In the concept of questions of European security, two different stages of postwar development are reflected, and — last but not least — of the development of military science. During the first stage, the pressure predominated to achieve absolute security by the formation of a universal (homogeneous) social system. This maximalist objective was to have been accomplished by all means, including the use of force.

In spite of the fact that neither side succeeded in realizing a plan to ensure its own security by the creation of a universal social system, or just because of it, a special security system came gradually into being, a system of security based primarily on a military equilibrium of two alliances confronting each other. The security was dependent on a continuous growth of the risk of mutual annihilation in the event of a war and thus also on the ability of both sides to maintain status quo by mutual deterrence.

The role of Europe in the fight of two worlds. The main factor which restricted the war possibilities of Western military alliances was the balance of forces in Europe and Asia which was unfavourable for them, because the forces of socialism have become superior. This affected, without doubt, not only the overall situation and the possibilities of both camps, but had to be especially prominently apparent in the strategic position and military policies of West European states.

The marked polarization of forces, which led to the formation of two antagonistic camps, one headed by the greatest power of the Euro-Asian continent, the Soviet Union, and the other headed by the strongest power of the American continent, the United States, determined the place of West European metropolises in world politics. Contrary to former times, when it was Europe and the political interests of European powers which formed the basis of world politics, Europe has become in postwar years only one of the areas in which a conflict of interests of the two super-powers takes place. The importance of Europe was declining with simultaneously growing emphasis on global problems. This process was being aided by the decline of the political, economic and military strength of West European countries, which became second-rate powers after World War Two. The influence on world politics of such powers as Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy has diminished in this period, and their dependence on global developments has grown. European problems were projected against the background of wider, global relations and conflicts which often were of decisive importance even from the point of view of European development. Factors and forces entered the game which were in many cases beyond the reach and influence of European nations. This applies above all to the decisive means of force, which are concentrated in the hands of world powers, whose guarantees are „necessary“ for European states.

In this situation, attempts appear of West European governments to seek security in a close alliance with the decisive power of the Western community, the United States. Let us leave it to historians to provide an answer to the complex question how far these attempts were motivated by the fear of a „Soviet invasion of Western Europe“, or by an active anti-communist policy. It has remained an incontestable fact that the complexes which have come into existence during this period have been complicating until today any solution of fundamental questions of European security.

In the strategy of West European countries in this period, certain specific features can be discerned: a) attempts to avoid mutual armed conflicts, to solve mutual disputes peacefully and thus to prevent their own weakening, b) active participation in the American policy of containing communism, and later in the American policy of „liberation“, aimed at liquidating socialist system in the countries of Eastern Europe, c) subservience
of their own strategies to the American strategy (mainly by their membership in NATO), d) loss of ability to retain by force their colonial possessions, and gradually leaving the role of a world policeman to the United States.

It can be said on the whole that the military policy of West European governments during the first postwar stage has brought their countries under an almost complete military and political dependence on the United States.

At the end of the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s, a possibility of another solution appeared, though the world security continues to be based on the mutual check-mate of the two world super-powers, and — on European level — on the mutual check-mate of the two military and political groupings: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. For Czechoslovakia, as well as for the other European socialist countries, the Soviet Union remains even today the main guarantor of their security. It is, however, security in divided Europe, security based on a hardly stable balance of forces, security which can be wiped out by all manner of accidents, security which requires ever greater efforts and resources to renew the equilibrium, security which is founded on a growing arsenal of destructive weapons.

Under such circumstances, the possibility of a direct use of force cannot be excluded (otherwise the principle of deterrence, on which a certain stability is based today, would cease to function), and thus also the possibility of the security of European nations being destroyed.

Therein lie the merits of the matter: military strength can contribute towards ensuring security even for a relatively long historical period, but it cannot ensure full security, let alone permanent security.1) The latter can be achieved only on the basis of a broader political solution (which presupposes, ultimately, finding another principle than force in international relations, elimination of all disputes which might lead to armed conflicts, homogenization of political interests on global scale). The formation of a permanent security system requires the elimination of the means of force, not only on regional level.

