Indirect Interventions in Civil Wars: The Use of States as Proxies in Military Interventions

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Abstract: Current research on motivational sources of military interventions in civil wars frequently assumes that states intervene due to direct interests in the civil war country. However, this study argues that there exists a subset of interventions in which weaker powers intervene on behalf of interests which great powers hold vis-à-vis the civil war country. Using the logic of principal-agent theory in combination with arms trade data allows one to identify 14 civil wars which experienced the phenomenon of indirect military interventions. This type of intervention features a weaker power providing troops for combat missions, whereas its major arms supplier is only involved with indirect military support. The analysis is complemented with two brief case studies on the Moroccan intervention in Zaire (1977) and the Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic (2009). Both case studies corroborate expectations as deduced from the proxy intervention framework.

Key words: Proxy interventions; arms trade; civil wars; military intervention; principal-agent theory; great powers.

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Military interventions constitute an essential instrument for states to project power in the international system and alter unfolding dynamics in civil wars for the benefit of the intervener. The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 to support a communist leadership (Hilali 2003), whereas the United States militarily supported opposing factions in the conflict to deny the Soviets a foothold (Hartman 2002). France, the United Kingdom, and the United States intervened in unison in the recent Libyan Civil War in 2011 (Adler-Nissen – Pouliot 2014), and Russia and Iran became active in the current civil war in Syria (Wastnidge 2017). Data from the Uppsala Conflict Dataset (Pettersson – Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002) demonstrates that military interventions have consistently occurred throughout the period from 1975 until 2009 and by no means constitute a new phenomenon. The general understanding of these interventions assumes that the intervener has a direct interest in the outcome of the civil war and acts based on its agency. However, the international system is defined by a web of relationships among different countries. Legalists pronounce the equality of states, whereas political science scholars are nuanced about the actual limits of sovereignty (Krasner 1999; Keohane 2005). History illustrates that in
several instances, a state intervened in a conflict but was dependent on the consent of a great power in doing so. Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s participation in the civil war in Yemen was supported by US military supplies. The US, in turn, perceives this intervention as an instrument to push back against the Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula.1

Focussing on the research area of interventions in civil wars, and explicitly on the sub-domain of military interventions, this article challenges the generally accepted view that states intervene to foster their interests vis-à-vis the country experiencing civil war. Kreps (2008: 580) states that “it is difficult to imagine a case in which a state would commit resources, whether financial or personnel, to a conflict if it has no strategic interest in the intervention. It is also difficult to substantiate based on the historical record. Even parties that appear to have been disinterested had some motivation for participation, whether in side payments, debt relief, international prestige, or coercion.” This raises the question of the determinants of state interests in military interventions. Research in this area has mainly concentrated on goals that are imminent to the civil war country. Findley and Teo (2006) explicitly criticised a recent scholarly discourse for its focus on “phenomenon-centric” explanations of civil war interventions. From this perspective, “[...] theoretical and substantive interest lies, by construction, in ‘what happens to’ the conflict” (ibid.: 828). Therefore, they opted to focus on “actor-centric” explanations and focussed on interventionism as reaction to prior interventions of allies or rivals. Even humanitarian interventions are guided by the interest of the intervener in stopping atrocities occurring during civil wars and are therefore directly linked to the outcome of the civil war (Aydin 2010; Gilligan – Stedman 2003). Furthermore, the “phenomenon-centric” approach has come under strain with the emergence of literature on coalitional warfare (Baltrusaitis 2010; Kreps 2011). Most countries participating in the War in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards had less interest in the civil war itself than in improving relationships with the United States and strengthening alliances. Since several studies use dyadic relationships between the intervener and the target country,2 the causal effect of advancing interests vis-à-vis the coalitional leader is not accounted for in many quantitative studies.

This study goes a step further and attempts to address the research question of whether military interventions occur based on the intervening country’s relationship with an external country which does not directly intervene in a civil war. By direct military intervention, I explicitly refer to on-the-ground military combat which jeopardises the lives of soldiers in contrast to just supporting a conflict actor with logistics, arms, or intelligence. Is a state willing to bear the costs of a direct military intervention, including the risk of casualties, chiefly because of the relationship it enjoys with another power? To answer this question, I propose that we understand a subset of interventions under the concept of indirect intervention, which is related to the current notion of proxy interventions. Indirect interventions are such that involve a state intervening with combat troops, but the primary beneficiary of the intervention only participates indirectly with military instruments like logistics, training, intelligence, or arms supply. The concept resembles the notion of coalitional interventions in that it postulates that the interests of the intervener are also shaped vis-à-vis the beneficiary (coalition leader) and not purely by the outcome of the civil war. However, the concept precludes the direct involvement of the beneficiary and postulates that the intervener performs as a proxy for the beneficiary. The purpose of this study is to investigate if the concept of indirect interventions by states can be identified as a separate class of interventions which has been overlooked by current scholarship in the domain of military interventions in civil wars.

To engage with the research question, the following steps have been implemented. In the subsequent section, I first refer to the conceptual understanding of motivational aspects of interventions in current literature and argue why those are insufficient to explain the variety of observed interventions. Here, I take recourse to earlier studies from
the 1980s, when a debate ignited over how to comprehend Cuba’s military interventionism during the Cold War. The second section provides a deeper exploration of the connection between the intervening country and its potential beneficiary. It argues that the relationship between the beneficiary and the direct intervener should be understood in the framework of principal-agent theory and that arms trade can be harnessed to indicate principal-agent relationships between two states. In the third section, the methodological approach is specified and explicated. Subsequently, in the fourth section data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and data on arms trade from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are used to identify indirect interventions as a subset of interventions within the universe of all military interventions. The following section then engages in two descriptive cases studies to evaluate whether the identified cases meet the expectations of the assumed relationship. The Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic and the Moroccan intervention in Zaire were chosen as the case studies. Lastly, the sixth section concludes the article with implications for further research.

