda – Verbeek 1998). It is the autonomy of personnel policies combined with autonomy in budgetary matters that gives IOs the ability to handle their mandates in an impartial manner. It is this perception of impartiality that gives IOs their power (Barnett – Finnemore 2004: 2). In line with that, staff members are not allowed to take instructions from their states of origin, as stipulated in Art 100 (1) of the UN Charter. Also, IOs rely at least to some extent on internal socialization processes within which their staff are supposed to develop supranational loyalties to the organization mission in place of or in addition to their original national loyalties (Murdoch et al. 2018; cf. Hooghe 2002).

Nevertheless, the reality is more complex, and it is widely understood that the staff members cannot be expected to completely lose their national affiliations and affections. As famously proclaimed by Nikita Kruschev with regard to the UN staff and its impartiality, “while there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men” (quoted in Hammarskjöld 1961: 329). In a similar vein, but with an interesting twist, Luard, a historian of the United Nations, vividly describes how the US government and the FBI exerted massive pressure on the UN and its first SG Trygve Lie. During the McCarthy campaign, they sought to prevent the UN from employing any US nationals with questionable national loyalties (Luard 1984: 19).

All this illustrates that staffing is naturally a point of major contestation, another playground on which states compete for power and control over IOs (Novosad – Werker 2018;
States seek to influence policy-making or, at the very least, maintain informal information channels by strategically positioning their citizens in the hierarchies of IOs (Stone 2013: 125; Chwieroth 2013). Kleine even speaks of national fiefdoms within segments of international bureaucracies (2013). The authors of this text have conducted a series of interviews with senior diplomatic staff at the permanent missions to the UN in Geneva. Our interview evidence strongly confirms these intuitive insights, as virtually all the interviewees, including those from the CEEU region, highlighted IO staffing as an important part of their diplomatic agenda. Representation in the professional staff of IOs is a scarce resource which states fight for.

Of course, the representation in IO staff is principally different from representation in a decision-making or legislative body of an IO. There the representatives of states are simply supposed to reflect in their behaviour and decision-making their states’ foreign policy orientations as closely as possible (Rapkin et al. 2016: 79). The link between the representatives and the represented is extremely strong and direct. With representation in staff, the situation is much subtler. Probably no one expects the staff of IOs to actively prioritize the interests of their countries on a day-to-day basis. Representation in international staff corresponds much more closely to the notion of mirror (or descriptive) representation, whereby the composition of a political or administrative body reflects the composition of the underlying population, but the accountability between the body and the population is absent or very indirect (Rapkin et al. 2016: 80). The body thus mirrors in its composition the underlying constituency, but its members are not expected to actively represent any particular interests. This notion of mirror representation also closely corresponds to the notion of passive representation in public administration research, which is often applied to the study of administrations under the label of representative bureaucracy (for a discussion of passive and active representation, see Meier 1975, 2018).

To moderate the countries’ struggle for representation in professional staff, many IOs have formal systems of quotas for their bureaucratic bodies whereby a part of the appointments is subject to geographical distribution rules. So, for example, the UN Secretariat uses a formula that allocates 55% of positions based on assessed budgetary contributions, 40% based on the sovereign equality principle, and 5% based on the population sizes of countries. Many other IOs of the UN family adopt the same or a slightly modified system (United Nations Joint Inspection Unit 2012). The International Monetary Fund, to take another example, has a similar formula-based system (International Monetary Fund 2003). After all, the UN Charter also stipulates geographical distribution of the staff as an important requirement, whereby “[d]ue regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible” (Charter of the United Nations, Art. 101(3)). All this is meant to make sure that no single state or group of states can dominate the bureaucratic body of an IO, as this would risk the very legitimacy of the IOs’ work.

This issue of distribution and representation has a national but also a regional dimension. Many IOs are too small for meaningful staffing patterns to exist on the level of all individual member states. Within the 36 UN system bodies that we map, there are 15 that have a professional staff of less than 200 and as many as 26 bodies with a staff of less than 500. Of course, such small individual IOs cannot be representative with regard to the entire UN system membership. The notion of regional, in addition to national, representation is also deeply enshrined in the UN through the system of regional voting and representation groups. As mentioned earlier, the regional system translates also to the highest levels of staff allocation, where the most senior staff and the heads of IOs are concerned, including the UN SG. After all, such concerns with representation on regional, and not only national level, are quite natural. While particular representation biases and irregularities on the micro level of individual, especially smaller states may go unnoticed,
significant under- or over-representation of entire geographical regions testifies to systemic problems. Our interview evidence suggests that this is fully in line with how the member states themselves perceive the problem. It may not be necessary that a specific state is represented in the secretariat of an IO as long as its neighbours and regional partners are. Regional partners very often share many interests, a language, a common working culture, etc. So, for example, one representative to the UN of a CEEU country argued that "[the regional balance] ensures that even when there is no [citizen of our country – omitted for anonymization], anyway our region as such is represented."

