

---

## Chapter 3

# The European Dimension of the Czech Foreign Policy

*Vít Beneš, Mats Braun*<sup>1</sup>

During the years 2007–2009 the European integration process has had a big impact on the political agenda of the Czech Republic. The Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2009 provided the country with an administrative challenge as well as an opportunity to make the country visible within the EU. The presidency had an impact on the way European policy is handled within the Czech administration and was also a topic that attracted public interest to European affairs. The preparations for the presidency led to an upgrading of the work of the Committee for the EU, which is the body under the Czech government that set the long term priorities for the Czech work within the EU even if the Czech Republic has not presented a new strategic document concerning the long term orientation of the Czech Republic within the EU since 2004, when such a document was accepted by the then Social Democrat led coalition government. The governments in office have regularly presented their long-term positions on various fields of the integration process – i.e. the Europe 2020 strategy, EU budget reform, reforms of the common agricultural policy, etc. The increased importance of the European agenda can also be seen on the ever more frequent meetings of the Committee for the EU – a trend that was maintained even after the end of the presidency.

The Lisbon Treaty (LT) was the second big issue that dominated both the political and the public debate on the EU as well as the actual agenda during the period (the presidency being the first). Both the presidency and the LT were issues in the political divide on the EU within the Czech Republic. Traditionally, there is a more pro-European camp consisting of the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and the Greens (SZ), and a more euro-sceptic camp consisting of the Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Communist Party (KSČM). Gradually, however, and primarily as a consequence of the ODS becoming more pragmatic, this clear division has become blurred. The political dispute over Lisbon complicated the ratification process of the treaty and also had some impact on the overall reputation of the Czech presidency. Even if the actual outcomes of the presidency were rather positive in many respects – the Eastern Partnership, the way the presidency solved the gas crisis and the legal guarantees for Ireland – it will probably be remembered mainly

for speculations about the impact of Czech euro-scepticism and the media turmoil after the fall of the government in the middle of the presidency.

## **THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT**

The ideological bases of the political parties clearly affect their positions on European integration. In the following we will first look at how Czech politicians have discussed the future direction of the EU during the last three years and thereafter we will turn to how they view the future of the Czech Republic within the Union.

### ***The Future of the EU***

The discussion on the future of the European Union during the period mainly focused on the Lisbon Treaty. This debate consists of three parts: 1) visions about the future institutional organisation of the EU, 2) views on what should be the main tasks of the EU in Europe and 3) visions about the EU in the world.

As we already mentioned above and as various studies testify, Czech political elites remain divided in their positions towards political integration. On one side we have small centrist parties like the Christian Democrats and the Greens, who strongly favour the deepening of the integration and support the institutional reform (a more powerful European Parliament, qualified majority voting in the Council, etc.). The Social Democrats support the deepening of European integration and the institutional reform streamlining the decision-making process. They strongly advocated the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. But even if the ČSSD party programme<sup>2</sup> includes parts which could be described as ‘federalist’, the party is not too visionary about the future of the EU, and its positive view on institutional reforms can be credited to a successful Europeanisation of the party (within the Party of European Socialists). The party has a rather EU-reluctant electorate which puts limits on how far the party can agree with a deepening of the European integration project. Both the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats refer to the EU as a solution to problems caused by globalisation in their party programmes – especially in regard to the European welfare states.

On the other side of the spectrum are the Civic Democrats, who opposed the deepening of European integration and most of the institutional innovations introduced by the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). They link the EU with a superficial intervention into the market and simultaneously with an unwanted intervention of a supranational authority into the national domain. They reject any strengthening of the European Parliament and they are also negative to increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU. Nevertheless, their electorate traditionally supports European integration, including the institutional reforms with pragmatic reasons. Even though the party continues to prefer the intergovernmental model of the EU, in 2009 we have witnessed a pragmatic adjustment in the official position of the party which supported the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The party openly clashed with its founder Václav Klaus, who remains faithful to his ideological conviction that

the institutional reforms are heading in an absolutely wrong direction for both the EU and the Czech Republic.<sup>3</sup> The Communists provide for an alternative understanding of the EU as a neo-liberal project, and for that reason the party was the only one to reject EU membership in accordance with the 2004 membership conditions. Since then, however, the Communists also came to accept the Czech EU membership but they were, for instance, still against the Lisbon Treaty.

During 2009 a number of smaller political subjects were also newly created. A few of them primarily devoted their attention to European issues and aimed at gaining seats in the European Parliament after the elections in 2009. Some of these subjects were eurosceptical, such as the Free Citizens' Party, Liberstas.cz and Sovereignty, or pro-European like the European Democratic Party. These parties, however, have so far had a rather limited influence on the broader debate on the Czech Republic in the EU. For the future other almost new political subjects might be of greater relevance, such as TOP 09 and the Public Affairs, even if they are parties that are not primarily oriented towards European policies.

If we turn to the second dimension and the question of what should be the EU's primary tasks, we find the following differences in broad terms. Whereas ODS emphasise their support for the idea of a single European market and the four freedoms of movement, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats describe the EU in terms of a possible way to protect the social welfare state from the pressures of economic globalisation. A fraction of the Communists would also accept the EU as a potential instrument to protect the country from the negative consequences of globalisation, but the mainstream view in the party is rather that the EU as it looks today is rather a part of the problem than of the solution.

Only regarding the third dimension we find something close to a consensus among the Czech political elite. Especially regarding the issue of future enlargement of the EU, all Czech political parties are in principle positive to such a process. The Christian Democrats are an exception in the sense that they reject a potential enlargement to Turkey, which the other parties accept.<sup>4</sup> Also if we look at the more general role of the EU in the world, there is a near consensus on the need of a strong EU – for instance, in negotiations with Russia (especially regarding the question of energy security). In the yearbook on Czech foreign policy in 2007 a distinction was made between Atlanticism, Europeanism (continentalism), internationalism, and autonomism.<sup>5</sup> These categories show that the Atlanticists, primarily the ODS, stress the importance of NATO and are sceptical to the EU as an alternative to this alliance. The Europeanists, the Social Democrats, emphasise the EU as the most important organisation, even if they would not be NATO-critics by any means. The internationalists, represented by the Christian Democrats and the Greens, are clear supporters of both organisations. Finally, the autonomists (the Communists) are anti-NATO and eurosceptic.<sup>6</sup>

### ***The Integration of the Czech Republic in the EU***

There are at least two competing understandings of what should be the role of the Czech Republic in the EU on the more general level. The crucial question seems to be whether the Czech Republic should at all times protect its formal decision making

power or whether the reduction of its own voting weight can be in the national interest of the country. To a large degree this division corresponds with the general support for a more intergovernmental or supranational EU, as discussed above, but with one difference. At this level it is not crucial what visions of the EU the different actors have, but whether it is acceptable or not that the Czech Republic can be outvoted by the other members of the EU. Quotations such as the following were quite common in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty: ‘...it will not take long before we will be outvoted in a regular and democratic way based on the LT and in the name of the European interest.’<sup>7</sup> This quotation indicates that opponents of the LT doubt the possibility of a European interest, which is linked to the traditional ODS view of the EU as a tilt-yard of interests<sup>8</sup> with the dominant characteristic of all the EU member states being primarily concerned with protecting their own interests. For this reason the Civic Democrats prefer to speak of their view on the EU as ‘eurorealist’ which they view as a part of a ‘realist’ concern for the promotion of the Czech national interest. This is where the ODS draws the conclusion that it is always necessary to seek to maximise the Czech Republic’s own national sovereignty and voting powers. At the same time, they promote their program as the only ‘realistic’ solution to Europe’s problems. The ODS fits into the definition of *euro scepticism* provided by Kopecký and Mudde. The ODS is no complete *Euroreject* party, instead, they ‘support the general ideas of European integration, but are pessimistic about the EU’s current and/or future reflection of these ideas’.<sup>9</sup>

Other parties might agree or disagree with the general description of the EU but they are more optimistic of the possibility of EU institutions serving all European interests and thus also the Czech interest. Thus, on the general level we have a conflict between those that believe that the Czech government should also in a narrow sense protect the Czech influence and those who believe in the possibility of realising Czech interests through the EU.