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS

Interventions in civil wars have enjoyed the interest of scholars for more than two decades. The debate centred around several central themes. One literature strand addresses the motivations of states to intervene with various military, economic and diplomatic instruments in an ongoing civil war (Lektzian – Regan 2016; Regan – Aydin 2006). From this perspective, the focus lies on the intervening country and its relationship towards the target country. A further academic strand explores the effects of interventionism (Shirkey 2012, 2016). Typical questions in this area relate to the duration (Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008) and severity of the civil war (Sousa 2014; Wood et al. 2012) once third states are caught in the dynamics of civil wars. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are a specific type of military interventionism which has received separate attention as those instances deviate from the logic of unilateral interventionism and are designed by international bodies like regional organisation or the United Nations with clearly defined mandates and troop contribution composition (Karlsrud – Osland 2016; Velázquez 2010). While unilateral and multilateral interventions engender the question of why particular countries intervene in a civil war, in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding literature this question is reframed by focussing on the motivations for troop contribution to international missions.

In this study, I focus on the use of proxies in civil wars, which can be constituted by state or non-state actors (see figure 1). Current research on this topic has concentrated on

Figure 1

The choice of a third state to use state or non-state actors as proxies in civil wars

![Diagram showing the choice of a third state to use state or non-state actors as proxies in civil wars](image-url)
the use of non-state actors. Brown (2016) understands the rise of non-state actors in proxy
interventions as a reflection of structural changes in the international system. In the
current polyarchic system, a host of non-state actors with military capabilities provide an
extensive reservoir for states to shun active combat. Krieg (2016) identifies in Obama’s
“leading from behind” doctrine elements that pronounce the use of non-state and state
actors to defer costs and risks in the Middle East. Salehyan (2010) and Salehyan et al.
(2011) provide a supply and demand model which addresses the question under which
circumstances states are willing to use non-state actors as proxies and when non-state
actors accept outside help. They find, for instance, that rebels groups forgo foreign
assistance when they are at an advantage vis-à-vis their opposing government to avoid
sacrificing autonomy. Further research investigates the conditions under which rebel
groups defect from the patrons (Popovic 2017), the selection process among multiple
rebel groups (Sozer 2016), the disentanglement from rebel proxies (Brewer 2011) and
the question of the legitimacy of proxies in the civil war (Szentkirályi – Burch 2018).

However, an underdeveloped research strand in Conflict Studies and International
Relations concerns the use of states for the benefit of another state. The most pronounced
argument in this field comes from Mearsheimer and Walt (2016), who advocate the use of
“offshore balancing” to maintain US hegemony in the world. According to this approach,
the United States should abstain from intervening in the affairs of countries in essential
gostrategic regions, but instead, the United States should support countries that would
guarantee balance-of-power within a region. For instance, Bar-Siman-Tov (1998: 244)
identified a “proxy-relationship” between the United States and Israel during the Nixon
administration. He further cites Kissinger, who maintained that a strong Israel is necessary
for intervening in regional affairs which the United States itself shuns. Krieg (2016: 99)
writes that “[...] if vital US national interests are not directly concerned, the mobilization
of partners and allies allows for the sharing of the strategic and operational burden of
war,” thereby hinting at the potential use of states as instruments to advance US interests.3

The concept of the use of states as proxies in the specific context of civil wars has been
neglected in the past decades with the exception of Dunér (1981) and Dunér (1987). Dunér
investigated the question whether the Cuban interventions in Zaire, Angola, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Bolivia, El Salvador and Nicaragua constituted truly independent choices or had
to be understood as proxy interventions on behalf of the interests of the Soviet Union. He
coined the term “dependent interventionism,” which signifies a particular relationship
between Cuba and the USSR. In general, both countries shared a similar ideological
viewpoint based on socialism. According to Dunér (1987), Cuba itself had intrinsic inte-
rests in spreading the ideals of its revolution through the developing world in its pursuit
of “anti-imperialism” and its memory of being a victim of imperialism. This type of
revolutionary revisionist behaviour was enabled through military supplies from the Soviet
Union. However, as Dunér observed, the support to Cuba was not unconditional or
unconstrained. The decision-making process in Havana was autonomous, but in several
cases, the interventions might have been thwarted when the Soviet Union perceived an
intervention as unnecessarily antagonising the United States. A more recent empirically
investigated example of proxy intervention is the case of Somalia (Epstein 2017; Menk-
haus 2009). Backed by the United States and the US-sponsored UN Security Council
Resolution 1735, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in December 2006 against the Islamist
Court Union (ICU).

To advance the concept of proxy interventions in the case of state actors, I contend that
the debate on military interventions in civil war has so far been insufficient because much
of the literature is concerned with interests of the intervener in the civil war country4 but,
in contrast, it should include the interests of other existing states in the international system.
For this study, I focus on the triangular relationship between the intervening country, the
civil war country, and the beneficiary country which endorses the intervention and
participates, however, only indirectly in it. In contrast to the debate on proxy-relationships, I coin here the term indirect intervention, which denotes an unequal burden-sharing structure in a military intervention in a civil war and can be understood as a special case of proxy intervention. Accordingly, an indirect intervention refers to the phenomenon of a state (here a great power) being interested in the outcome of a civil war but delegating the use of military combat troops on the ground to another state. The beneficiary itself only provides military supplies and lets the other state implement the hazardous and cost-intensive deployment of troops in the civil war. The indirect military involvement of the beneficiary of the intervention signifies its interest vis-à-vis the civil war country.