All this has been at least to some extent discussed in the several recent works mapping the representation of states in IOs’ secretariats (Parízek 2017; Novosad – Werker 2018; Eckhard – Steinebach 2018; Parízek – Stephen 2019b; cf. Christensen – Yesilkagit 2018). States seek to be represented in the secretariats of IOs, even if the staff members are not supposed to actively promote the interests of their countries of origin. If it is not possible or practicable for all individual states to have their own nationals on the staff of a particular IO, it is still important to at least have there citizens of the unrepresented countries’ close neighbours and regional partners.

However, such a straightforward logic of national and regional competition for representation in the staff of IOs fails when it is applied to countries of the former Soviet bloc. With the end of the Cold War, the formerly highly cohesive EEG split into two parts, with the first, large part being constituted by the CEEU countries, and the other by Russia. The core of our theoretical and empirical puzzle is that it is not at all obvious what the outcome of this change should be in terms of staffing patterns.

ACCOUNTING FOR STAFFING PATTERNS IN IOs: EMPIRICAL DATA

In this section, we briefly outline our empirical strategy for addressing our research question as presented in the Introduction: What is the result of the conflict between Russia and the CEEU states over representation in the staff of IOs? The core of our approach lies in the collection of new empirical data on the presence of citizens of CEEU countries and Russia in the staff of 36 bodies of the UN system. The data has been extracted semi-manually from the appendices of the Personnel Statistics yearly reports of the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions and, later on, the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (UNCEB).

This data source is unique in its empirical coverage. First, it includes most of the widely known IOs, starting with the largest one, the UN Secretariat, and continuing with many large functional IOs, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and so on. It also covers many smaller and often less known IOs, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and even hardly known technical bodies, such as the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) or the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF). The UNCEB reports do not cover only three IOs that are formally parts of the UN system: the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.

Second, the data source covers the years 1996–2015, effectively capturing the post-Cold War period. The dataset we created based on these UNCEB personnel statistics reports amounts to 3582 country-IO-year observations, mapping the representation of both Russia and the eleven individual CEEU states across all the bodies for which information was available and across the entire time-span covered in the data source.

One important weakness of the data source is the absence of full information on the representation of individual countries’ citizens across the levels of the IO bureaucracies’ hierarchies. In other words, we do not know how many of the professional staff members from each country work at which level. Nevertheless, previous research using this data source has shown that in the aggregate, across many IOs and all the countries of the
world, there do not seem to be any systematic differences in the staffing patterns across professional staff levels (Parízek 2017; Parízek – Stephen 2019b: 15–16). Furthermore, we should also highlight that we only map the representation of countries in the professional staff of IOs, the globally recruited professionals with a specific expertise demanded by UN bodies for the implementation of their mandate. We do not include the locally recruited staff of the General Services category, as the patterns of geographical distribution of this staff are likely to closely reflect the locations of IOs’ activities.11

Our new empirical evidence will enable us to map how the individual countries of the region are represented in the staff of the UN bodies and what changes their representation patterns have undergone over the time-span of twenty years.

As we will show later, we empirically identify a major declining trend for the representation of Russia in the UN administrations. We will argue that an intuitive explanation for such a decline could be the waning interest of Russia in multilateralism and the UN system. In other words, it could be that our empirical observations are entirely accounted for by a possible (tacit) withdrawal of Russia from the UN system. An additional component of our empirical strategy will thus lie in the identification of possible trends in the Russian interest in the UN over the last twenty years. To do so, we quantitatively analysed the material recently made available in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive, containing all public and media output by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is pertinent to international politics.12 The archive effectively covers the period from the year 2000 until today.13 Through the archive interface, we were able to identify more than 40,000 outputs tagged as related to the United Nations. These were extracted from the archive and a small sample of them was checked for their actual UN-related content, confirming the validity of the procedure. To provide a relative measure of the importance of the UN on the Russian agenda, we also applied the same procedure to output related to the three key contemporary global actors with approximately equally sized economies representing the three current global political and economic giants, namely the US, China and the EU. The same actors can be also seen as representing the rest of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, with the EU including the United Kingdom and France. In total, there were close to 16,000 such entries pertinent to these individual countries (and the EU). To obtain a relative measure of the importance of the UN on the agenda, we then scaled the numbers of entries for the UN in each year to the sum of the numbers of entries for the three key actors. This way, we will be able to assess the trends in the Russian interest in the UN system.