The most radical interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on the Czech Republic was the view of President Klaus that the treaty means the end of the country as a sovereign state.<sup>10</sup> Klaus also initiated the so-called Czech opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The discussions on the Charter showed the potential of the question of German property claims for the Czech EU debate. Even if most legal experts were clear on the point that the Charter never could affect the validity of the Beneš decrees and thus open up the way for German property claims in the Czech Republic, this turned out to be an issue where rather few Czech politicians were willing to challenge the President. Even if most of the political parties were of the opinion that the treaty would not affect the decrees, they still found it necessary to support a declaration of the parliament stating that the Charter can not be used for challenging property conditions caused by the Beneš decrees.<sup>11</sup> This issue shows that the relations to Germany and the Czech Republic’s past remain a crucial component for the debate on the country’s integration into the EU.

In general the discussion on the Czech integration policy had the character of disputes on whether the government, in particular during the time of the three coalition cabinet led by the ODS, is marginalising the country within the EU due to the euro-

sceptic faction of the ODS and the failure to ratify the Lisbon Treaty. The Social Democratic opposition presented alternative priorities prior to the presidency, in which the ratification of the LT and the social dimension of the integration project were mentioned as well.<sup>12</sup> In the aftermath of the fall of the government during the presidency, both sides criticised each other for marginalising the Czech influence in the EU.

It should also be mentioned that EU related topics receive rather little attention in the Czech political debate. In the parliament if we exclude the work in the committees on European affairs in the Senate and the in the Chamber of Deputies there is very little debate on these issues. In plenum European issues are discussed rather rarely. And when they are, for instance in relation to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the discussion gives the impression of being partly uninformed and a lot of space is devoted to accusations between governing and opposition parties regarding who is to be blamed for delayed voting etc. In general European affairs are viewed as secondary to domestic politics. A clear proof of this was how the Chamber of Deputies voted the government out of office in the middle of the Czech presidency in 2009.

## **THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: AGENDA AND EVENTS**

### ***Institutional reforms and the protracted Lisbon Treaty ratification***

The reform process, which took the rejected Constitutional Treaty as a base for negotiations, intensified during the German presidency in the first half of 2007. The Czech government adopted an official position towards the institutional reforms on 25 April 2007,<sup>13</sup> anticipating tough negotiations. Even though the then government of Mirek Topolánek was no keen advocate of the reform process, it (for pragmatic reasons) wanted the whole debate to be over so that the EU could focus on substantive issues, including the enlargement agenda.<sup>14</sup>

The government was very sensitive to the possible weakening of voting power of the Czech Republic within the Council. Thus, it advocated ‘the balance between the principle of the equal representation of citizens and the principle of equal representation of states’.<sup>15</sup> The government promoted the transparency of the decision-making processes and more intensive involvement of national parliaments. The government strongly opposed the state-like symbolic dimension of the institutional reform (such as the terms ‘minister of foreign affairs’ and ‘constitution’). Secondly, the government rejected the stand-alone Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and proposed that the EU sign the European Convention on Human Rights. The Czech government proposed an innovation: the so-called ‘two-way flexibility’ allowing not only shifts of competences from the national to the European level, but also the return of certain competences back to the national level.

The reform process culminated in the adoption of the LT, which was negotiated during an Intergovernmental Conference that commenced on 23 July 2007. The treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon. In line with the initial Czech position, the treaty refrained from the state-like symbolism. The ‘two-way flexibility’ became

the key political demand of the Czech delegation. The provision eventually made it into the text, but in a watered down version (in this version, the mechanism is non-obligatory).

The ratification of the LT dominated the agenda for the next two years and the issue significantly affected both the internal politics of the Czech Republic and its image in Europe. Paradoxically, the discussion about the LT intensified only after the government led by Mirek Topolánek signed the final text of the treaty in December 2007. The situation eventually led to the renegotiation of the terms under which the Czech Republic accessed the treaty.

In 2008, the ratification of the LT was the centerpiece of the Czech discussion about European integration. Prime Minister Topolánek only very reluctantly backed the treaty, balancing between pressure from the pro-European opposition (ČSSD) and the coalition partners (KDU-ČSL and the Greens) on one side and the eurosceptical dissidents within his own party (loyal to President Klaus) on the other. The parliamentary debate began in March 2008. Shortly after that, the Senate referred the treaty to the Constitutional Court. The court was asked to review the constitutionality of six specific points of the EU's reform treaty (see below).

The Senate decision immediately attracted EU-wide attention and sparked a domestic debate about the consequences of the step for the Czech Republic (not least for the upcoming Czech presidency).<sup>16</sup> The Czech debate about the fate of the LT became even more heated after the negative Irish referendum (13. 6. 2008). Pro-European politicians described the referendum as a negative step threatening further development of the EU. On the other side, President Klaus expressed his gratitude and argued that 'Europe should thank the Irish people for slowing down the current erroneous processes towards more unification'. The government as a whole did not call for the suspension of the ratification process in the Czech Republic.

On 26 November 2008 the Constitutional Court ruled that the reviewed provisions of the LT are consistent with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.<sup>17</sup> The treaty was not ratified after the ruling and the parliamentary debate was postponed until February 2009. Nevertheless, the positive ruling of the Constitutional Court in the end convinced and silenced some of the eurosceptics in the Senate and paved the way for the approval of the treaty.

In February 2009 the parliamentary debate resumed with a new compromise proposal on the table: the so-called 'binding mandate'. The binding mandate prevents the Czech government from approving any transfer of powers to the EU without the parliament's agreement (see the section dedicated to actors). The political agreement on the 'binding mandate' cleared the way for the approval of the treaty in both houses of the Parliament. The Chamber of Deputies approved the treaty on 18 February 2009 and the Senate added its stamp in a closely observed vote on 6 May 2009.

In the second half of 2009 the ratification process has been delayed due to a second submission to the Constitutional Court by a group of 17 senators, which was quickly dismissed by it. On the other side, the determined opposition of President Klaus posed a more serious challenge. President Klaus delayed his decision on the LT and eventually requested the Czech opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

After achieving this goal and after the Constitutional Court's rejection of the senators' complaint, President Klaus ratified the Lisbon Treaty.

To sum up, the ratification of the LT was (together with the Czech presidency of the Council) a key item on Czech Republic's European agenda. The debate surrounding the process exposed the basic assumptions and ideological preferences of the political parties and individual politicians in regard to European integration (see the corresponding section of this chapter). During the observed period, the Czech debate about European institutions shifted from substantial issues (Czech Republic's position within the EU and the EU's institutional setup) towards fundamental disputes about the interpretation of the Constitution and the roles of individual institutions in the foreign policy decision-making process. While the compromising proposal for the 'binding mandate' moderately strengthened the Parliament and clarified its relationship with the executive,<sup>18</sup> the row over the ratification and the inaction of the President sparked a constitutional tug-of-war between individual institutions. The ratification process in the Czech Republic received wide coverage by the European media and probably influenced the long-term image of the Czech Republic within the EU.

### *The Czech EU Presidency – a General Perspective*

For the whole three year period the Czech political scene and the administrative apparatus were busy preparing and executing the Czech EU presidency. The preparations started as early as late 2006, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by A.Vondra, the future Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs. In the anticipation of the presidency, the position of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs was established, and it was endowed with the coordination task not only during the planning phase but also in the course of the Presidency term itself.

During the preparatory phase, most of the time and energy was concentrated on the formulation of Czech priorities for the presidency and training for the staff in the various ministries and country representations. The first tentative document outlining the political priorities of the Czech government was approved by the government on 28 February 2007. The document testifies that even though the government had been dominated by the eurosceptical ODS, it approached the challenge with great enthusiasm and ambitions. The government was aware that the management of the presidency would affect the image of the state for many years to come and planned to act as a critical but constructive and reliable partner. The presidency was seen as a unique opportunity to shape EU policies and 'leave a national footprint' in the EU.<sup>19</sup> The government decided to combine Czech national interests with EU's goals and formulate 'ambitious but feasible' program priorities.