Figure 2 indicates the locations of indirect interventions in the current debate about interventions in civil wars. In coalitional interventions, the great power intervenes with combat troops and invites smaller powers to participate for varying reasons. Unilateral interventions by states refer to interests of states vis-à-vis the target country but exclude the participation of the beneficiary. Indirect interventions include those instances in which the beneficiary delegates the specific use of ground troops but remains involved through indirect military instruments like the provision of arms, finance, intelligence or logistics.

MEASURING INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS: ARMS TRADE AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY

The greatest challenge in identifying an indirect intervention is in discerning the relationship between the intervening country and the beneficiary of the intervention. Several conceptual difficulties have to be addressed. First, if the intervention occurs, then it might not be clear whether the intervention was conducted because the intervener followed the interests of the beneficiary or because the intervener genuinely followed its own interest which happened to overlap with the interests of the beneficiary. Dünér (1981: 358) makes the crucial distinction between a proxy and an autonomous actor. The former is induced or threatened to implement military missions, whereas the latter coincides with the interests of the patron and is, therefore, able to cooperate in the intervention. Second, the intervention itself can be against the interests of the troop-contributing country. In this case, the beneficiary needs an instrument which would raise the cost of non-intervention so that they would be higher than the costs of the intervention. Salehyan et al. (2011: 735) highlight the desire of rebel groups to maintain as much autonomy as possible about their objectives. Similarly, states as nominally sovereign actors in the international system resist giving up their agency to another state.
I offer in this study the following tentative solution to allow for the measurement of a specific type of what can be understood as an indirect intervention with recourse to principal-agent theory. Following the logic employed by Salehyan (2010) in his work on rebel patronage, and that employed by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) in their work based on principal-agent theory in an institutional setting, four concepts are relevant for understanding the relationship between principal and agent. Those are adverse selection, agency slack, police patrol, and fire alarm. The first refers to the appropriate choice of an agent which is designated to best carry out its delegated responsibilities. The second concept refers to the possibility that the agent could follow its own interests instead of those of the principal and thereby contradict with its actions the goals of the principal. Police patrol is a technique of constant monitoring of the agent by the principal, and fire alarm constitutes an external mechanism that raises awareness of agency slack to the principal. Whereas adverse selection becomes a crucial ex-ante, police patrol and fire alarm are designed to provide ex-post information about the agent.

To meet the conditions laid out by the principal-agent framework and to address the questions of agency slack and adverse selection, I argue that currently the best measurement of such a relationship is based on arms trade. According to Derouen and Heo (2004), Kinsella (1998) and Sislin (1994) arms are typically sold to countries which have similar foreign policy preferences. This type of trade also creates dependencies from which the recipient cannot briskly turn away. Maintenance requires essential spare parts that are produced in the arms supplying country. The operation of technologically advanced weapons and vehicles presupposes specialised training that is typically provided by the arms supplier. Furthermore, the transfer of arms can constitute an enabling factor for the intervening state. Lastly, the recipient state must anticipate that actions in violation of the interests of the supplier might lead to sanctions. This “locked-in” character of arms trade relationships is hard to overcome and often comes only with high associated costs. Hence, arms supplies exert a long-lasting effect between the provider and the recipient. For the recipient, engaging in foreign policies that contradict the interests of the supplier can be costly. Hence, using arms trade in combination with the principal-agent framework allows for the identification of a pool of potential agents for the principal, which minimises the risk of adverse selection.

A telling case of the sanctioning mechanism and the role of dependency can be observed on the example of Iran under the Shah and Iran after the 1979 revolution. The successful Islamic uprising has changed the relationship between the United States and Iran fundamentally. Under the Shah, the country was one of the major allies of Western powers in the Middle East. During the insurgency in Oman in 1975, Iran participated in the counterinsurgency alongside the United States and the United Kingdom (DeVore 2012). However, with Ayatollah Khomeini as Iran’s new leader, opposing foreign policy visions, and the ensuing hostage crisis, Iran became a rival of the Western powers. This translated into active military supplies for Iraq in its endeavour to annex territory from Iran in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 until 1988. US and UK military supplies to Iran measured in several billions of dollars in the period from 1970 until 1978 and abruptly declined to zero after the successful Islamic revolution. The dependence of Iran on the purchased equipment was telling, as after prolonged fighting its maintenance of the technologically advanced weaponry became problematic (Karsh 2008: 42).

Conceptually, only great powers will be regarded as beneficiaries in this analysis due to their ability to project power worldwide, their interest in extra-regional developments, and their ability to block UN resolutions condemning their interventions, and also because they possess a sizeable defence industry. All these conditions are crucial to identifying meaningful relationships between the intervening country and the beneficiary. First, the beneficiary must have the physical opportunity to intervene. Second, great powers compete on a global scale and are therefore interested in the outcomes of distant civil wars for
political, economic and security reasons. Third, all the great powers used here are at the same time members of the UN Security Council. Occupying this position allows great powers to block UN Security Council resolutions which would contradict their interests in indirect interventions. The intervening country itself is generally a small or middle power which is dependent on arms supplies from great powers. Figure 3 schematically depicts the relationship between the great power, the smaller power, and the civil war country.

**Figure 3**
*Indirect intervention scheme*

Great Power country C  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal-agent relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Intervention without combat troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Small Power country A  
| Military Intervention with combat troops |

Civil War in country B

**METHODOLOGY**

In accordance with the conceptual discussion of the principal-agent framework and the use of arms trade in the identification process of potential agents for great powers, the following steps were conducted to assess the validity of the concept vis-à-vis empirical data. To identify all cases that fall into the concept of *indirect interventions*, the UCDP dataset of recorded instances of civil wars from 1946 until 2017 was harnessed (Pettersson – Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). According to their definition, civil wars are instances of violence in which the government of a state is set against a non-state actor who fights either for secessionism or to overthrow the government. In order for such a conflict to be counted as a civil war, at least 25 battle deaths have to be recorded annually. The civil war dataset was merged with the External Support Data, which is also provided by the UCDP (Högbladh et al. 2011). It includes, in a dyadic format, military interventions from 1975 until 2009 and provides details of the exact form of implementation of the military intervention. These consist of troop deployment, provision of military intelligence, and access to territory, weapons or other types of supplies, including logistics, training of troops, financial support and other relevant supplies that do not fit the prior categories. The resulting dataset consists of all the combinations of civil war states (state b) and intervening states (state a and state c). The information on the types of military instruments allows for the grouping of interventions by whether ground troops were deployed in them or not.