The combination of these two data sources, complemented with interview evidence, will enable us to provide an account of the staffing patterns in the CEE region across a large number of important IOs.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE SECRETARIATS OF UN BODIES

Russia, as the heir to the USSR, has always enjoyed a prime position in the system of IOs, most notably in the UN, which it co-founded as one of the winners of World War II. From the early days, the Soviet Union has also taken a keen interest in the working of the international administrations, and especially the UN Secretariat. Its approach, however, was primarily defensive. While Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld were building up the new international civil service, broadly with a support from the US and Western European allies, the USSR sought to restrict the independence of the IOs’ secretariats, or, most importantly, the UN Secretariat as such, insisting that it should be controlled by the Security Council (Luard 1984: 19). On repeated occasions, the Soviet leadership tried to curtail the powers of the Secretariat. The most notable case of this was its proposal to replace the position of the UN SG with a troika of under-secretaries general coming from the West, the East, and the non-aligned movement, respectively (Dallin 1962). In general, the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc have been historically reserved towards the idea of
an impartial, supranational civil service that would supposedly be devoid of the previous national loyalties (Ziring et al. 2005: 143).

Of course, Russia’s attempts to influence the functioning of the UN, like those of the US and other major powers, have always been substantiated with power: both material economic and military power, but also institutional power in the form of its permanent UN Security Council membership (Barnet – Duvall 2005). Russia is not just one among several powerful UN states. From the very beginning, the only other non-Western power among the permanent members of the UN Security Council has been China. Until 1973 the Chinese seat on the SC was held by Taiwan (the Republic of China). Even after the transition of the seat to the People’s Republic, China as a member of the SC maintained significantly less pronounced multilateral ambitions, due to its primary focus on internal matters (cf. Wuthnow 2010).

With the end of the Cold War, the position of the Soviet Union and, later, Russia quickly deteriorated. The Soviet Union dissolved and its economic breakdown was associated with a dramatic drop in its industrial production and a de facto collapse of its military power, at least when seen in the perspective of its former superpower status (Trenin – Lo 2005; Lo 2002; Mankoff 2009). At the same time, its institutional power, notably in the form of its permanent UN SC membership, remained untouched. In spite of a long period of decline, Russia started to regain its economic power and also its international ambition around the turn of the millennia. In 2008/2009, it became a founding member of the BRICS group (Lo 2015; MacFarlane 2006). Partly on the wave of high oil and gas prices, it started to invest significantly in the renewal of its military power, and of course its economic influence started to rise again as well (Legvold 2007; Mankoff 2009).

In spite of that, we find that the renewed influence and assertiveness of Russia in international and multilateral affairs since the 2000s does not translate into a strong position in international bureaucracies. In the following, we present a series of charts mapping the representation of Russia in international secretariats, or, more precisely, on their professional staff. Figure 1 shows the overall shares of Russian nationals across all

**Figure 1**

*Per cent (%) share (left) and total number (right) of Russian nationals in the professional staff of 36 UN system IOs*
the 36 UN bodies combined. The data show that over the examined twenty-year period, Russia lost more than 40% of its representation share, dropping from above 3% of all UN professional staff in the mid-1990s to less than 2% in the mid-2010s. This represents the single biggest loss of representation in staff out of all the UN members, which is further highlighted by the fact that Russia’s representation in the staff was not very sizable to start with (at least when compared to its overall power position in the system). In their research, Parízek and Stephen show that other countries lost representation in the staff of IOs over the last twenty years as well, and this holds especially for a number of economically advanced states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Yet, as they show, all the other major losers of representation started at much higher positions, such as the United States with more than 10% of the staff in the mid-1990s, or are, in general, much smaller than Russia, as, for example, the Netherlands and Denmark (Parízek – Stephen 2019b).14

The relative decline of Russia needs to be interpreted in the light of a massive increase in the overall size of the staff of the IOs. That means that Russia has not lost much of its absolute representation, as for the last twenty years it has stayed at around 550 professional staff members across all UN bodies. Yet, it completely failed to catch up with the dramatic expansion in the overall size of the UN’s administrative bodies.

It is interesting to consider not only the aggregate picture but also the varying situations in different IOs. While in the appendix to the article (Figures A.1–A.3), we provide a complete account for all the individual UN system bodies covered, in Figure 2 we offer a view on six of the largest IOs, illustrating three more widely applicable patterns of Russian representation. The first pattern is that of the UN Secretariat. Russia has been

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**Figure 2**

Large UN system bodies and Russian representation (per cent share) in staff over time