The government chose a motto for the Presidency ('Europe without Barriers') overarching a set of (initially six) general priorities. The motto and the overall direction of the proposal clearly reflected the ideological background of the centre-right government. While the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs retained a coordinating role, the sectoral ministries (the administrative apparatus of the state) played the key role in further elaboration of the priorities. Some feedback has also been received from the academia and NGOs.

The year 2007 saw a lengthy process of repetitive amendments and selections culminating in the formulation of the ‘one plus four’ priority areas. The key priority ‘Europe competitive and open’ was supplemented by the priorities in energy policy; budget reform; external relations; and internal affairs and justice.<sup>20</sup> Those priority areas (accepted in October 2007) served as a basis for the negotiations with France and Sweden about a common 18-month program. During 2008 the political priorities were further reduced and reformulated into what has become known as ‘the three Es’: Economy, Energy and European Union in the world.<sup>21</sup> The administrative apparatus (diplomats and bureaucrats) produced a detailed but equally ambitious working programme (‘sectoral priorities’) of the Presidency.

In late 2008 the government held political talks with the main opposition party (ČSSD) about a possible ‘ceasefire’ during the presidency but these negotiations reached a dead end – the opposition felt left out from the formulation of political priorities, and key political partners (ODS and ČSSD) accused each other of not being interested in the conciliatory agreement. This failure had serious consequences during the presidency itself.

The presidency started amid fears among the European politicians and media of the small and supposedly eurosceptical Czech Republic’s lack of willingness and ability to fulfil all the duties of the presidency at the time of the gathering financial crisis and other challenges.<sup>22</sup> Right at the beginning, the Czech government faced three serious crises (‘three Gs’: Gas, Gaza and the Global financial and economy crisis) and was forced to modify her initial priorities (for the assessment of individual program priorities see the following sections in this chapter).

On one side, the Czech Republic was able to deliver important substantive contributions in some of the policy areas. In line with the Central European tradition, the Czech Republic disposed of a capable administrative and diplomatic apparatus, and the organisational and logistic aspects of the presidency were appreciated.<sup>23</sup> In most policy areas, the expertise and the effective management of the agenda by Czech bureaucrats and diplomats have been assessed positively.<sup>24</sup>

On the other side, Czech political elites (as a whole) received a scathing assessment. Before the start of the presidency, the attention focused on President Klaus as a symbol of radical euroscepticism.<sup>25</sup> In the first half of the term, the innovative and active style of the Czech political leadership (such as the shuttle diplomacy during the gas crisis – see below) has been welcomed. But on other occasions, the activism and courage of Czech political representatives transmuted into gaffes and harangue. Apart from individual excesses, the overall image of the Czech Presidency was severely shaken by the vote of non-confidence on 24 March 2009 and the fall of Topolánek’s government.<sup>26</sup> The fall of the government received unequivocally negative assessments in both the European and the Czech press and apparently confirmed some of Europe’s fears and prejudices about the euroscepticism and unpredictability of the Czech political scene. The botched Czech Presidency played into the hands of the supporters of the permanent EU presidency<sup>27</sup> and did not make things easier for the subsequent ‘new’ member states’ presidencies.<sup>28</sup>

***Focusing on Further Liberalisation of the Single Market***

During the examined period, the Czech government promoted liberalisation in many areas, including the agricultural policy, budget reform and the streamlining of the European regulation. Czech diplomacy also highlighted the need to preserve the competition rules on the internal market and strengthen the external competitiveness of the EU. As a small, export-oriented state, the Czech Republic has always nurtured the idea of 'four freedoms'. Czech intentions to remove the remaining barrier hindering the full potential of both the Single Market and the External Trade Policy were eventually expressed in the slogan of the Czech EU presidency: 'A Europe without barriers'.

Generally speaking, the Czech Republic has been a keen supporter of further services liberalisation. Czech politicians closely followed the heated European debate about services liberalisation in 2006. In the early stages of the preparations for the Czech EU presidency, the central-right government considered restarting the formal debate on services liberalisation during the presidency<sup>29</sup> but this plan was largely watered down due to external factors.

A short glance at the preparatory period provided above illustrates the importance of economic issues for Czech representatives. Reflecting its neoliberal background, the Topolánek government initially pondered about advancing further liberalisation on the single market (including the services), budget reform, liberalising the Common Trade Policy and other liberalising measures as a way to strengthen EU's competitiveness on a global level.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, the gathering global financial crisis forced the Czech Republic into playing the role of a defender of the existing status quo rather than the role of a promoter of further liberalisation. As Zemanová and Abrahám noted, 'the Czech struggle for removing barriers turned rather into a struggle for preventing new barriers from occurring'.<sup>31</sup>

Already in late 2008, during the negotiations of the European Recovery Action Plan, the liberal government of Mirek Topolánek fought (along with other liberal-minded member states) against massive financial injections into the collapsing bank sector. During the Czech presidency, the Czech government continued with the defence of the liberal principles underpinning the Single Market against protectionist anti-crisis measures in an attempt to avert large scale interventions and subventions. The fight against protectionism transformed into an open Czech–French row after President Sarkozy's suggestion that French car makers should repatriate their Central European investments and jobs back to France.

The presidency has been largely successful in achieving the goal of fighting protectionist measures. It organised an informal European Council summit in March, which discussed the response to the financial crisis. The summit mentioned the fiscal impulses needed to recapitalise the EU economy, but at the same time the member states pledged to respect the rules of the single internal market, the competition rules and the Stability and Growth Pact, especially when it comes to long-term sustainability of public finances.<sup>32</sup> On the other side, thanks to its neoliberal, non-interventionist approach, the Czech presidency has been criticised for taking little initiative regarding further anti-crisis measures.<sup>33</sup>

### *The Energy Comes Before the Environment*

The Czech government's approach to the issues of energy, environment and climate change reflects the power imbalance between the pro-business and nuclear-energy-friendly ODS and her small coalition partner – the Greens. The governmental representatives from the ODS openly supported further development of nuclear energy<sup>34</sup> (promoting the idea of 'low-carbon energy' rather than 'renewable energy') and prioritised competitiveness (of European and Czech business) over environmental issues and the fight against climate change. Between 2007 and 2009 the Czech and Slovak Prime Ministers jointly hosted the European Nuclear Energy Forum organised successively in Bratislava and Prague in order to relaunch discussions on nuclear energy in Europe.<sup>35</sup>

In 2008 the government showed strong interest in the negotiations of the so-called 'climate and energy package' that aims to combat climate change and increase the EU's energy security. It raised critical objections under the banner of keeping European countries (i.e. their energy companies) competitive. The government sharply criticised the Commission's plan to start a full auctioning of pollution allowances in the power sector as early as 2013. In line with the position of Czech energy company ČEZ, the Czech Republic (and other new member states) sought an exemption which would allow poorer EU countries (those who get more than 30 percent of their energy from coal and with a GDP per head lower than 50 percent of the EU average) to hand out a part of the allowances for free even in the third trading period, 2013–2020.<sup>36</sup>

During the examined period we have recorded an ever intensifying debate about the energy security of the EU (and the Czech Republic), which eventually culminated during the Czech Presidency. In contrast to other issues on the European agenda (such as institutional reform), the idea of energy security (including the support for nuclear energy) is rather consensual in the Czech Republic, at least when the two biggest parties are concerned. Secondly, within the rich agenda of energy-related issues, the Czech government put political emphasis on the security and geopolitical aspects of the energy policy, while the environmental aspects and the fight against climate change have been deliberately sidelined by key political leaders.<sup>37</sup> Thirdly, the geopolitical priorities of Czech Atlanticists and their traditional fear of Russia largely influenced the Czech definition of EU's energy security. Since the first gas row between Ukraine and Russia (in early 2006), Russia has been accused of using her 'energy weapon' as a tool in her 'neoimperial foreign policy' aimed at restoring Russia's sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The dependence on energy supplies delivered from and through Russia was perceived not only as an economic issue, but as a direct threat to EU's security, (geo)political independence and core values.<sup>38</sup>