In the second step, arms trade data from SIPRI was retrieved. In the present study arms trade data on volume is used to ascertain which state was the major arms supplier of an intervening country. For each state in a particular year the cumulative sum (or rolling sum) of the past 20 years of bilateral arms trade was calculated. For instance, for a country like Indonesia in 1987, cumulative bilateral arms trade volumes from 1968–1987 were determined. In such calculations the country which shows the comparatively highest arms trade volume is regarded as a major arms supplier. The rule of regarding the past 20 years of arms supply is grounded on two observations. First, countries rarely have only one state as their major arms supplier but can benefit from different providers. This is especially the case for countries which were supported by a group of Western states,
namely France, the United States and the United Kingdom. Second, some arms sales are crucially important and signify a deeper, long-term relationship between two countries. For example, purchases of jets and tanks, as well as other technologically sophisticated armaments, establish long-lasting relationships due to maintenance requirements, training, and the supply of spare parts. For the definition of a great power, post-Second World War data provided by the Correlates of War project is utilised (Correlates of War 2017). In the present paper, Japan and (West) Germany are not deemed to be great powers because both followed policies of non-use of military personnel abroad and both were militarily subordinated in their alliance with the United States. Consequently, only five states are regarded as great powers here, namely the United States, the Soviet Union (later Russia), China, the United Kingdom, and France. The formula for calculating the arms trade between the direct intervener (a) and the indirect intervener (c) is the following. In the appendix, an excerpt of the data is used to illustrate the identification process of indirect interventions and provides two brief analyses.

Cumulative Arms Supply\_a,c,t = \sum_{i=0}^{19} Arms Supply\_a,c,t-i

In the third step, an analysis of two cases was conducted to validate whether the expectations concerning the triangular interest relationship can be identified in actual military interventions. Since this study proposes a new concept which has not yet been tested before, the approach here follows most closely the notion of “theory-confirming” (Lijphart 1971: 692). Following the advice of George and Bennett (2005) to explicate the scope and parameters of the analysis, the following remarks have to be made. The class of events to be investigated is the set of all identified indirect interventions which were uncovered through the data procedure as mentioned above. The dependent variable, intervention in a civil war, remains constant, and the focus lies on the causal process behind the decision-making process of the (directly and indirectly) intervening country. The guiding questions based on the indirect intervention concept, which is a subset of proxy interventions, refer to the relationship between the intervening state and the beneficiary. They are as follows.

First, does an interest congruence between the intervener and the beneficiary with regard to the outcome in the civil war exist? Second, how does the relationship between the beneficiary and the intervener manifest itself? Third, why does the beneficiary not intervene with troops on the ground? The answer to the first question should also answer the question whether both states had the same interests vis-à-vis the potential civil war outcome. According to the indirect intervention concept, the beneficiary should have a more intense interest in the outcome than the intervener. Hence, the direct intervener constitutes a proxy. The second question probes the interests of the intervener towards the beneficiary. Here, we should expect the driving force of interventionism. The interest itself can be of wide range, as Kreps (2008) identified for the particular case of coalitional interventions. Question 3 identifies why the beneficiary did not intervene in the civil war with combat troops. According to the indirect intervention concept, one should observe constraints that only allow for indirect military support.

To render the inference from the case studies more robust, I identify two such cases for testing the principal-agent concept which increase their variance regarding the historical conditions (i.e. background variables) within which the cases are embedded (Seawright – Gerring 2008). This allows one to identify whether the concept of indirect interventions is not driven by exogenous factors, for instance the polarity of a system or guiding international norms of military interventions. Hence, one case should be part of the Cold War struggle and the other should refer to the post-Cold War period as in each period different norms regarding military interventionism existed (Finnemore 2003). The overarching norm of non-intervention in domestic affairs was frequently trumped by security interests in
the East-West competition. In contrast, the 1990s and 2000s experienced a more pronounced emphasis on human security and the rising norm of “responsibility to protect.” The methodology allows investigation of whether the phenomenon as such exists and can be identified. Only after the validation that the subset of indirect interventions exists as such and can be identified in the proposed procedure in step 1 should large-N analyses be carried out, which can be the focus of future research (Levy 2008).

EMPIRICAL DATA: INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS

According to table 1, there were 16 civil wars in the examined period which meet the criteria defined by the indirect intervention concept. These civil wars involved 22 countries intervening with combat troops, which at the same time were assisted by their respective major arms supplying great power(s). Of those 22 countries’ interventions, the interventions in Afghanistan by Poland and Rumania as well as the Polish interventions in the framework of the War on Terror are artifacts of the coding rules. To put the findings into

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civil War (state b)</th>
<th>Troop Provider (state a)</th>
<th>Indirect Intervention (state c)</th>
<th>Cumulative Arms Supply*</th>
</tr>
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<td>China: 303</td>
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</table>

Table 1
Indirect interventions with state a supplying troops and state c providing military support without troop commitment.
The period under consideration ranges from 1975 to 2009
### Table 1 – continuation

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Civil War (state b)</th>
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<th>Indirect Intervention (state c)</th>
<th>Cumulative Arms Supply*</th>
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### Table 1 – continuation

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perspective, in the period from 1975 to 2009, there have been 639 annual unilateral combat interventions in civil wars recorded. However, for a valid comparison, the dataset has to be reduced because it includes interventions by both superpowers – the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union – which by definition cannot be agents of indirect interventions, as well as the coalition interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global US War on Terror. These missions follow a different participation logic of smaller states than interventions in which the great power is not participating in the conflict with its own combat troops. Hence, the sample of all the combat missions without the participation of the superpowers and without the coalition missions mentioned above records 161 annual unilateral combat missions. In comparison, the sample of indirect interventions from table 2 records 57 annual instances of indirect interventions (excluding Poland and Rumania). Hence, 35 percent of all the observed annual interventions, in which small powers intervened without participation in coalition interventions (France and the United Kingdom are conceptually allowed to be treated as agents of the United States), constitute cases of indirect interventions.