- UN
- WHO
- UNICEF
- IAEA
- UNESCO
- UNDP
relatively strongly represented in the UN Secretariat in the mid-1990s, with around 6% of the staff. Yet, over the twenty years its share declined sharply towards just above 2% of all staff; this represents a relative loss of around 60–70%. A similar pattern is visible in the IAEA, for example, and partly also in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, see Figure A.1 in the appendix). The second identifiable pattern is visible in the traditional large functional IOs, such as the WHO and UNESCO, but also in the ILO. In these IOs, Russia started at around 3%, and its representation declined to between 1% and 2% of the professional staff. Finally, the third pattern is visible in the highly development-assistance-focused and budget-heavy IOs such as UNICEF and UNDP (but also, e.g., FAO, UNHCR, and WFP). In these IOs, Russia had barely any professional staff in the mid-1990s and then its representation in them slightly grew or remained stable at below 1%. In spite of this variation in Russia’s representation in staff across IOs, there is an overarching pattern whereby either Russia has massively lost its representation over the twenty years, or it never actually had it.

It is important to note that the massive decline in Russian nationals' representation in UN bodies' staff is by no means driven by a lack of Russian interest in multilateralism or the UN. On the contrary, Russia considers multilateralism as one of its key tools in the strategic toolbox for the promotion of its interests (Dorskaya 2016; Oleandrov 2012). To get a close view of the variety of perspectives on the UN in Russian professional circles, we conducted a screening of relevant Russian-language scholarly literature. Searching for content pertinent to Russia's foreign policy and the UN system, we identified at least three strands of literature on how Russia perceives the UN and its position in it. They all point at the persistent prominence of the UN in the hierarchy of Russian foreign policy agendas.

First, in the eyes of (of course not only) the Russian scholarly works, the UN and the UN Security Council are a playground of high politics par excellence. It represents the great power principle whereby the management of global affairs is in the hands of a restricted club of great powers. In this vein, for example, Oleandrov analyses the UN as an institution laid down on the principles of democracy, but also realism. The former relates to the ability of each state (regardless of its position vis-à-vis the others) to voice its position or concern regarding any question. The latter recognizes the preponderance of great powers in international politics (Oleandrov 2012).

Second, and related to that, the UN represents the key principle of multipolarity, as conceptually put into opposition to unipolarity and especially the US unipolar moment of the post-Cold War period (Krauthammer 1990). It is thus critical for the prospects of Russia’s (and, to some extent, Chinese) attempts to actively challenge the dominance of the US and its European allies. So, for example, Litvinova notices that it is in the interests and capabilities of both the United States and Russia to use the UN mechanisms in order to achieve their goals (Litvinova 2006). This notion of multipolarity is also frequently referred to by the authors of the leading Russian professional foreign policy-oriented journal *Russia in Global Affairs*. The United Nations is the organization that reflects the power hierarchy of the current world order. In this respect, they put an equal sign between the UN and the Security Council (Lomanov 2008; Lukyanov 2008).

Third, the UN is also seen as an important manifestation of the multilateralism principle and norm. While Russia is often portrayed in (Western) media as acting primarily unilaterally or bilaterally, Russian scholarly literature highlights multilateralism as an important element of Russia’s overall foreign policy approach and global problem-solving efforts. So, for example, Oleandrov (2012) and Dorskaya (2016) go back in history in order to trace the important role that Moscow played in multilateral initiatives, such as nuclear disarmament or security resolutions, and Sadkov, Chubarec, and Aronov (2015) suggest an important leadership role for Russia in common global problem-solving and in the call for UN reform.
This picture identified in the Russian-language scholarly debates is also supported by primary data on Russian foreign policy output in the form of public attention dedicated to the UN by top Russian foreign policy officials and especially by the Russian Federation president(s) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As we have presented earlier in this text, to evaluate the interest of Russia in the UN system over time, we have counted the number of references to the UN system in the news archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To provide a calibrated relative measure of Russia’s interest, we divided the number of references to the UN by an analogous count of references to the United States, China, and the European Union. The results of this estimation of the relative Russian interest in the UN are depicted in Figure 3. The graph shows a fairly stable ratio of the references to the UN up until around 2005, followed by a rise in the prominence of the UN relative to the references to the three powers. This is in line with the increased multilateral orientations of Russia as well as other rising powers in the 2000s and 2010s. Most importantly, we certainly cannot observe any decline in the interest of Russia in the UN. In fact, if anything, a rise in the prominence of UN can be observed in the data, as indicated with the linear model plotted through the graph.15

Figure 3
Interest of Russia in the UN, relative to key states, as recorded in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs media output