Connected with this is the question whether to seek European security in a military neutralization of Europe or its parts, or under the threshold of these radical measures. In case we adopt the second alternative, we orientate ourselves to the preservation of the status quo, albeit with a certain improvement. The substance of the security will remain the same — deterrence with all its negative consequences.

The first alternative, however, also has its serious drawbacks. The main disadvantage is that it is only a partial, and not a definite solution. Great sacrifices may bring only a small certainty.

Momentous questions are attached to this: can Europe give up its influence upon further political development, which would a military neutralization probably be tantamount to, in a world in which the relationships among nations are based on force, can Europe transfer the responsibility for world security on the two super-powers to which even China might belong in the future, possibly also Japan and other countries?

Some analysts reply to these questions by other questions: whether, on the contrary, by taking the steps towards armament restriction, Europe would not break through the confines, whether it would not free its hands to exert greater influence on international developments by setting other potentials into motion? They have in mind above all influence in the moral sphere, a full utilization of the moral potential of European nations (which is, however, a very vague term).

The possibility of a non-violent solution of European conflicts, of ensuring European security on the basis of another principle than deterrence, has been much discussed in the past few years. Positive features of European development are being pointed out, which are said to make

1) Deterrence may fail entirely, and result in global annihilation, or may not cover all degrees of the spectrum of force, thus resulting in local destruction. Czechoslovakia is interested in the formation of a more hopeful security system both on European and global scale.
such a solution feasible (in the spheres of politics, economy, culture etc.). It will not be out of place to see whether these positive features of European development are also reflected in the military sphere.

At the first cursory glance at the not so auspicious situation of the military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and other realities, the answer would seem to be positive. If we make a more thorough analysis of military and political facts, the situation will be found to be more complicated.

Let us first examine the quantitative expression of the military efforts of both sides. One of the major indicators of the degree of effort in the military sphere are, without any doubt, direct military expenditures. Unfortunately, these register no positive trends. Military expenditures have been growing at such a rate that they are even comparable to figures from World War Two. In 1962—1965 they increased, on world-wide scale, from 120 000 to 130 000 million dollars. In 1966, total military expenditures in the world amounted to 140 000 million, in 1967, to 150 000 - 160 000 million dollars. During World War Two, annual war costs averaged about 186 000 million dollars. In 1965, out of the total of 130 000 million dollars, the United States and Europe spent a full 113 000 million dollars for military purposes, while the rest of the world only 17 000 million dollars. This means per capita annual expenditures of 145 dollars in the United States and in Europe, 10 dollars in Asia, Africa and Latin America. (The military expenditures in the so-called development countries increased by 50% from 1960 to 1965.)

These data are more alarming than satisfactory. With certain reservations, we may regard the decrease in the number of troops on the continent of Europe as one of the positive features of European development.2) The total number of armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty has dropped over the past five years by more than a quarter million men (by 270 000, to be exact). This reduction is largely due to the Soviet Union which has cut its armed forces by 380 000 troops since 1962. There have been moderate increases in the armies of the other Warsaw Treaty member states (with the exception of Rumania which increased the strength of its armed forces by more than 20% servicemen). From the point of view of individual services of the Warsaw Treaty countries, different trends can be observed: while the armies have been considerably reduced (almost by half a million men — by 470 000 troops), the air forces have increased by 223 000 men.

Thus, as regards the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, two processes are taking place simultaneously in opposite directions: the cuts in the numerical strength of the armed forces are accompanied by wider introduction of new military technology and by increase of firepower and striking power of the armed forces.

As regards the Atlantic pact, the situation is even more complicated. Both flanks of the pact, i.e. the West European and the North American, have been developing in a different way. The troop strength of the armed forces of the West European members of NATO has decreased by 174 000 men over the past five years; see Table 1.