Findley and Teo (2006) argued that military interventions in civil wars could increase the probability that a rival state will intervene in the same conflict but on the opposing side. Of the 14 civil wars (excluding the Polish and Rumanian cases), four instances of indirect interventions were met by a rival power. According to the UCDP External Support Dataset, when the Soviet Union conducted an indirect intervention together with Cuba in Ethiopia, the United States supported the opposing Ethiopian Democratic Union indirectly with financial supplies. In the case of Angola, two opposing indirect interventions occurred. Whereas the Soviet Union supported the Angolan government together with Cuba, France provided training to South Africa, which directly intervened in the Angolan conflict. A counter-intuitive picture emerges in the case of Mozambique as in this case rivals on the international stage supported the same conflict actor in a civil war. Here, the Soviet Union and Cuba together with the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe supported the government in Mozambique against the RENAMO rebel group. Lastly, in the case of Israel in the year 1982, the Soviet Union and the Syrian government supported Palestinian groups against the Israeli government. In turn, the United States provided extensive support in terms of weapons, funding, and logistics for Israel. Hence, in only three cases could a genuine counter-intervention be observed.

**CASE STUDIES**

**Zaire and Shaba**

This paragraph provides a summary of the Shaba conflict in Zaire. During the turbulent years of the Congo Crisis following the independence of the Belgian Congo in
1960, the resource-rich region of Katanga attempted to secede from the centralised rule in Kinshasa with the help of Belgian troops (van Reybrouck 2016: 334). However, by 1963 the first secessionist rebellion was suppressed by the Western- and UN-supported government of Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu. The rebels fled from the Congo in the second half of the 1960s and regrouped in Angola. The sentiment among the refugees for greater autonomy and independence did not fade away. Organised as the FLNC (Front de libération nationale congolaise), former Congolese refugees infiltrated Katanga from Angola in 1977 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1979). The ensuing First Shaba War drew attention from Western states, in particular, the United States and France. Ultimately, the war was concluded by the deployment of Moroccan troops who were transported by French military aviation (van Reybrouck 2016).

Referring to question 1, on the interests of the beneficiary and the intervening country in the civil war, the following can be stated. After the independence of the Belgian Congo, the US had a crucial interest in upholding the territorial integrity of the Congo as well as keeping it firmly within the Western anti-communist camp. The province of Katanga was already a region of interest for the United States during the Second World War, when local uranium deposits became the source for the first nuclear bombs devised in the Manhattan Project (Williams 2016). During the Cold War, the Congo became a crucial supplier of cobalt, an element vital for the production of military armaments. When the First Shaba War began, Mobutu asked Western powers for military support (Schatzberg 1989). According to Lamer (2013: 98), the French president Giscard D’Estaing perceived the Shaba insurgency as a communist movement which had to be halted. From the French perspective, Zaire constituted its most crucial ally in Sub-Saharan Africa under Giscard D’Estaing (Stuart 1988: 106).

According to Schatzberg (1989), it is difficult to understand the apparent Moroccan interests in Zaire. One could argue that it is because of Morocco’s historical ties to the Congo as Morocco participated in its first UN mission there in 1965. However, as he points out, the clearest interpretation is based on the relationship Morocco had with the United States and France. He states: “Since Zaire had voted against Polisario, Hassan might well have seen this as a chance not only to repay a diplomatic debt, but also to collect ‘chits’ from both the French and the Americans which could later be redeemed in forms of aid in the Sahara” (ibid. 332). A similar view is provided by Young (1978: 170), who states that “Morocco ventured its units partly in the hope of gaining greater Western support in its own annexation of the Western Sahara, as well as in opposition to Soviet policy.” Similarly, Solraz (1979: 293) recognises that “[Morocco] sent troops to Zaire’s Shaba province to protect Western interests” in his deliberations on whether the United States should sell offensive weapons to Morocco. This indicates that the motivation behind the provision of ground troops in the conflict was less based on the outcome of the civil war than on Morocco’s relationship with its two largest arms suppliers.

Investigating question 2, namely, the connection between the intervener and the beneficiary, leads to the following conclusion. In the 1970s the relationship between the troop provider Morocco and the beneficiary the United States was determined by the long-standing alliance between Morocco and the United States as well as the US stance towards Moroccan activities taken in Western Sahara and Morocco’s relationship with France. Solarz (1979: 278) called Morocco an “an old friend of the United States [...]” who put the US in a dilemma with its activities in Western Sahara. Morocco under King Hassan II was keen to become the succeeding administrator of Western Sahara after Spain released its colony. To buttress his ambitions, the king organised the “Green March” in 1975, in which 350,000 Moroccans marched into the territory of Western Sahara. According to Mundy (2006), it was in the interest of the US to support Morocco in the Western Saharan crisis as it proved to be a steadfast ally against Arab nationalism and socialism in the past. Both France and the US protected Morocco from adverse UN
resolutions within the Security Council. Furthermore, the United States engaged in
diplomatic talks with Spain with an outcome favouring Morocco in the Western Saharan
crisis. As for French-Moroccan relations, France was a member of a joint alliance of
intelligence services called the “Safari Club” together with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Morocco (Bronson 2008). It was instituted on the basis of a French initiative and followed
the US doctrine of containing the spread of communist governments in Africa at a time
when the Carter administration took a more passive stance to US interventionism.