A testimony to the Russian interest in institutionalized cooperation and multilateralism lies in that Russia itself has been very active in institution building in the last decade or so. Together with other non-Western powers, it has participated on the creation of a number of regional as well as global initiatives. The most obvious example is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). As compared to other Russian-led and initiated regional institutions, the EEU has a clear-cut structure and goals, with the main goal being to create a space with guaranteed free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers (Gussarova et al. 2017; Ostrovskii 2017). Yet, it seeks to establish an economy-driven organization that will not intervene in the political affairs of its member-states. Perhaps the most prominent non-Russia-centred regional IO that has Russia as an important member is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the global level, as a direct manifestation
of its clear contested multilateralism strategy (Morse – Keohane 2014), Russia has been among the five BRICS members that founded the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Russia is also a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, though there the role of China is significantly stronger than that of any other member (cf. Cooper 2017).16

One could possibly argue that precisely this interest in new multilateral cooperation schemes may have a negative effect on the Russian presence in the UN system, as it could drain prospective applicants for positions in the UN system towards the regional and global institutions Russia participates in. We should note, though, that these bodies are only several years old, while the decline of Russia’s representation in the UN has been visible for the last 20 years. Furthermore, the secretariats of at least the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are so far very small (Serrano Oswald 2018: 4).

Our evidence confirms that Russia is losing interest neither in the UN as such, nor in multilateralism more broadly. When we observe a massive decline of Russian citizens’ share of the professional staff of UN bodies, that decline certainly cannot be ascribed to any lack of interest in the UN system on the part of Russia. Instead, the decline appears to be driven by the staffing rules and norms of the UN system, whereby an increasing space is provided for the representation of the CEEU members. Historically, their levels of representation were extremely low. As we show in the next section, this is changing, and they are slowly gaining representation in the UN staff at the expense of Russia.

**CEEU COUNTRIES’ RISE AND CONTINUING UNDER-REPRESENTATION IN THE BUREAUCRACIES OF THE UN**

During the Cold War, the position of today’s CEEU countries in the UN system was not particularly pronounced, most notably due to the *de facto* subordination of their foreign policies to that of the USSR (e.g. Dejmek 2002). The composition of the regional (and voting) groups of the UN system closely respected this principle. All the Soviet satellites, together with the USSR, formed the Eastern European Group as the main geopolitical adversary of the Western block, which was formally aligned within the Western Europe and Others group, as mentioned earlier in the text.

In the area of the staffing of IOs, the Eastern European countries shared with the Soviet Union a suspicion towards the notion of an independent international civil service. For example, they, in general, insisted on fixed term-contracts for their citizens within the UN system, with a clear end-date and a point of return to the national administrations, as opposed to the principle of lifetime UN-based individual careers (Ziring et al. 2005: 143). In some cases, such as that of Ceausescu’s Romania, the suspicion towards the UN translated to a *de facto* complete withdrawal from the UN staff.17

After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the situation changed radically. Many of the former Soviet satellites reversed the geopolitical course and effectively reoriented themselves towards their former adversaries in the WEOG. This process culminated later on in the CEEU states’ NATO and EU accessions. The former Soviet bloc entered the post-Cold War period and the new millennium split into two blocs of countries with divergent geopolitical orientations. Naturally, their newly acquired autonomy led to the CEEU countries’ autonomous behaviour within the IOs. It also translated into their (belated) struggle for recognition and representation in the IOs’ professional staff. While their representation in the bureaucracies of the UN system may have been side-lined by the CEEU countries’ focus on representation within the institutions of the European Union as their top priority, in recent years they have been increasingly seeing their representation in the UN bodies as highly important. Some CEEU countries are currently devising national strategies for the promotion of their nationals in the IOs’ secretariats. The Czech government, for example, has recently
adopted the Strategy for the Employment of Czech Citizens in International Organizations (vláda ČR [Government of the Czech Republic] 2017). Our interviewees from the CEEU region unanimously declared achieving an improved position for their respective countries in the UN bodies’ administration as an important part of their agenda.\(^{18}\) As summarized by one CEEU country’s ambassador to the United Nations, “we are a member in a given international organization, we make a contribution to the budget, and we take part in the decision-making. We have a legitimate claim for a fair share of our compatriots on the staff of the organization”.\(^{19}\)

This new post-Cold War approach also translates visibly, if not on a massive scale, to the quantitative patterns of CEEU countries’ representation in IOs’ staff. In the following set of charts, we again use the same Personnel Statistics reports of the UN Chief Executive Board for Coordination that we referred to earlier and used in the charts depicting the position of Russia. Figure 4 replicates the graphs from Figure 1, depicting with the full line the representation of Russia across all UN bodies – as a % share of all staff (left) and in absolute numbers (right). However, here we also add, in dashed lines, the analogous information for the sum of staff members who are nationals of the CEEU countries. The left chart shows the rather prominent increase in the representation of the CEEU countries in UN bodies, as it rose from around 1.5% of the total UN staff in the mid-1990s to around 2.5% in the mid-2010s, an increase by around 60%. It also shows that around 2005 the new EU members from the former Soviet bloc managed to surpass Russia in their representation share. The right figure depicts the absolute numbers of staff from CEEU countries, which rose from around 250 to more than 800.