2) In view of insufficient data on the military potential of the socialist countries published in our press, we use figures given in the annual reports of the British Institute for Strategic Studies. They must be, of course, accepted with reservations. We believe, however, that they are sufficient for our purposes, i.e. for revealing certain development trends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Armed forces</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3 099.0</td>
<td>2 151.5</td>
<td>385.5</td>
<td>589.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2 925.1</td>
<td>2 026.0</td>
<td>349.2</td>
<td>550.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>— 173.9</td>
<td>— 125.5</td>
<td>— 7.3</td>
<td>— 39.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cuts affected all traditional services of the armed forces, mainly — however — the ground troops, where the decrease is 125,000 men. The situation presents a different appearance, when we examine the changes with respect to individual countries: it is characteristic that while the majority of West European countries have reduced the strength of their armed forces — France has made the greatest cuts — by 185,000 men — West Germany and Portugal have built up their armies: West Germany by 107,000, Portugal by 68,000 men.

There has been an extraordinarily large increase in the United States: over the past five years, the U.S. armed forces have grown by 585,000 men. This increase, attributable above all to the American aggression in Vietnam, does not directly influence the balance of forces in Europe.

It does — however, change the overall balance of military forces in the world, and thus also the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

The development in the sphere of the most up-to-date means of waging an armed conflict is even less encouraging. During the past five years, nuclear weapons have become the possession of five powers, as France and China also acquired nuclear potential. Thanks to underground nuclear test-explosions, the United States and the Soviet Union improved their nuclear weaponry. The number of the most effective offensive weapons — guided missiles — has been growing at a fast rate. The following increases were registered as regards weapons of strategic-operational importance over the past five years:

Table 2
Increase of strategic offensive weapons, 1962—1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO states</th>
<th>Warsaw Treaty States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land-based ICBMs</td>
<td>400—500</td>
<td>1054+554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet ballistic missiles</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>656+406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBMs and MRBMs</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The stockpiles of nuclear ammunition, ready for use in case of a conflict, have been also increasing on the European continent. According to Robert McNamara, the stockpiles of U.S. nuclear ammunition of all kinds, stored in Western Europe (notably in West Germany), have grown by 60%.

Despite the reduction of the troop strength of the armed forces of West European member countries of NATO, their direct military expenditures over the past five years have grown by 5,921 million dollars.

It is apparent that in spite of a certain lowering of the numerical strength of the European armies, the tendency is not to weaken the military element, but on the contrary, to further strengthen the overall strength and effectiveness of the military systems.

These facts must be borne in mind in considerations about ensuring European security. It would not, however, be right to draw a one-sided conclusion that it is the military factor which precludes any positive solution of European question. Military interests are secondary ones; military measures, though reflecting specific military factors, stem from political interests and objectives. Only their fundamental changes can also bring about a fundamental change of the military situation in Europe. It can hardly be the other way round.
The demand is being heard from various sides for a European settlement of European questions by the formation of a European security system, without direct participation of the United States etc.

The main factor which prevents a European solution of European problems is the strategic position of Europe, and its role and place in world politics. From the point of view of the problem under discussion, i.e. European security, the fact is of special importance that the relative stability of political relations in Europe is being achieved by means of a broader military balance of forces between the Western alliance and the socialist community, especially between the USSR and the United States.

Without the direct military involvement of the United States in Europe, the military balance of forces would in all main indicators prove to be in favour of the Warsaw Treaty member countries. This would, according to NATO strategists (and it is necessary to stress in this connection that similar views are held, in addition to the governments of the United States, Great Britain and the German Federal Republic, also by many official representatives of the small NATO countries) impair the relative balance of military forces in Europe, and stability would be replaced by instability. It would lead to a growing, real danger of an armed conflict, which is small today. Therefore, the exclusion of the United States from the decision-making on the fate of Europe would, according to these views, have negative rather than positive consequences.

In order to be able to decide to what extent such considerations are meant sincerely, we must size up, at least on a general level, certain facts.