Question 3 evaluates the reasons why the United States did not intervene militarily
with combat troops. Various US administrations felt too constrained to intervene directly
with troops in the domestic affairs of the newly-independent countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa out of a fear of being perceived as a neo-colonial, imperialist power and thereby
jeopardising their crucial relations with states that had been former colonies and who
formed a sizeable bloc within the United Nations. Therefore, the United States relied on
other powers like France and Belgium in the case of the Simba rebellion in 1964 to push
back against what was perceived as a communist-inspired uprising (Gleijeses 2010).
Furthermore, according to Stuart (1988: 106) the United States was not inclined to inter-
vene with ground troops in Africa under the Carter administration after its experiences
with Vietnam. It instead favoured the concept of “African solutions to African problems”
and resisted French attempts to draw its ground troops into Zaire. As mentioned in
Cooker (1988: 106), the US ambassador to the United Nations Young said that
“after Vietnam, there is almost no way you could get the United States militarily involved in
Africa.”

Uganda and the LRA

Historically, the origins of the Lord’s Resistance Army date back to the civil war in
Uganda in the 1980s (Branch et al. 2010). Soldiers from the Acholi tribe were on the
losing side when Museveni’s National Resistance Army claimed victory and overthrew
Tito Okello from the presidency. Following suppressive moves by Museveni’s government
against the tribes in the North of Uganda, his support of the Karamojong, a group hated
by the Acholi due to their frequent cattle-raids, and the Acholi’s distrust of his motives
created fertile ground for the galvanisation of armed resistance groups. The regrouping
occurred mainly in Sudan, where members of the wider group of Acholi people were
living as well. In 1988, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) emerged, based on spiritual
beliefs anchored in traditional values and Christianity (Doom – Vlassenroot 1999).
Joseph Kony, apparently a cousin of Alice Auma, the leader of the HSM, began his own
rebel group in 1987, which he initially called the Holy Spirit Movement II but later
changed its name to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Filling his movement with
rebels from the defeated Acholi insurgency groups, the HSM, and the Uganda People’s
Democratic Army (UPDA), he organised the Lord’s Resistance Army around himself as
a prophetic leader.

Losing its backing from the Acholi people, and the increased counter-insurgency by
Museveni’s government in Kampala at the beginning of the 1990s pushed the LRA to the
brink of extinction but it was saved through military supplies from Sudan (van Acker
2004: 336). The peace negotiations between the LRA and representatives of the Ugandan
army broke down in 1994, when for unclear reasons Museveni halted the talks and issued
an ultimatum of surrender which was refused by the LRA and led to the resumption of
the civil war (ibid.: 337). Retreating from Uganda, the LRA found sanctuary in Sudan,
which provided it with training facilities and supplies (Schomerus 2007: 24–25). As
compensation, Kony turned against the SPLM rebellion. Faced with this new situation,
the LRA became exceptionally violent, including against its own people (i.e. the Acholi).
With its abductions of young men and women and use of brutal methods against the
civilian population, the international community paid closer attention to the conflict to
the extent that even the International Criminal Court issued warrants against the LRA leaders by 2003 (Branch et al. 2010). From 2008, the region of operation of the LRA stretched from Southern Sudan and the DRC to the Central African Republic, with raids and attacks on villages in all three countries. After the failed Operation Lightning Thunder, in February 2009 Kony fled to the CAR, which was embroiled in its civil war against the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Oxford Analytica 2010).

After investigating the relationship between the intervener and the beneficiary, the following can be said (question 2). The operations of the UPDA against the LRA outside Uganda must be considered from the perspective of the relationship between Uganda and its major arms supplier, the United States. For the US, Uganda constituted the hub from which politics in East Africa could be influenced according to its interests (Epstein 2017; Mwenda 2010: 51; Omach 2000: 90). Through Uganda, arms supplies from the US reached the SPLA, which was fighting the Islamic government in Khartoum. Similarly, Museveni supported Paul Kagame, who received military training in the United States, and his Rwandan Patriotic Front with a sanctuary in Uganda and military equipment during the civil war in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Equally, after the joint military intervention by Ethiopia and the US against the Islamic Court Union in Somalia, the United Nations authorised a peacekeeping mission by the African Union in which several thousand US-trained Ugandan soldiers were deployed to support the US-favoured Transitional Federal Government (Epstein 2017: 160).

Regarding the interests of the beneficiary and the intervener in the civil war (question 1), for the United States, the LRA posed an actor that should be targeted based on humanitarian reasons and security interests. In the U.S. President Barack Obama’s letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Obama 2011), the LRA was denounced as inflicting violations of human rights through killings, rapes, and abductions. Along these lines, he also stated that “[...] deploying these U.S. Armed Forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy [...]”. Foremost, the United States was concerned about the instability the LRA could bring to the region. Schomerus et al. (2011) further argue that Obama acted because of domestic pressure through NGOs, the existence of then recently discovered oil deposits around Lake Albert and the possibility to support Uganda, which was engaged in a counter-insurgency mission against al-Shabaab in Somalia. As stated by the authors: “so domestic political agendas, which at least did not conflict with broad U.S. strategic interests, are the most probable explanations for Obama’s decision” (ibid.). Referring to question 3, the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, which was passed by Congress in 2010, only allowed for “providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support” (Section 3, paragraph 1). Congress explicitly asked for a supporting mission that did not jeopardise the lives of US soldiers. Within this environment defined by foreign policy interests to intervene but being constrained by domestic considerations and the legislative pressure by the Congress, the United States became militarily active against the LRA in Central Africa as a provider of indirect military assistance. While the mission had already begun in 2008 with Operation Lightning Thunder under previous president George W. Bush, its indirect character was maintained under Obama in 2009 (Schomerus – Tumutegeireize 2009). In 2011, the United States sent over 100 military advisors who were to support regional governments and, in particular, the UDPF in the pursuit of the LRA. Kony was to be apprehended or removed (Arieff et al. 2015).