Right at the very beginning of its tenure, the Czech Presidency had to face the interruption of gas supplies from Russia, which severely affected customers in East European and Balkan countries, including several EU member states. Despite the above mentioned aversion towards Russia, Prime Minister Topolánek, acting on behalf of the EU and in tandem with the Commission, was able to launch a cool-headed and highly effective shuttle diplomacy between Russia and Ukraine. The Czech mediating efforts

were eventually successful. After protracted wrangling between Ukraine and Russia, both parties reached an agreement about the gas metering stations between Russia and Ukraine and, on 18 January, an agreement about the resumption of gas supplies.<sup>39</sup>

The Czech Presidency promoted some long-term measures for strengthening EU's energy security. Firstly, it pushed forward the establishment of a common energy policy, i.e. by concluding discussions on the 2nd Strategic Energy Review and promoting the preparation of the 2010–2014 Energy Action Plan. Secondly, it advocated a common EU position towards Russia on energy issues and successfully promoted concrete measures for the diversification of the gas supply routes. The revitalisation of the withering Nabucco project became a tangible contribution of the Czech Presidency to the EU's 'pipeline geopolitics'. The Nabucco project has been formally endorsed on 8 May 2009 at the Southern Corridor Summit with the poetic epithet 'New Silk Road'. Despite some remaining challenges down the road (no guarantee of sufficient gas supplies), the Presidency was able to secure €200 million for the Nabucco project by including it on the list of energy infrastructure projects financed from the European Economic Recovery Plan.<sup>40</sup>

On the internal market front, the Czech presidency successfully concluded negotiations between the member states and the European Parliament on the so-called third energy liberalisation package aimed at liberalisation of the EU's electricity and gas sector.<sup>41</sup> According to the compromise wording of the final text, individual member states are free to choose from one of three options of market regulation: ownership unbundling; Independent System Operator; and Independent Transmission Operator.<sup>42</sup>

To sum up, the Czech Presidency succeeded both in advancing its own goals and in meeting EU-wide expectations. Czech representatives and diplomacy successfully managed the imminent gas crisis in June 2009 and promoted long-term measures addressing the security of energy supply. Czech political representatives acted like 'Europeanists in spite of themselves'. Despite the 'eurorealist' rhetoric and repute of the main coalition party (ODS), her government self-confidently promoted the deepening of the European integration in the energy area. By advocating a common position towards Russia, by securitising the threat of energy dependence and by engaging the EU in pipeline geopolitics, the Czech 'eurorealists' in fact contributed to the establishment of the EU as a global political actor.<sup>43</sup>

### *EU's External Relations*

Further EU enlargement has been a long-term priority of the Czech Republic and a steady ingredient of Czech European policy. On the political level, most major political parties continuously express their support for EU enlargement.<sup>44</sup> The EU enlargement is accepted by all major political forces as beneficial for both the EU and the candidate (neighbouring) countries.

The Czech support focuses first and foremost on the Balkan countries. Due to the Czechs' long-term historical and cultural bonds to the region and due to contemporary attractiveness of the territory for both Czech tourists and businesses, the entry of the Balkan states made it to the top of the list of Czech Presidency Priorities. In 2007, the Czech decision-makers envisioned the conclusion of negotiations with Croatia, the

beginning (or continuation) of accession talks with Macedonia and a clear articulation of the European perspective for Serbia.<sup>45</sup> The final Presidency priorities listed the EU enlargement as a part of the European Union in the World priority area. The final wording was less optimistic and focused primarily on Croatia. Turkey, mentioned as ‘a strategic ally of the EU’, has been sidelined, even though the Presidency expressed its willingness to continue the talks. The potential membership of Turkey causes some controversy (the Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People’s Party opposes the Turkish EU membership).<sup>46</sup>

At the beginning of 2009 the Czech Presidency was caught by surprise by the escalation of the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia and the subsequent Slovenian blockage of the Croatian accession negotiations. The Presidency got its hands off the issue, relegating the conflict to the status of a bilateral issue, and let Commissioner Rehn play the role of a mediator. The Presidency recorded only very limited success in passing the Albanian application to the Commission, receiving the Montenegrin application and opening one chapter in the negotiations with Turkey. Except for the conference ‘EU Enlargement – 5 Years After’, which commemorated the successes of the past enlargement round,<sup>47</sup> the enlargement agenda was hardly visible and gave way to the Energy Security, the Eastern Partnership and other agenda highlighted by Czech politicians. The Czech Republic failed to get an EU consensus for some of its priorities referring to the Western Balkans; especially the Benelux countries and Germany remained hesitant towards any steps that could be interpreted as leading in the direction of further enlargement.

The ideological background of Topolánek’s government was definitely ‘Atlanticist’ (see the chapter devoted to the security dimension). The Czech government planned to strengthen transatlantic ties during the Czech Presidency, presuming that the continuing engagement of the USA in Europe is indispensable for both Czech and European security. The transatlantic priority took the form of a strong but abstract political proclamation of the need to keep and develop a multifaceted transatlantic cooperation between the USA and the EU. The Czech priorities lacked substantive content and proposals.

Ideological assumptions and concrete proposals made by the new American administration (in economy, foreign policy and security) collided with those of the Czech government. The Czech EU presidency publicly clashed with the American administration over the economy, arousing questions about the Czech ability to represent the EU as a whole.<sup>48</sup> The tangible results of the ‘transatlantic priority’ were limited to organising the first meeting of President Barack Obama with all the EU leaders in Prague.

In reaction to the escalation of violence in Gaza in late December 2008, the Czech Presidency tried to mediate a ceasefire and establish a ‘humanitarian corridor’ by sending a mission headed by Minister Schwarzenberg, which was accompanied by key EU officials. Yet these brokering efforts were watered-down not only by a parallel mission by French President Sarkozy, but also by the pro-Israeli statements of Czech political representatives and officials. Well ahead of the presidency, Czech political representatives stressed that the deepening of the EU-Israel integration was to

become one of the Czech Presidency priorities.<sup>49</sup> The Czech government adhered to this priority even in the aftermath of the Gaza crisis and entered into an open split with the Commission and other EU member states over the continuation of the EU-Israel talks.<sup>50</sup>

Concerning the Eastern neighbourhood of the enlarged EU, the Czech diplomacy supported the Swedish-Polish plan (released in May 2008) for the development of the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (i.e. the strengthening of the cooperation between the EU and six Eastern European and Southern Caucasus countries). The initiative was hailed for strengthening ties with the East and welcomed as a tool to balance French plans for the Union for the Mediterranean.<sup>51</sup>

The Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy was just one of several topics in the priority area 'EU in the World'.<sup>52</sup> But in the end, the Eastern Partnership became the most visible success and identification mark of the Presidency. The Czechs 'fulfilled their role' and 'ensured [the] final acceptance'<sup>53</sup> of the initiative during the March meeting of the European Council (the initiative was endowed with €600 million). The Eastern Partnership was during the summit on 7 May 2009, which was nevertheless struck by low attendance on the part of the leaders of the biggest EU member states.

The Czech Republic was able to push forward several initiatives in the area of EU's external relations (energy security policy, the Eastern Partnership), but it often failed to represent the EU as a whole.

### ***Entry into the Schengen Zone and the Postponement of the Euro Adoption***

One of the most important items on the agenda of the past three years has been the entrance of the Czech Republic into the *Schengen zone*. The entry into the Schengen zone was one of the most vivid and tangible benefits of the EU membership for the Czech citizens.<sup>54</sup> The key negotiations took place already during autumn and winter 2006. It was agreed that the schedule of the Schengen zone enlargement would be observed even though the development of the second generation of the Schengen Information System was running late (the Council of the EU accepted the compromising Portuguese proposal for the so-called 'SISone4all').