It is a fact that NATO — the United States included — is superior to the Warsaw Treaty member countries as regards many indicators of military power (besides medium-range ballistic missiles, the number of divisions, the number of tanks etc.). This superiority is especially apparent, if we make a comparison between the strength of the armed forces and direct military expenditures of both blocs (see tables 3, 4, 5).

Table 3
Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population in millions</th>
<th>Armed forces total in thousands</th>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Treaty</td>
<td>334.4</td>
<td>4 309</td>
<td>2 845</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>511.07</td>
<td>6 428.1</td>
<td>3 538.2</td>
<td>1 396.2</td>
<td>1 494.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-176.67</td>
<td>-2 119.1</td>
<td>-693.2</td>
<td>-861.2</td>
<td>-795.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
Differences in NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces 1962, 1965 and 1967 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Armed forces</th>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>- 1 335</td>
<td>+  84.5</td>
<td>- 478</td>
<td>- 478.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>- 1 414.7</td>
<td>- 44</td>
<td>- 742</td>
<td>- 778.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>- 2 119.1</td>
<td>- 693.2</td>
<td>- 881.2</td>
<td>- 795.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It can be seen from Table 5 that the military expenditures of NATO countries are almost 5 times greater than those of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The United States, with its 70-billion budget, has the main share in the enormous military expenditures of the West. Bourgeois analysts claim that the actual military expenditures of the Soviet Union amount to 30—35 billion dollars annually. Even so, the military expenditures of the NATO member countries would be almost 3 times higher than the expenditures of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The military balance, and thus also that strange stability which also applies to a certain degree to Europe, is achieved not so by conventional armed forces, but rather by the ability of both super-powers to destroy each other in an all-out nuclear war. This possibility rests on the following strategic attack weapons (figures at the end of 1967 and beginning of 1968):

The above means are sufficient for mutual deterrence, and make a direct armed conflict of both super-powers improbable. This is not the case of a possibility of an indirect encounter in various limited armed conflicts. Also, not even a direct conflict with limited objectives, on a limited space and with limited means cannot be excluded. Such conflicts might be quite exceptional, but thus even more serious and more dangerous for world peace.

While the comparison of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty war potentials shows that the West enjoys superiority in many fundamental indicators, and while the overall comparison of the war potentials points to a balance of forces, the comparison of the military strength of the European socialist countries and the European countries of the Western alliance reveals the weakness of the West European flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This can be clearly seen from a comparison of several basic figures (see Table 7).
Comparison of the numerical strength of the armed forces of Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO (without US and Canada) in 1967

(in thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armed forces (total)</th>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air forces</th>
<th>Other military organizations (incl. border troops)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Treaty</td>
<td>4,309</td>
<td>2,845</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>10,022.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO (without US and Canada)</td>
<td>2,925.1</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>349.2</td>
<td>550.2</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+1,383.9</td>
<td>+819</td>
<td>+165.8</td>
<td>+148.8</td>
<td>+566.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures demonstrate the superiority of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The West European military system is, however, not negligible from the point of view of conventional warfare. If we take into consideration other factors (e.g., the population figures, i.e., the fact that the West European flank of NATO has almost as many inhabitants as the Warsaw Treaty countries, the economic level, technical equipment of the armies and others), we see that instead of a superiority of the Warsaw Treaty countries, rather a balance exists.3)

This is so only from the viewpoint of a conventional war, i.e., with the exclusion of the use of the most up-to-date means of warfare, above all of nuclear missiles.

The situations present a different appearance if we consider it from the point of view of the achieved level of action unity in case of a conflict, and especially from the point of view of waging nuclear warfare. We are then confronted with incommensurable factors not only as regards territorial size, vulnerability of the main strategic targets, and above all as regards the magnitude of nuclear potential.

The qualitative difference can be seen from the following table of strategic and strategic-operational means of nuclear attack possessed by the European nuclear powers (those means which were operational, i.e., in readiness for immediate use at the end of 1967, are given in the table).

3) This offers certain possibilities for the realization of a European security system; they have not yet been sufficiently evaluated even in theoretical considerations.