However, the interest of Uganda in fighting against the LRA in the context of atrocities committed in the Central African Republic (and other countries) was limited. The LRA posed no security threat to Uganda at that time and Ugandan military personnel were not convinced that it was effectively possible to capture Joseph Kony. An observation raised by U.S. military personnel was as follows: ‘Although the Ugandan military (Ugandan People’s Defense Force or UPDF) is regarded as the most effective of the African forces
involved, some observers have questioned its capacity and commitment to complete the mission” (Arieff et al. 2015). Also, an assessment shared by some of the U.S. military advisors engaged in the mission was that searching for Kony was like searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack (Bishop 2017). Over time, the Ugandan government lost interest in the fight against the LRA outside its territory and reduced its initial commitment of 4,000 troops to less than 2,000 within 2 years (Schomerus et al. 2011). The joint mission between the US and Uganda ended in 2017 without having captured Joseph Kony but with a significant impact on the capacity of the LRA to conduct future guerilla operations (Cakaj – Titeca 2017).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In this study it was hypothesised that there exists a subset of military interventions in civil wars in which the intervening country intervenes with military combat troops due to interests that are partially exogenous to the conflict itself but instead relate to other states in the international system. This subset consists of indirect interventions, which are characterised by a specific configuration of burden-sharing. Indirect interventions are such in which a country intervenes with direct military instruments while being supported with indirect military instruments by a great power. To substantiate this claim, I argued that the relationship between these two interveners could be understood from the principal-agent perspective, a concept that was already used for the identification of rebel patronage. Using arms trade data from SIPRI and information on military interventions in civil wars from the UCDP External Support Dataset, I identified all the listed instances in which the agent (the recipient of arms supplies) intervened with combat troops on the ground of a civil war country and the principal (the supplier of arms) only partook in the civil war with the provision of intelligence, logistics or other indirect forms of intervention. In the examined period, twenty-two different countries intervened in a civil war while meeting the criteria mentioned earlier.

Two cases were then analysed based on three questions in order to validate whether the assumptions laid out by using the principal-agent concept reflect empirical realities. The historical cases of the intervention of Morocco in Zaire during the First Shaba War and the Ugandan intervention to fight the LRA on the soil of the Central African Republic do not falsify the deduced expectations of the principal-agent framework. In each case, the interest of the intervener in the outcome of the civil war was less salient than its interest vis-à-vis the beneficiary. The beneficiary was, however, constrained and avoided participation with combat troops on the ground. Once the beneficiary country lost interest in the civil war and withdrew (Uganda) or the mission was accomplished (Zaire), then the intervening forces followed suit and were deployed back to their home country without attempting to alter the dynamics of the civil war further. To conclude, the empirical cases illustrate the existence of indirect interventions following the expectations laid out by the principal-agent framework.

The potential limitations of this study provide grounds for further investigating the concept of delegated military interventions in civil wars. First, this study used arms trade as an indicator to identify relationships between principals and agents. However, other indicators might prove more useful for this purpose such as, for instance, foreign aid, formal or informal alliances, or the provision of security guarantees or other perks in exchange for delegated interventions. Second, to precisely identify the primary motivation behind an intervention is challenging. It is upon the researcher to determine which motivations were present and which constituted the actual driving forces since we can only make inferences based on observable data. Hence, more in-depth case studies on diplomatic exchanges between principals and agents such as those conducted by Gleijeses (2010) are necessary to untangle the directionality of interests and the context in which military interventions are embedded.
Additional research can further follow the conceptual underpinnings of the principal-agent mechanisms. First, great powers can draw from a pool of potential candidates. Hence, the selection process of choosing a suitable candidate for a military intervention in a civil war deserves further attention. The question of which factors contribute to the selection process was less researched in the case of states as proxies, but was addressed in the case of non-state actors. For instance, Salehyan (2010: 505) expects that non-state actors who “[…] share ethnic, religious, and linguistic kinship ties to the state […]” are more likely to be chosen as its agents. Hence, analogous research is required. Second, in this study, the use of carrots and sticks to induce arms recipient states to do something has been not thoroughly investigated. Hence, case study research could provide valuable information on how great powers used instruments and signalling to maintain control over their agents and how they attempted to prevent agency slack. It is hoped that the critical phenomenon of military interventions in civil wars was further illuminated in this study and that the concept of indirect interventions as a form of proxy intervention allows for a better conceptually-driven understanding of civil war dynamics.

1 The American Society of International Law (2019) shows how both the Obama and Trump administrations supported Saudi Arabia with various instruments such as intelligence and refueling of jets, as the Houthi rebels were considered a regional threat. It was Congress which stepped in with a resolution to end the military supplies.

2 Bove et al. (2016), Regan (2002), Regan and Aydin (2006), and Findley and Marineau (2015) as well as Lektzian and Regan (2016) use dyadic data structures between the civil war country and the potential intervener.

3 However, Krieg (2016) remains focussed on non-state actors in his analysis and does not further pursue the idea of the use of states as proxies or surrogates in greater detail.

4 An exception in this regard is the literature on coaltional warfare; see Kreps (2011) or Baltrusaitis (2010).

5 For instance, Krieg (2016) contends that the difference between a proxy intervention and a surrogate intervention is that in the case of the former all military operations are delegated to another actor, whereas in the case of the latter the surrogate complements the military mission in a particular domain.