This overall trend of a sizable increase in CEEU representation is visible also across individual IOs. In Figure 5, we show the same information about Russia’s representation in six key IOs that was depicted previously in Figure 2, but again add the corresponding information for the CEEU members. Today, in all the IOs except the UN Secretariat, CEEU countries are significantly more represented than Russia. In the development-
assistance-focused UNICEF and UNDP, this has been the case from the early 1990s, as
the Russian representation in these bodies was negligible. In UNESCO and the WHO
(and also, e.g., in the ILO, see Figure A.1 in the appendix), the CEEU countries started
with a much lower representation than Russia in the 1990s, but they jointly surpassed
Russia in representation after the turn of the millennia. The one IO where CEEU countries
are heavily represented in the professional staff is the Vienna-based IAEA. Today, in the
IAEA CEEU nationals constitute around 8% of the staff. We should note here again that
we only consider the globally hired professional staff in the analysis, and not the locally
recruited general services staff, such as administrative and technical support. Finally,
there is only one IO in which the CEEU countries have just matched Russia in their
representation, and that is the United Nations Secretariat, by far the largest body of all
the IOs in the UN system. Clearly, the region has seen a representational re-shuffle,
whereby the CEEU countries have been able to achieve representation at the expense of
Russia.

Figure 5
Large UN system bodies and Russian and CEEU representation
in their staff over time

The overall regional trends should not obscure the major variation across the CEEU
states, however. In Figure 6 we provide disaggregated data for four individual countries
of the region: Croatia, Czechia, Poland, and Romania. We selected these four to illustrate
the divergence of the representation patterns. Figure A4 in the appendix provides evidence
for all the CEEU countries individually. The left chart in Figure 6 again shows the percent
share of the CEEU countries in the UN staff. It highlights that only a part of the CEEU
group has recorded a relative increase in representation. In the chart, the countries that
achieved such an increase are Romania (dotted line) and Croatia (dot-dashed line). From
those not visualized, a larger rise has been experienced by Bulgaria and, to a smaller extent, also by Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states (see Figure A4 in the appendix). In contrast, Poland (full line) and Czechia (dashed line) in Figure 6, as well as Hungary (not depicted, see Figure A4), have barely improved their positions over the years. In fact, Poland has even lost a representation share.

The right chart in Figure 6 documents that in spite of the slow rise or stagnation of representation understood as a share of all staff, the absolute number of staff members has risen for all the depicted CEEU countries. For some, the rise has been fast and outpaced the overall growth of the secretariats’ sizes. These are the states whose representation share increased as well – in the graph, Romania and Croatia are two such states. For Poland and Czechia, even if the total numbers of their citizens working for the UN increased, that rise merely matched the overall expansion of the secretariats. As seen in the chart, Czechia (dashed line), with its 10 million inhabitants, now has half the staff representation of Croatia (with just over 4 million inhabitants) and one third of the number for Romania (with around 20 million inhabitants).

Interestingly, it seems that the cross-country differences are not associated with the parallel processes of the drafting of suitable candidates into the structures of the EU. In other words, the drain of talent toward Brussels is not the cause of this variation. This could be an immediately plausible explanation for the lack of success of some members in getting their citizens into UN structures. After all, our interview evidence strongly suggests that generating successful candidates for professional positions in the UN system, especially at higher levels, is no small challenge for CEEU countries, as the competition for posts is often extremely intense.20 Hence, a relatively larger share of candidates successfully obtaining positions in EU institutions could weaken the supply of applicants for positions in the UN system, which, in any case, is still scarce.

Nevertheless, our data indicate that this lack of supply of qualified candidates is not the distinguishing feature across the CEEU members.21 To see this, we can compare the relative representation of CEEU countries in the staff of the UN with that of the EU.22 The data for the representation in both institutions are provided in Table 1. The first two
Columns show the absolute numbers of staff from CEEU countries working in the European institutions (2016) and the UN system (2015), respectively. The last three columns offer for each country a per-capita expression for its EU and UN staff, and the country’s global rank based on its per capita representation in the UN system. In this overview, the CEEU countries’ per capita representations in the UN and in the EU are clearly positively connected. For example, Poland has the lowest representation from the CEEU region both in the staff of the EU and in that of the UN bodies in per capita terms. In this respect, it is followed, again both in the EU and in the UN, by Czechia. In fact, in the UN Poland ranks only in the 149th place out of the 190 countries considered, with 3.1 professional UN staff members per million citizens. This is very close to the score of Russia, with 3.8 staff members per million inhabitants. Czechia ranks only slightly better than Poland, as it ranked 129th, with 5.2 professional UN staff members per million citizens. In comparison, smaller CEEU countries, but also Bulgaria, tend to fare relatively better. Yet, even the globally highest-ranking CEEU states, Croatia and Slovenia, only rank 48th and 60th, respectively. For the entire region, including Russia, the median ranking in per capita representation in the UN is as poor as 89.