Table 8
Comparison of the main attack weapons of the USSR, Britain, France in 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet ballistic missiles</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBMs, IRBMs</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-range heavy bombers</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium bombers</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The prominent disparity in the quantities of means of nuclear attack, and the existing overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union has so far been the main reason why the West European ruling circles (and above all military circles) cannot imagine the defence of Western Europe without the participation of the U. S. nuclear means, and why they have been insisting on preserving NATO with U. S. participation (which is logical, at least in so far as NATO without the United States has no sense).

This is where other important questions come into the forefront: Are the existing military pacts necessary for the creation of a treaty-based system of European security, or do they rather, in their present form, represent obstacles? Can the existing military pacts be modified so as to contribute to the peaceful settlement of European problems? Is the physical presence of U. S. troops on the continent of Europe necessary for that?

Only political strategy can provide answers to these questions quite exhaustively. From the military point of view, corresponding to the present-day political concepts, the answer is determined by the following facts:

The balance of forces in Europe, after the withdrawal of the U. S. troops, appears favourable for the Warsaw Treaty countries in all fundamental indicators, but not in an especially obvious way in many of them. The comparison of some of the major indicators shows that

a) the population of the European member countries of NATO equals 86% of the population of the Warsaw Treaty countries,

b) their military efforts, in terms of direct military expenditures, are almost identical, which

c) means greater use of military technology to permit reductions of the numerical strength of the armed forces,

d) all Soviet armed forces are included in the comparison tables. After the deduction of the Soviet forces necessary to ensure the commitments of the USSR in Asia, the comparison of non-nuclear potential would be less favourable for the Warsaw Treaty countries than both tables indicate.

It is also necessary to take into consideration other factors of power, above all the economic factors. The comparison of the economic potential of the West European countries and the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty is not too unfavourable for Western Europe.

All these facts make it evident that Western Europe represents in the non-nuclear sphere a potential factor which could contribute to the formation of a military stabilized system of European security, without a direct participation of the United States. We should orientate ourselves to this possibility, in our considerations of European security. At the same time, a conclusion can be drawn independently of the above that overall power, and thus also the importance of Western Europe, will grow in the coming years.

This growth will, of course, be limited by Western Europe's potential in the highest levels of the spectrum of force. United efforts of West European countries can improve the chances of Western Europe. For the time being, it is only a hypothetical possibility, and in view of the political relations within the West European flank of the NATO, it will evidently remain for a long time in the realm of possibility. The constellation of forces in the world is such that Western Europe will for a long time be dependent on U. S. nuclear cover.

The facts given above testify to the following:

The majority of the governments of the West European member countries of NATO (with the exception of France — and even conditionally in her case, anyway) proceed from similar considerations: for most of them, it is unacceptable to exclude the United States from negotiations on European security, because — in their opinion — it is the United States with its nuclear power that is the guarantor of their security. Any security system agreed upon with the governments of West European countries must count with this reality. (We would not have to count with it in the event of striving to achieve a system of European security which would represent the will of European nations and which would be pushed through against the will of the present-day governments in Western Europe. This alternative is not so absurd as it might appear at
The situation assumes an entirely different appearance, however, if we begin to consider the form of the U. S. participation. Serious differences, and thus also willingness to discuss the issue, exist in this respect. In all NATO countries, there are circles willing to listen and to assess various possibilities of a solution. Let us examine in detail what it is that these possibilities depend on.

The relative stability in Europe is given, above all, by the balance of forces which blocks the use of force on the highest level of the spectrum. The forces determining the balance are essentially non-European forces, the main and decisive means of strategic deterrence (it is important from the point of view of the problem under discussion that this applies primarily to U. S. strategic nuclear forces) are located outside Europe — on the territories of the United States, Siberia and in the oceans and seas throughout the world. The preservation of the military balance does not require the strategic nuclear forces of the super-powers to be deployed in Europe. The super-powers have so far been motivated by valid considerations to locate these means elsewhere.