During 2007, the final stages of the evaluation of the country's readiness took place. The Czech Republic joined the Schengen zone at midnight between 20 and 21 December 2007 when the passport checks at its land borders were abolished. The passport checks on the flights to and from the Schengen zone disappeared on 30 March 2008.<sup>55</sup>

In contrast to the entry into the Schengen zone, Czech politicians, experts and other involved actors are divided on the issue of the *Euro zone*. The Social Democrats, the small centrist parties (Christian Democrats, the Greens) and the business partners, for pragmatic reasons, support the idea of an early euro adoption. On the other side, the Civic Democrats continue to raise objections to the idea of the euro adoption and employ the strategy of procrastination. The Civic Democrats were inspired by the ideological and substantive critique of the euro project by President Klaus. Klaus, as an opponent of political integration, criticises the common currency for being a 'political

project' and argues that the EU does not constitute an Optimal Currency Area. Moreover, right-wing politicians fear the loss of national sovereignty over monetary policy.

The timing of the euro adoption has been continuously discussed throughout the past three years. But no progress has been achieved. In August 2007 the Government adopted the Czech Republic's Updated Euro-area Accession Strategy and the original unofficial term for implementing the euro in the Czech Republic of 2009–2010 was abandoned.<sup>56</sup> In 2008, the ČSSD chairman Paroubek put forward 2012 as a possible date for the euro adoption.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, the government of Mirek Topolánek has always been 'euro-sceptic'<sup>58</sup> and postponed all the necessary decisions, including the decision to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (a two year membership in the ERM II is required prior to the euro adoption). Even though the government repeatedly vowed to set the date of the euro adoption (in late 2008 the then Prime Minister Topolánek promised to set the date for the end of 2009),<sup>59</sup> no political decision has been adopted yet. Moreover, until 2008 the Czech Republic was more or less fulfilling the Maastricht criteria,<sup>60</sup> but the global financial and economic crises worsened the outlook for the government debt.

The lack of progress in the adoption of the euro contrasts sharply with the Czech Republic's very smooth entry into the Schengen zone (in the accession agreement the Czech Republic formally signed up for both projects). The Schengen entry was a consensual and highly depoliticised issue. In fact, the ODS-led government picked up the Schengen entry as a showcase illustrating the benefits of the EU for ordinary citizens.<sup>61</sup> Political elites perceived the entry into the Schengen zone as an 'abolition of barriers' and not as an example of 'loss of sovereignty' (in border controls, visa policy and de facto in immigration policy). In contrast, the perceived 'loss of sovereignty' (in monetary policy) has been the main political obstacle for the adoption of the euro. No progress was achieved despite the technical readiness of the Czech Republic and the heavy lobbying by the business community (see the section dedicated to actors).

## **THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF KEY ACTORS**

In the following part we will look at the concrete activities of the single actors involved in the formulation of Czech European policies. We will also look at how the missions of these actors have changed during the three years in which we have followed their activities. In 2007 the new position of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs was constructed. The main intention of this new position and its body within the Government's Office was to prepare for the Czech Presidency. After the end of the presidency this unit still exists, even if its tasks have slightly changed and the minister in charge is no longer a deputy Prime Minister. Also the ratification of the LT has affected the competences of the actors involved in formulating Czech European policies, primarily since the ratification of the treaty led to a change in the rules of procedure for the two Chambers of the parliament.

***The Prime Minister and the Committee for the EU:***

The Prime Minister is involved in the shaping of Czech integration policy primarily in his capacity of being the chairman of the Committee for the EU.<sup>62</sup> The Committee can either meet on the level of its members or on the working level. The Committee defines the broader strategies and positions toward the principal issues discussed in the EU institutions. On the working level the Committee decides on the instructions for COREPER, mandates for ministers in Council meetings and other materials that are connected with the current EU agenda.<sup>63</sup> On the lowest level of the institutional hierarchy, the so-called sectoral coordination groups (resortní koordinační skupiny – RKS) have been established at every ministry. These sectoral coordination groups draft the instructions for the working groups of the Council, COREPER and the Council meetings.

Until October 2006 the Committee for the EU only met on the level of deputy ministers. At that time, however, there was a change in the status of the Committee which was related to the preparations of the Czech EU presidency. The second change of the status came after the end of the presidency.<sup>64</sup> The changes were rather moderate. The only substantial change worth mentioning is that there are now two equal deputy chairmen of the Committee (the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for European Affairs).

The Committee for the EU at the government level met approximately once a month in 2007 and 2008, during the presidency the Committee met nearly every week, and the frequent meetings continued thereafter. Thus, we can state that the involvement of the highest level of the government in European affairs has increased as a consequence of the presidency. In order to deal with the multitude of issues on the EU agenda the Committee can, on the working level, use a tacit procedure for mandates for both COREPER I and II and also for negotiations in the Council. This tacit procedure has been criticised for narrowing down the possible debate and criticism from other ministries, etc.<sup>65</sup>

Especially during the presidency the Prime Minister, the Office of the Government and the Committee for the EU were heavily involved in the work with the EU related agenda since this agenda to a large degree overlapped between the ministries (for instance, regarding energy security, the economic recession, etc). These coordination activities were under the auspices of the deputy Prime Minister (later minister) for European affairs (see below). Yet, the Prime Minister was personally involved in the work during the presidency as well. Among the issues where a Czech Prime Minister left an imprint were the gas crisis in the beginning of 2009, which was handled by Mirek Topolánek, and the so-called Irish guarantees regarding the LT (Jan Fischer). Thus the two Czech Prime Ministers that were in office during the Czech presidency were also the Presidents of the European Council during that period, and both chaired one European Council – in March and June.

During the presidency Mirek Topolánek first faced accusations of not being active enough, probably as a consequence of the very communicative approach of his predecessor in the office of chairman of the European Council (French President Nico-

las Sarkozy).<sup>66</sup> The change of government in May made Jan Fischer President of the European Council. In European press there were a lot of speculations about how this change would affect the presidency. Yet, it seems the change had a rather small effect on the actual work of the presidency, since at the time of the fall of the government the agenda for the rest of the presidency was already set for a long time, and consequently the officials could carry on with their work.<sup>67</sup> Yet, with the change of the government the presidency lost a face, and the episode was clearly negative for the public reputation of the presidency.

### ***The Office of Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs and its Subdivision***

In the beginning of 2007 Alexandr Vondra was appointed Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs. This new office had as its task to coordinate the activities of the government regarding the preparations of the Czech presidency, regarding the negotiations on the new treaty later known as the Lisbon Treaty, and regarding the general planning of Czech European policy. The subdivision was also in charge of the contacts with the permanent representation in Brussels regarding the presidency both during the planning period and during the actual presidency.<sup>68</sup> In order to fulfil these functions the deputy Prime Minister got a new subdivision for European affairs to have at his disposal in the Office of the Government. At the end of 2009 the staff of the subdivision was reduced.<sup>69</sup> There was also a change in the tasks outlined in the rules of procedures for the subdivision, but the general coordination mechanism remained with the subdivision even after the end of the presidency.<sup>70</sup> In this context it is important to note that at the working level the minister for European affairs is the chairman of the Committee for the EU.<sup>71</sup>

The subdivision should deal with issues where several resorts are involved, or where it is unclear where the issue shall be handled. Since 2007, gradually the unit has played an increasingly important role for the coordination of Czech European policy in cases where A) the central Czech long term priorities were concerned or B) there were conflicts between different ministries. Among the issues where the subdivision got heavily involved were institutional issues (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty), climate change, energy, the enlargement of the EU into the Western Balkans, and the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is in the competence of the unit to deal with all broader strategies of the EU such as the Lisbon Strategy and the Baltic Sea Strategy. However, in general, strategies referring to external relations of the EU are in the competences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the presidency it was this unit that, among others, led the work with the so-called Irish guarantees regarding the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>72</sup>

There have been three different ministers (or Deputy Prime Ministers) in charge of the subdivision since 2007: in the coalition government in office from 2007–2009, Alexandr Vondra and, then in the so-called apolitical care-taking cabinet that lasted from 2009–2010, Štefan Füle and Juraj Chmiel. To some degree the establishment of the position in 2007 might be linked to the fact that it was established by a coalition government where one of the smaller parties had the foreign ministry, whereas European affairs was then given to the major party of the coalition – the ODS. It remains to be seen what will happen with the position and the subdivision when the

next regular government will come into office. However, given that such an office is by no means unusual in Europe it could well be that the office will continue to operate in a similar way.

