The Post-Enlargement, Post-Lisbon and Post-Crisis European Union and Norm Enforcement: Towards an Internal EU Conditionality?

  • Ivo Šlosarčík
Keywords: European Union, conditionality, enforcement action, rule of law, Eurozone crisis, EU enlargement, Lisbon Treaty, Schengen cooperation, cohesion policy

Abstract

The article analyses the changes in norm enforcement in the EU that were triggered by the Eurozone crisis. It attempts to demonstrate that the Eurozone crisis contributed to a “transplantation” of conditionality instruments (which traditionally exist within the EU’s external relations) into the internal operations of the European Union. In particular, the article identifies which new internal rule-enforcement mechanisms of the EU share common structural features with the external EU conditionality (e.g. a vague legal framework; the use of the expertise of non-EU actors; an excess of competencies conferred to the EU; the institutional weakening of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; the format of the sanctions). The article comes to the conclusion that the formation of the EU’s internal conditionality occurred mainly within the instruments aimed at the crisis management of public finances of the Eurozone states (the EFSF, the EFSM, and the ESM), but it also concludes that there was an expansion of the new EU conditionality into other areas of the European integration, such as the Schengen cooperation and cohesion policy.

Author Biography

Ivo Šlosarčík

Born in 1974, he works as an associate professor and a guarantor of the European Studies programme at the Institute of International Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague. His research focuses on EU law, cooperation on justice and home affairs and institutional adaptation to European Union membership.