The conclusion is that the decisive means of strategic attack, which above all determine the military balance of forces in the world, can guarantee the security of Europe without being deployed there. With due regard to the new possibilities of military techniques, such as for example better possibility of long range troop transports, as well as to the fact that the war potential of Western Europe from the point of view of conventional warfare is almost equal to the potential of the Warsaw Treaty countries, the withdrawal of American troops from Europe need not be a problem.

The situation presents a different appearance, however, if we begin to view it from the angle of the American strategy of flexible response, i. e. from the point of view of different levels of a limited use of force, especially of limited nuclear warfare. This type of warfare lies for American strategists still in the sphere of limited conflicts, yet for European nations it represents total war and universal annihilation. A treaty-based system of European security and the withdrawal of American nuclear forces from Europe should above all bring their share towards excluding this possibility.

The evaluations of the possibility of an armed conflict breaking out in Europe included, until quite recently, the assumptions that the conflict would, sooner or later, reach the highest levels of the spectrum, i. e. that it would grow into a total nuclear war. All that formed the provisional stability in Europe, covering almost all degrees of the use of force.

The present character of the equilibrium of the nuclear rocket potentials of both super-powers does continue to impede, but does not quite exclude the possibility of a limited use of force in various, by no means peripheral parts of the world. The conflict in Vietnam, moreover, confirms the possibility of even greater escalation.

What has caused this change?

In the recent years, there was an unusually intensive development of the most effective means of nuclear attack, both as regards quality and quantity. Both sides reached the so-called „overkill capacity” which changed the possibility of thermo-nuclear annihilation into certainty. This has some entirely contradictory consequences. The relations directly connected with the highest levels of the spectrum of force have stabilized. The extreme means of using force have simultaneously become less usable, and their deterrent function has remained plausible only for extreme situations. Thus the threshold of a total nuclear war has been raised much higher. The threat that the means of nuclear attack will be used to avert or to terminate a limited war is becoming, in contrast to the recent past, less effective. This objectively increases the possibility of waging limited wars to achieve limited political objectives.

The threat of a „mass reprisal” is becoming increasingly less adequate to lower levels of the use of force. More adequate means are necessary today to cope with that. In this connection, the importance is growing of the means of waging an armed conflict below the level of a total nuclear war. This fact must
be taken into account in our considerations of possible systems of European security.

The crux of the issue is that neither side will accede to a system which would fundamentally change the balance of forces to its disadvantage not only as regards the decisive means of warfare, but also as regards the means designed to wage an armed conflict in the European theatre of operations.

It is here that the main difficulties are hidden.

The creation of stability under the threshold of a universal nuclear war should be the prime interest of all European nations. The real way out of this situation might be the formation of a security system which would be based on military neutralization of the hotbeds of tension in Europe. The strategists of the North Atlantic pact and of several West European countries see, however, the safeguard of greater stability in nuclear armament also on lower levels. In this respect, there are different, frequently even contradictory efforts within NATO.

This is apparently the main reason why the various proposals for a military neutralization of the hotbeds of tension do not meet with a favourable response in the West (e. g. the Rapacki plan, and others). In view of the dislocation of the American troops in Europe, the realization of such plans would affect a substantial part of the firepower, on which the military system and strategy of NATO is at present based, thousands of nuclear shells, bombs and warheads stored in American installations in West Germany.

It is above all in these means that the NATO strategy sees a factor which puts the balance of forces in Europe into equilibrium, and thus also a factor of greater stability.

Finally, there is the demand to abolish the military pacts (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty) which continue to divide Europe, and whose preservation and strengthening undoubtedly contains the danger of further spread of nuclear weapons (to West Germany, and thus also to the majority of European states).