### *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

The establishment of the position of a Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs in 2007 to some degree limited the competences of the MFA regarding European policy.<sup>73</sup> However, the MFA continued to play an important role for defining the mandate for the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). According to the latest change of the statute of the Committee for the EU the foreign minister is now also one of two equal vice chairmen of the Committee for the EU on the level of the government and the vice chairman of the working level. In the beginning there were some conflicts and uncertainties regarding the division of competences between the MFA and the Office of the Government but gradually such disputes seem to have been less frequent, and there is no evidence of such problems during the Czech presidency.<sup>74</sup>

The MFA plays a crucial role in the making of the Czech position on the EU's external relations. In the years prior to the presidency a lot of the work on the MFA was also oriented towards this task.<sup>75</sup> The transatlantic relations, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe are the three priority areas in the external relations of the EU.

The MFA is also an important actor since it is the gestor of the Permanent Representation in Brussels, and thus the MFA, together with the subdivision for European Affairs, led the representation during the presidency.<sup>76</sup> During the studied years three sections in the MFA dealt with the EU: the EU General Affairs Department (EUGA), the EU Policy Department (EUPO 1 and 2), and the Secretariat for the Preparations of the Presidency. The last section was cancelled at the end of 2009.<sup>77</sup>

The MFA was in charge of the external relations of the EU during the presidency. A big challenge for the ministry was how to handle contacts with third countries – especially since this included countries with which the Czech Republic had very little experience – for instance Pakistan or Jordan. The launching of the Eastern Partnership in May 2009 in Prague was considered a success for the Czech Republic and also for the work of the MFA.<sup>78</sup>

From 2007, the Foreign Minister was Karel Schwarzenberg, who was nominated by the Greens. After the fall of the government during the presidency he was replaced by the former deputy minister Jan Kohout. This change, however, had a rather marginal impact on the concrete work of the MFA during the presidency.<sup>79</sup>

The Czech Permanent Representation in Brussels and the Czech representation in EU member states and in countries outside of the EU were crucial for the management of the presidency. If we look at Czech representations abroad in general, the presidency was very demanding in areas outside of the EU, especially in places where the Union is active regarding either the processes of enlargement or within the neighbourhood policy (the Western Balkans, Turkey and the countries in the Eastern Partnership) and in countries where the EU plays an important role in the transformation process, i.e. countries where the EU has its special representative such as Mac-

edonia, Kosovo, Moldavia, Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In all these cases the Czech Republic had the difficult task of coordinating the activities of other member states and other bodies.

### *The President*

The President is involved in the preparation of government's strategies, positions and instructions for the EU Council meetings through the Committee for the EU. The Office of the President of the Republic (i.e. the President's administrative apparatus) is an associate member of both the working and the government level of the Committee for the EU and participates on the discussion about more general and strategic issues.<sup>80</sup>

The consistency and effectiveness of Czech foreign policy depended on a fragile structure of gentlemen's agreements and informal communication channels. An agreement has been made over the representation of the Czech Republic in the EU institutions (the President attends the informal meetings of the European Council).<sup>81</sup> Informal but regular meetings between the key figures (the President, the Prime Minister and the minister of foreign affairs) have been arranged in order to coordinate Czech foreign policy.

These informal regulatory and communication structures eroded in the course of Topolánek's term. The informal coordination meetings ceased in 2008 and the mutual hostilities between Topolánek and Klaus have been exposed to the public. Klaus' safe distance (or even isolation) from the treaty negotiations and the everyday European multilateral diplomacy allowed him to play the role of an outspoken critic, provocateur and self-appointed EU dissident.<sup>82</sup> The President's request for the opt-out from the Charter (October 2009) only testified the lack of communication on strategic issues of the European agenda between the government and the President. Despite the lack of coordination in the key questions, the President and the government were able to reach an agreement about chairing the June European Council and the summits with third countries during the Czech EU Presidency.

On the European level, the President put stress on bilateral relations with individual member states in the immediate vicinity and on personal ties with their heads. Relations with the representatives of EU institutions remained cool and formal at best, but they often ended in sharp diplomatic disputes like the meeting with MEPs in December 2008.<sup>83</sup> The Czech President clashed with the European Parliament also through his provocative speech in the European Parliament in the early days of the Czech EU Presidency.<sup>84</sup> His sharp critique of the EU and its institutions prompted a walkout by a large number of MEPs, although he was also cheered by right-wing and eurosceptic deputies because of it.<sup>85</sup>

With regard to the subject area, the Czech President focused on abstract, conceptual and strategic issues of European integration, especially on the institutional design of the EU. He has also questioned the merits of the common currency<sup>86</sup> and he sharply criticised EU's measures on the fight against the climate change (carbon dioxide reductions).<sup>87</sup>

Since the ideological background and the substance of his positions are discussed elsewhere, we would like to focus on the procedure and the concrete steps taken by

the President. In the aftermath of the negative Irish referendum (June 2008) the President called for a halt to the Czech ratification process and used all his means to achieve this goal. Most of the time he shielded himself with the pending Irish referenda and the pending reviews of the Treaty by the Czech Constitutional Court. The tin roof got hotter in May 2009 when the lower Chamber made clear its approval of the Lisbon Treaty. In a dramatic public appearance President Klaus described the vote as 'yet another failure of an important part of our political elites of the type which we know all too well from other crucial moments of our history'.<sup>88</sup> He accused the political elites of cowardice and a betrayal of long-term national interests. The serious accusations and the disregard for the Parliament's will brought about a backlash from the Parliament (see below).

President Klaus and the senators loyal to him reacted with a series of counter-measures. In June 2009 Klaus argued that the document specifying the so-called Irish guarantees is an 'international political treaty'.<sup>89</sup> Thus, he expected the Prime Minister to ask for the full powers to conclude such a treaty and the parliament to approve these guarantees for Ireland.<sup>90</sup> The President's legal opinion was dismissed by the government.<sup>91</sup> In an attempt to relieve the President from political pressures, a group of 17 Senators loyal to him asked the Constitutional Court to review the 'binding mandate' (the objection was swiftly swept aside by the Court) and on 29 September they filed a second petition to the Constitutional Court to review the Treaty of Lisbon.<sup>92</sup>

The final act of the drama was surprisingly short. On 8 October 2009 Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (the holder of the EU presidency) reported about Václav Klaus' new request, which came up during their phone conversation.<sup>93</sup> Following this leak, President Klaus disclosed his demand for a Czech opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights.<sup>94</sup> He argued that the Charter could serve as a backdoor for property claims by Sudeten Germans evicted from Czechoslovakia after the end of WWII. The negotiations were eventually reopened and Prime Minister Fischer was relegated to the role of a mere mediator between President Klaus and the rest of the EU. After brief but intense talks the Czech Republic gained a political formula in which Protocol 30 of the Treaty would apply not only to the United Kingdom and Poland but also to the Czech Republic (the so-called 'opt-out' will be appended to the next treaty that enlarges the EU). Even though the media and the politicians repeatedly described the deal as an 'exemption' or an 'opt-out' from the Charter of Fundamental Rights,<sup>95</sup> Protocol 30 in fact represents a mere 'interpretation clause'.<sup>96</sup>

Shortly after that, the Constitutional Court ruled that the ratification of the LT did not violate the Czech constitutional order and Klaus signed the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>97</sup> The President sharply criticised the 'political opinion' of the Court and warned that 'with the Lisbon Treaty taking effect, the Czech Republic will cease to be a sovereign state'.<sup>98</sup> Until the very last moment President Klaus played his heroic role of 1) the sole defender of Czech national interests and 2) the last standing EU dissident. He admitted considering resignation over Lisbon's ratification, but then he reached the view that the LT does not mean the end of history and that there are 'more battles to come'.<sup>99</sup>

### *The Parliament*

The Parliament's function is threefold: it discusses motions for EU legislation and documents (through the 'early-warning system'); it examines the government's instructions and mandates for the meetings of the Council of the EU or the European Council; and it discusses nominations for important posts in European institutions.<sup>100</sup> The parliament also implements the European legislature into the Czech legal system.