6 For instance, Brown (2016: 248) describes how Kennedy had an interest in the South Vietnamese winning the war against their communist counterparts but was very reluctant to send American soldiers into the civil war.

7 According to Shapiro (2005), principal-agent relationships can be defined by multiple principals. In this study, the scope of principals will be held constant to one principal per intervening country. The reasons are threefold. First, in this study the five great powers, namely the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China and France, are analysed as potential principals. Of those five, based on historical rivalry the only potential combination of principals would be the United States, France and the United Kingdom. It would add more complexity to the model at this stage, which would not be justified as the three great powers generally had overlapping foreign policy interests. Second, according to the empirical results, only one case was identified which exhibits the features of multiple principals. Third, as the empirical results show, the relationships between the agent and the principal are frequently dominated by one principal who transfers arms in a much higher magnitude than other great powers.

8 An alternative measure would be to examine foreign aid or UN voting patterns. In the case of foreign aid, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) argue that foreign aid is provided by donors to states in order to receive political concessions. For instance, Wang (1999) finds evidence that the United States is able to buy off votes in the United Nations with foreign aid. However, the drawbacks of using foreign aid are threefold. First, foreign aid is also distributed for humanitarian, developmental and disaster relief purposes (Heinrich 2013: 423). Hence, it is crucial to distinguish how and to whom foreign aid is distributed. Second, foreign aid is not just provided bilaterally but frequently distributed through international organisations which can function as complements or substitutes for unilateral donors. For instance, in the period between 2002 and 2011 Lawson (2013) identifies 45 countries constituting providers of foreign aid but also 21 international organisations which performed the same function. Third, systematic data is much more sparsely available compared to arms trade data and is often only used for assessments of Western countries that participate in the OECD. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009, 2007: 270) speak about a “lack of systematic data” in relation to foreign aid. With regard to UN voting patterns, the problem is that UN behaviour represents an indicator for foreign policy congruence between states, but UN voting patterns themselves are not causes of a principal-agent relationship between a great power and a small power. Rather, UN voting patterns represent dependencies created through foreign aid. See, for instance, Wang (1999) and Adhikari (2019). For contrary opinions about the effectiveness of foreign aid in buying UN votes, see Keigle and Hook (1991) and Adhikari (2019).
INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS

9 I am not contending that particular weapon type transfers constitute a necessary condition of military interventions. There can be cases in which great powers supply a specific category of weapons that are being used in a civil war by the recipient. However, the argument for arms trade here is to use it as an identifier for a principal-agent relationship with unequal dependencies between the arms supplier (principal) and the receiver (agent). I am equally not assuming that arms supplying states anticipate civil wars in the future, but that they choose their recipients for varying reasons. See Sullivan et al. (2011) and Erickson (2011) for further debate on the selections of arms recipients.

10 See the data provided by SIPRI: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php, retrieved on 04. 03. 2019.

11 I omit the inclusion of regional powers as principals since arms trade is used as the identification criterion of a principal-agent relationship with its underlying dependency of the receiver on the supplier. According to Armstrong (2018), among the top 6 arms exporters (value in billion TIV in parentheses) from 1950 to 2017 are the five great powers and, in the fifth place, Germany (86). The following arms exporters on the list, namely Italy (32), the Czech Republic (31), the Netherlands (24) and Israel (17), are separated by a wide margin from the great powers the United States (673), Russia (588), the United Kingdom (140) and France (121). Out of the great powers, only China (53) is comparatively close to the “followers” in this respect. Furthermore, regional powers are not represented in the UN Security Council, which renders their participation in military interventions in civil wars dependent on the good-will of at least one Security Council member.

12 See https://sipri.org.

13 However, such purchases are not frequently conducted due to the high related financial costs. Counting only recent supplies could mean that a great power which only provides small arms to a recipient country would be counted as a major supplier. To prevent obscuring of long-term and insignificant relationships, 20 years are used to approximate a better weighting of influences by the supplying states. Nevertheless, the downside of extending the time period to 20 years is forgoing examinations of swift changes in foreign policy objectives which typically only occur due to major international or domestic changes. Such a historical event is the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the NATO alliance system. Since the Soviet Union was the primary provider to these countries over the course of the 1980s, the change to Western suppliers in the few years at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s could potentially lead to cases in which Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union is counted as the primary supplier of a NATO member. The empirical data will show whether this leads to artifacts.

14 This is a subjective assessment based on historical knowledge of the cases and is open to debate. The “civil war” in the United States refers to the 9/11 attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda and is coded as an internationalised civil war in the UCDP dataset. Poland joined the coalition forces to fight against the Taliban, who were providing sanctuary for the Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan. Russia, due to the coding rules, is counted as the major arms supplier in this case as NATO membership for Poland was a relatively new condition at the time. The accession was completed in 1999, just two years before the terrorist attacks in the United States. However, Russia initially supported the United States in their fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan; therefore although Poland’s intervention in Afghanistan was primarily motivated by its relationship with the US, in the same year it had an interest congruence with Russia. Similarly, as the arms trade volume provided by the US to Poland and Romania did not yet surpass the previous arms volumes of Russia in 2003, the latter is still counted as a major arms supplier in that year.

15 This number is calculated when double counting of interventions, i.e. interventions in different conflict dyads in civil wars, is accounted for. For instance, Cuba is recorded to have intervened in Ethiopia twice in 1977 as Ethiopia was fighting against both the rebel group WSLF and Somalia in the same year.

16 The following Second Shaba War similarly ended with a loss for the rebels inflicted by French Foreign Legion soldiers and Belgian paratroopers.

17 Clark (2001: 270) notes that at the end of the 1990s, the United States ceased to provide military aid to Uganda as a reaction to Uganda’s military intervention in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Literature


INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS


Documents


INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS

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