The reasons for this enormous variation in representation in UN staff across the CEEU countries most likely have to do both with the supply of motivated and talented
applicants for UN jobs and with the technical and political support the prospective applicants receive from their national administrations (Eckhard – Steinebach 2018).24 On the supply side, it is possible to theorize a negative relationship between the level of economic wealth of a country and its citizens’ interest in applying for a position in an international secretariat. The less wealthy the countries, the more likely their qualified citizens are to seek an international job with better career prospects. Of course, there are limits to this logic, as historically by far the most highly represented countries in the world are also those with the highest per capita incomes, as found by previous studies (e.g. Novosad – Werker 2018). In addition, the entry requirements for UN positions are demanding and applicants from countries with better education systems and better functioning institutions in general are likely to enjoy important advantages in the process (Parízek 2017).25

A complementary perspective would see the differences as driven by the overall support the prospective applicants receive in their home countries. This has at least two dimensions. The first is institutional support, especially in terms of training, encouragement, and, of course, political backing, typically within structures of the ministries of foreign affairs.26 The second has to do with ideational support, as the multilateral agenda may be presented in a country with varying levels of respect and prioritization. For example, the UN system may have been raised high in terms of its public profile in the poorer countries of the region as a genuine source of development assistance (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania) or as a mediator in a devastating conflict, such as in the case of the Balkan states (in our dataset, Croatia and Slovenia). We do not have the empirical data to substantiate such arguments systematically, however, and further studies should explore these factors qualitatively.

It should be noted that individual citizens of some countries of the region were also successful in reaching the highest echelons of the UN hierarchy. This was the case with the Bulgarian Irina Bokova, the head of UNESCO in 2009–2017, or the Slovak Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the UN, Miroslav Jenča. These partial successes, however, are clearly obscured by the failure of the region to nominate a suitable candidate for the highest position in the UN system, the SG, as we mentioned in the introduction. Although numerous individuals from the region announced their candidature for this position, including the already mentioned Bokova, the Slovak Miroslav Lajčák, and the Serbian Vuk Jeremić, in the end the bid was won by the former Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres, the current SG.

Today, the region as a whole continues to fare poorly in its representation in the UN staff. So in spite of the continuing (and slow) rise of the CEEU countries identified here, their global standing is rather weak. As noted by a previous study, middle-income countries belong among those that are often under-represented in the UN system staff, and they are surprisingly frequently more under-represented there than low-income and least-developed countries (Parízek 2017; Ziring et al. 2005: 139). It seems the CEEU countries are a good case of this broader pattern.

CONCLUSIONS

Much literature today addresses the effects of the major power shifts in global politics on IOs and the global order in general (Kahler, 2013; Stephen 2014). Often institutions are seen as mechanisms that maintain the privileges of the established powers in the face of the challenge raised by the rising powers, which are frequently associated with the BRICS group. In our text, we study the position of one of the BRICS, Russia, in the administrations of a large number of the most important contemporary IOs. We show that in spite of its self-proclaimed rising power status, Russia has, over the last two decades, tremendously lost its representation in the bureaucracies of global IOs.

The representation lost by Russia has been gained by its former satellites, which are now the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. While historically
these countries followed the lead of the USSR, the breakup of the Soviet bloc enabled them to search for their own genuine representation in global bodies. This has also translated into their improved representation in the bodies’ administrations. Yet, the countries of the CEEU region vary strongly in how successful they proved to be in acquiring higher shares of positions for their nationals. Clearly, while IO rules have helped lift the representation of the CEEU region significantly, some countries fared much better than others. It is a matter for further qualitative research to systematically explore the differences across the CEEU states. Based on such research, some policy advice for governments could be proposed, which would aim at increasing their ability to secure for their citizens a higher share of seats in the UN bodies’ and general IOs’ secretariats.

In conclusion, we would like to highlight the substantive relevance of the study of international administrations – a field that has until very recently been largely neglected in mainstream international relations (Ege – Bauer 2013). International administrators are often powerful actors, although their power and legitimacy do not stem from material resources but rather from their expertise and impartiality (Barnett – Finnemore 2004). In the long term, this notion of impartiality is hardly reconciled with situations of highly uneven representation of states in the IOs’ staff. IOs with such uneven patterns of staffing, especially when they are visible, are likely to face serious legitimacy problems (Parízek – Stephen 2019b; cf. Christensen – Yesilkagit 2018). This paper sought to advance our understanding of the outcomes of possible clashes between states’ powers and their interest in having a fair representation share.