On the EU level, the Czech Parliament participates in the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (*Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires et Européennes des Parlements de l'Union européenne – COSAC*).<sup>101</sup> The Czech Parliament had a busy schedule during the Czech EU Presidency. Among other events, the Parliament (specifically the Community and European Affairs Committees of both its Chambers) organised the XLI. COSAC meeting, which took place on 10–12 May 2009.<sup>102</sup>

### *The Chamber of Deputies*

A key organ of the Chamber of Deputies (CoD) in the European agenda is the Committee for the European Affairs. The resolutions of the committee stand for the decisions of the Chamber of Deputies as a whole (the Senate needs to adopt its resolutions in plenary sessions – see below). The parliamentary debate about the EU agenda has been complicated by the fact that the post of the Chairperson of the Committee on European Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies has been vacant since December 2007. The Committee got a chairperson at the beginning of April 2009 when Kateřina Jacques (the Greens) was elected for the post on the second attempt.<sup>103</sup> In June 2008 the ČSSD cancelled a gentleman's agreement about 'pairing off' missing deputies. The agreement ensured that the absence of a coalition deputy (for example, a minister travelling to Brussels) would be counterbalanced by the absence of an opposition deputy.

Not surprisingly, the most important item on the European agenda of both Chambers has been the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>104</sup> The first reading in the CoD took place in the second half of March 2008 and the beginning of April 2008. At that time, the Senate was preparing a constitutional review of the Treaty, and the deputies from the ODS were able to adjourn the discussion on the Lisbon Treaty in the Chamber's Committees until the Constitutional Court's ruling.

After the green light from the Constitutional Court (the end of November 2008), the political parties clashed over the timing of the LT ratification. The extraordinary session of the Chamber adjourned the issue until 3 February 2009, when the accompanying 'binding mandate' was supposed to be ready.

In January 2009, two Committees interrupted the discussion on the Treaty. In reaction, the opposition ČSSD, which favoured a quick ratification of the Treaty, initiated an extraordinary session of the lower house. On 18 February 2009 the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament adopted the Treaty of Lisbon by the required constitutional majority. The Chamber of Deputies complemented its approval with a resolution declaring that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU does not apply retroactively and does not question the post-war property arrangement (the Beneš decrees).<sup>105</sup>

The position of both Chambers of the Parliament towards the government has been strengthened by the so-called ‘binding mandate of the government’. This special mandate bars the government from transferring Czech national powers to the EU (through the passerelle clause and the flexibility clause introduced by the Lisbon Treaty) without the Parliament’s consent.<sup>106</sup> The binding mandate, implemented through the amendments of the rules of procedure of both parliamentary Chambers, represents a nodal point of a political agreement regarding the ratification of the LT in the Czech Parliament. The amendments of the parliamentary rules of procedures have been accepted by the Chamber of Deputies on 19 March 2009.

### *The Senate*

While the Czech Senate’s power in domestic affairs is significantly lower than that of the Chamber of Deputies, both Chambers stand on equal footing with regard to the scrutiny of EU Affairs. The Senate treats the foreign policy agenda and European affairs as its profile topics.<sup>107</sup>

The key body responsible for the EU agenda (focusing primarily on the scrutiny of the Czech government’s actions in the Council of Ministers and on debates about emerging European legal acts) is the Committee on EU Affairs headed by Senator Luděk Sefzig. In contrast to the CoD, the Czech Senate adopts positions on the merits of the Government’s position *vis-a-vis* the draft legislative act in question via the plenary session.<sup>108</sup> Governmental representatives also inform the Senate about positions taken at the European Council.

The Senate engaged actively in the process of refining the rules of parliamentary scrutiny of the EU agenda of the Czech government (the so-called ‘binding mandate’). The Committees of the Senate discussed the LT during March and April 2008, and the debate culminated in the EU Affairs Committee’s recommendation to review the conformity of the LT with the Czech constitutional order (9 April 2008). After a stormy plenary session, the Senate adopted the petition to review the constitutionality of the LT by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. The Court was asked to review the constitutionality of six specific points of the EU’s reform treaty: the existence of the exclusive competencies of the EU; the flexibility clause; the passerelle clause; the right of the EU to conclude an international treaty through a qualified majority in the Council; the possible conflict between the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the EU and Czech constitutional human rights standards; and the EU sanctions regime against a member state violating human rights.<sup>109</sup>

The Senate’s petition represented an important turning point in the ratification process and attracted wide attention both at home and abroad. The Senate pushed the Constitutional Court into playing a more active role in reviewing the primary legislation. On the other side, by submitting the LT to the Constitutional Court, the Senate partially divested its responsibility for taking political decisions to the Court.

The Constitutional Court published its decision on 26 November 2008. It concluded that the articles under scrutiny are not inconsistent with the constitutional order.<sup>110</sup> Nevertheless, the debate about the Lisbon Treaty has been paused in December due to the fine-tuning of the legislature introducing the ‘binding mandate’. The

binding mandate has been incorporated already in the Senate motion of the Act on the principles of conduct and relations between both Chambers and in their external relations (*Stykový zákon*).<sup>111</sup> But because this motion also regulated the Presidential elections, on which no consensus exists, it encountered severe difficulties in the CoD. The ‘binding mandate’ has eventually been implemented through the amendments of the rules of procedure drafted by the Chamber of Deputies. The amendments put both Chambers on equal footing in this regard.

The Czech Senate restarted the discussion on the LT no sooner than in April 2009 (in the meantime the CoD passed the LT and the ‘binding mandate’). In a closely watched and dramatic vote on 6 May 2009, the Czech Senate approved the LT together with the ‘binding mandate’.<sup>112</sup>

The President sharply criticised this vote (see above), and his disregard of the parliamentary approval aroused a widespread criticism from parliamentarians of all colours. Several deputies spoke about the possibility of setting limits to Presidential powers. The head of the Senate Přemysl Sobotka (an ODS heavyweight) described Klaus’ attacks on the senators’ voting as a challenge to the sovereignty of the legislative body, the pillar of parliamentary democracy.<sup>113</sup>

On 31 August 2009 a group of 17 eurosceptical senators challenged the ‘binding mandate’ through the Constitutional Court (but the objection was swiftly swept aside by the Court).<sup>114</sup> In September 2009 (shortly before the second Irish referendum) the same group of senators submitted their motion, which had been awaited for several months, to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Treaty would infringe the Czech sovereignty. In contrast to the first complaint (filed by the Senate as a whole), the second complaint was more radical and more complex, it received only very limited political backing and its authors openly admitted that its purpose was to delay the process, to provide the President with extra time and to ‘relieve him from political pressures’.<sup>115</sup>

On November 3<sup>rd</sup> the Constitutional Court delivered its second judgment, which found that the ratification of the LT did not violate the constitutional provisions.<sup>116</sup> With a reference to the steps taken by the petitioners, the Court also warned against the risk of abuse of procedural mechanisms before the Constitutional Court. It stated that any future petition to review the constitutionality of international treaties by groups of senators, groups of deputies, and the President of the Republic must be delivered ‘without unnecessary delay’. The Court emphasised that the decision to transfer competences to the EU is a political one since ‘the responsibility for these political decisions cannot be transferred to the Constitutional Court; it can review them only at the point when they are actually made on the political level’.<sup>117</sup>

### ***Social Partners***

The social partners (trade unions and employers or their representative organisations) participate on the formulation of the official EU policy of the Czech Republic primarily through their membership in the tripartite (the Council of Economic and Social Agreement; *Rada pro hospodářskou a sociální dohodu* – RHSD). The members of the tripartite are the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (*Českomoravská konfederace odborových svazů* – ČMKOS), the Association of Autonomous Trade

Unions (*Asociace samostatných odborů* – ASO), the Confederation of Industry (*Svaz průmyslu a dopravy* – SP) and the Confederation of Employers’ and Entrepreneurs’ Associations (*Konfederace zaměstnavatelských a podnikatelských svazů* – KZPS). The Czech Chamber of Commerce (*Hospodářská komora* – HK) is also able to exert some influence on Czech governmental positions and the EU-level decision-making process.