The dissolution of the pacts is also connected with various risks, above all with the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons by the building of independent nuclear forces by other European states, especially West Germany. These risks can be reduced to a minimum, if appropriate preconditions are created in advance. These include the elimination of those negative factors which accompanied the building of the pacts and which belong entirely into the arsenal of cold war. In the first place, it was the remilitarization of West Germany. The dissolution of the military pacts in Europe, which would leave West Germany strongly armed and with the potential danger of nuclear armament, might lead to freeing the German war potential for the needs of an extremely dangerous nationalist policy, and to the abrogation of even those weak safeguards of control existing within NATO. A great-power status, based on nuclear potential, would incite the expansionist tendencies in Germany and impair European stability.

The prerequisite, necessary to find a genuine solution of European problems, is military neutralization of central Europe, including both parts of Germany. Such a solution can be accomplished by gradual measures, acceptable to both sides. The abolishment of the military pacts would then be the next logical step towards ensuring European security, because the present system would be replaced by a better one.

Theoretical works of military and political experts should pay greater attention to finding ways of realizing such a solution, than to questions of war escalation, scenarios and war games. Not only because it is more beneficial to mankind, but also because it is much more complicated. Scaling the ladder of escalation may proceed automatically, on the basis of unilateral measures and acts; a peaceful solution requires mutual agreement on a common course of action. The following is an attempt to outline one of the possible peaceful solutions of European problems:

1) Codification of the positive results of the European development until the present (this means above all the recognition of the existence of the two
German states, and the Oder-Neisse border); 

2) Conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty which would cover both the production of weapons and making them available to other states, and the access of non-nuclear powers to nuclear weapons of their partner states in pacts; the treaty should also contain a clause banning the use of nuclear weapons against those countries on whose territory no nuclear weapons are located; 

3) Setting up an all-European study group, which would investigate the possibilities of agreements in political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural spheres, and which would initiatively work out studies to be submitted to governments, recommending the solution of problems in which there is accord of views or probability that agreement could be achieved through negotiations; 

4) Conclusion of agreements between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, which would enable the prevention of crisis situations in Europe — this would include a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and other measures designed to prevent the launching of limited wars in Europe; 

5) Guarantees undertaken by nuclear powers — USSR, the United States, France and Great Britain — that no country in Europe will be the target of a military attack, and adoption of joint and unilateral measures aimed at punishing the aggressor (this would help replace the unstable equilibrium based on deterrence by a more hopeful equilibrium of guarantees); 

6) Freezing the armament in Central Europe on the present level. Military systems would not be developed further, and would not be provided with new equipment and weapons; 

7) Reduction of the military role of both parts of Germany in the pacts, and corresponding reduction of their armed forces; 

8) Reduction of the armed forces of foreign countries stationed in both parts of Germany, and proportionate withdrawal of conventional and nuclear weaponry; 

9) Gradual weakening of the structure of military organizations of the existing pacts in Europe; 

10) Disarmament of both parts of Ger-

many — only the troops necessary to keep internal order and ensure routine border defence would remain. Demilitarized Germany would not, however, be accorded a preferential treatment in so far as it would not be required to pay for its defence. A part of its national product, close to the amount which is currently being spent for military purposes, would have to be paid into an international fund set up to aid the developing countries. This would help eliminate poverty in the world, and thus contribute towards building a safer world; 

11) Creation of an inspection system, and control of a Central European demilitarized zone, which might include both parts of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and certain other states; 

12) Ban of ABC weapons production in the demilitarized zone; 

13) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany; 

14) Disaffiliation of both parts of Germany with military pacts; 

15) Creation of an all-European advisory and consultative body (including both German states) for political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation; 


Other order and other scenarios could be drawn up. I am far from convinced that this scenario is the most realistic, that it best reflects the interests of all countries concerned. It does — in my opinion — deal with the main issue: the elimination of the latent hotbed of an armed conflict on the continent of Europe. Moreover, it does not substantially affect the world military balance of forces. The existing wider military equilibrium, based on the proportion of the nuclear missiles potential of both superpowers would be retained, even after the implementation of the above measures. The demilitarized zone in Central Europe, gradually extended also to other spheres, might bring about further stabilization of the European situation, make available the forces and resources to the solution of more urgent problems, and thus positively influence world development, become a preview of a global settlement.