1 In the empirical analysis, we only consider Russia on one hand and the eleven new EU member states from the EEG, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania, on the other.

2 The remaining members of the EEG are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, Moldova, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, of course, Ukraine. We intentionally leave these countries out of our analysis in order to identify as clear a divide between Russia and the CEEU group as possible.

3 We interviewed 6 high-ranking diplomats in total, typically the permanent representatives of countries to the UN or their deputies, from the countries under consideration in this paper. Yet, in the development of our argumentation we also rely on more than 30 interviews with top UN-affiliated diplomats from other regions of the world.

4 As it turns out, even IOs that do not have a formal quota system develop very similar patterns of actual (empirical) staffing as those with exact rules (Parízek 2017). Part of the reason clearly lies in that only a small portion of professional positions are typically subject to these geographical representation criteria. In the UN Secretariat, for instance, only around 25–30% of professional positions are subject to this formal requirement (see e.g. A/71/360, Table 2a, with the number of positions under the geographical formula rules). But a broader explanation is that the patterns of staffing tend to reflect the patterns of the distribution of power in the international system.

5 Momani (2007) presents an interesting discussion of how Russia obtained one of the sole seats on the Board of Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund in the early 1990s. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this study.

6 We elaborate on the logic of our sampling further in the text.

7 Interview with a CEEU country deputy permanent representative to the UN, 3. 11. 2017. Similarly, another representative (Interview 6. 11. 2017) highlighted the advantage of staff members being from the same region in terms of getting insider information about processes in the IOs, as compared to staff members being from different regions, especially regions that are very distant from each other culturally and geographically.

8 The analysed documents were those from ACC/1998/PER/R.9 up to CEB/2016/HLCM/HR/20. The documents are available at http://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system-human-resources-statistics-reports.

9 For the delimitation of the UN System, see http://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system (last access 10. 12. 2018).

10 As highlighted by one anonymous reviewer, it would be very interesting to also see the patterns of change in staffing during the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath. However, in spite of our best efforts, we were unable to identify data sources that would provide for a comparable mapping of the staffing of UN bodies prior to 1996.
In addition to the globally recruited professional staff, IOs also employ a large number of locally recruited general services staff (e.g. administrative support) as well as national professional staff, who are only allowed to work in the given country, not internationally, and are often hired for specific projects.

The starting date was chosen as the earliest point with robust data availability in the archive.

They also highlight that some of the obvious candidates for a rapid rise in representation in IO staff have, in fact, not been very successful – the most notable case being China, which hardly increased its (low) share over the twenty-year time-span at all. More broadly, they highlight the declining relevance of economic power (and budgetary contributions) as determinants of IO staffing patterns in the post-Cold War period (Parízek – Stephen 2019b). We do not seek to interpret the linear model as indicating a trend in a statistical sense, due to the low number of observations and high data variability, and also due to the step-function pattern visible in the data.

An important reason for Russia’s activity in these alternative institutional fora has been the dominant positions of the United States and other OECD countries in many of the key global IOs, including the Bretton-Woods institutions (for an overview of several key global economic IOs, see Parízek – Stephen 2019a). We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this.


The Pearson correlation coefficient r with all the CEEU countries included reaches around 0.35, but once we exclude Croatia, which only accessed the EU relatively recently, it jumps to 0.68. We should note, however, that with such an extremely small number of observations the correlation coefficient barely provides more than a simple descriptive account.

The supply of qualified candidates appears to be an important factor globally, however (Eckhard – Steinbach 2018).


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Documents


Note

We gratefully acknowledge the funding by the Czech Science Foundation project Global Bureaucracy: The Politics of International Organizations Staffing (no. 17-10543S).
Appendix

List of UN system bodies covered

Table A1

*Overview of UN bodies with their total professional staff and professional staff from CEEU*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IGO body</th>
<th>Total professional staff 2015</th>
<th>CEEU professional staff 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>11,495</td>
<td>309</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>3580</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2494</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>37</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
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</table>
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The representation of Russia and CEEU states across UN bodies

Figure A1
Representation (% share) of Russia (full line) and CEEU countries (dashed line)²
Figure A2

Representation (% share) of Russia (full line) and CEEU countries (dashed line)
(continued)
Figure A3

Representation (% share) of Russia (full line) and CEEU countries (dashed line) (continued)
Aggregate representation of individual CEEU states

Figure A4

Representation (% share) of individual CEEU countries in all IOs’ staff combined

1 The list does not include ICAT, with data for 1996–2006 only.
2 Figures A1–A3 do not include PAHO, UNICCC, UNSSC, and UNU, for which no data for display are available.