The most important body responsible for the EU agenda within the RHSD is the Working Team for the EU, which serves as a platform for discussing concepts, priorities and selected draft laws.<sup>118</sup> Nevertheless, the functioning of the Working Team for the EU has been disturbed by the institutional changes in the government (the establishment of the office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs), and the meetings remained rather formal for some time.<sup>119</sup> The social partners may participate as observers in the meetings of the so-called sectoral coordination groups, where the instructions for the EU Council meetings are being drafted. Czech social partners suffered from a relative lack of expertise compared to the state administration.<sup>120</sup>

In a joint effort with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Czech entrepreneurial and employer organisations (the Confederation of Industry, the Confederation of Employers, the Entrepreneurs’ Associations and the Chamber of Commerce) established the Czech Business Representation to the EU (CEBRE). Nevertheless, the primary task of CEBRE has been to act as an information service for Czech companies rather than representing the Czech business community and lobbying in the EU decision-making process.

Czech trade unions and institutions representing employers may influence the European legislative process through their membership in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and through specific pan-European umbrella associations. EESC is a consultative body within the EU institutional structure, and the Czech Republic is represented in all three of its groups (employers, employees and various interests). ČMKOS is an active member of a pan-European umbrella association of trade unions, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and on the other side of the barricade, the Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic participates in BusinessEurope. These pan-European associations serve not only as *lobbying* tools for European trade unions and businesses respectively, but they also provide a platform for *coordinating* actions taken by individual national associations on the domestic level.

In principle there is only one Czech company capable of effective individual promotion of her interests in the European agenda: the state-owned energy company ČEZ. The company maintains a specialised European Agenda Section within its organisational structure and operates a permanent ČEZ Representative Office in Brussels. Czech trade unions, institutions representing entrepreneurs/employers and ČEZ were able to win support for their cases among like-minded Czech MEPs. ČEZ, for example, cooperated with the communist MEP Miroslav Ransdorf (EP’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy) on the preparation of the amendment to the so-called third energy package.<sup>121</sup>

The direction of power and influence between the nominally state-run ČEZ and the Czech government is a rewarding topic of many speculations.<sup>122</sup> The positions of the

Czech government on most issues (internal market, energy, environment, etc.) generally tend to respect the interests of Czech business and industry – in particular ČEZ, the main energy producer (and the largest contributor to the public budget) The company also cooperates with the government on many high-profile initiatives and conferences (like the European Nuclear Energy Forum).<sup>123</sup>

Czech trade unions paid attention to the working time regulation and the services liberalisation. On the other side, the Czech business and industry community focused on the euro adoption, energy market liberalisation, climate change, administrative burdens reduction and market liberalisation.

The representatives of Czech business and industry, suffering because of the strong Czech crown, lobbied heavily in favour of a quick adoption of the euro. Especially in 2008 the Czech industry leaders pressured the government to at least set a target date for the euro adoption. But as we have already noted, the Czech government successfully resisted these calls.<sup>124</sup> In 2008, the lobbying efforts of the Czech business community focused predominantly on the so-called third energy package. In line with the government's position, Czech entrepreneurial and employer organisations and ČEZ sharply criticised the Commission's plan to introduce the auctioning of pollution allowances.

### ***Other Actors***

In this section we will shortly assess the influence of other Czech actors (regional actors, municipalities, NGOs and individuals) on the Czech Republic's policy within the EU or directly on the EU's decision-making process. The representatives of these special interests do have a limited access to the lowest level of the preparation of the government's instructions for the EU Council as they are being drafted (through sectoral coordination groups or the so-called 'enlarged sectoral coordination groups').

Czech regions and municipalities and their national associations play the rather passive role of consumers of EU's legislation and financial resources, focusing on drawing money from the EU structural funds. With some rare exceptions (the Region of South Bohemia maintains a permanent office in Brussels and is active at the CoR),<sup>125</sup> the lack of administrative and expert capacities prohibits Czech regions and municipalities from more actively lobbying in the EU's legislative process and participating in the preparation of governmental instructions for the Council of the EU.<sup>126</sup> Similarly to the regions and municipalities, the participation of Czech NGOs in the formal process of the preparation of governmental instructions (through RKS) has been very low or varying at best. Moreover, some NGOs like Greenpeace focus on public and media campaigns instead. The interviews with state officials confirm that the influence of NGOs on the government's official policy stands or falls on the NGOs' ability to provide useful expert opinions and inputs.<sup>127</sup>

The non-governmental sector is relatively fragmented, but one can find national associations of NGOs focusing on environmental issues (the Green Circle) and on development cooperation (the Czech Forum for Development Co-operation) which are able to deliver expert opinions and participate in substantive discussions about the Czech government's positions and priorities in the specific areas.<sup>128</sup>

Among the individual NGOs we would like to single out People in Need (PIN), which focuses on a wide range of topics ranging from relief aid and development assistance to defence of human rights and democratic freedom. PIN relies on its long tradition, its multiplicity of programs, its solid expert base and, last but not least, its close ties to the Czech political elite and state administration.

The ex-President Václav Havel stands out as the most influential individual person engaging in the EU agenda from beyond the official circles. In April 2008 the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) was launched under the patronage of Václav Havel.<sup>129</sup> The EPD serves as the platform for European civil and political society organisations working on democracy assistance.<sup>130</sup> A host of various public intellectuals and authorities stepped into the debate about the LT and the future of the EU. Václav Havel presented his vision during his speech to the European Parliament on 11 November to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>131</sup>

## THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE CZECH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC SPACE

### *Topics*

The public debates during the last three years have to a large degree followed a similar pattern as the political debate; the two big issues have been the general question of the future of Europe and the Czech presidency. The Czech media has paid a lot of attention to how Czech actors have positioned themselves on the LT since the European discussions on what to do with the failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe restarted in 2007. The same year the discussions on the Czech presidency and the presidency priorities also started to gain media attention, and up until the presidency the preparations were a part of the news coverage. During the actual presidency there was a tendency of the Czech media to discuss issues in terms of successes or failures of the Czech political leadership, and for this reason a lot of attention was paid to how the foreign press wrote about the Czech presidency. Other issues have also been present in the public debate, such as, for instance, the euro.

The debates on the LT over the years were mainly the domain of politicians, EU experts and journalists, but on the other hand, the euro, for instance, also attracted the interest of organised business and other entrepreneurs. It is also clear that President Klaus receives a disproportionately big share of the attention in the public discourse. His confrontational views gain attention not only in the Czech press (and the foreign press, which then gives the Czech press a second reason to write about them) but also among experts.<sup>132</sup> Klaus was able to use both the Czech ratification of the LT and the Czech presidency as opportunities to present his euro-sceptical views. At the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 the Czech news coverage was full of writings about the negative European expectations for the Czech presidency in other European countries, which were based on the information reported by other European media largely due to Klaus' possible impact on the presidency.<sup>133</sup> And when the cabinet fell in the

middle of the presidency the discussions on the possible role of President Klaus for the remaining time of the presidency began again.<sup>134</sup>

### *The General Structure of the Debates*

If we look at the general structure of how the Czech media write about the European Union, we can identify two dominant characteristics: 1) a tendency to focus on specific Czech issues and 2) a tendency to describe any EU decision as something that took place completely without Czech involvement. We will start with the latter of these characteristics.

Ever since the accession period there has been a tendency to describe EU decisions (where, of course, the Czech government is one of the decision-makers as well) as decisions made by Brussels. Still, six years after the Czech EU accession the EU is often described as a distant norm-maker, and not as an institution for which the Czech Republic has shared responsibilities. The EU decision making is often described in terms of the Czech Republic either greeting or criticising the EU position without taking into account the complex decision making process of the EU. From this general understanding of the EU follows a situation where not only the decisions are the decisions of the others, but where also the money of EU funds is understood as the money of the others. For this reason it is seen as less of a problem if these sources are used in a non-efficient way, etc.

Secondly, there is a tendency towards a Czechification of the EU in Czech public discourse. David Černý's *Entropa* exhibit is illustrative of this phenomenon; in the middle of Černý's Europe you find Klaus screaming out his statements, and the rest of the EU is partly made up of only passive bystanders. When, for instance, the new European Commission was discussed in 2009 it was not so much about what impact the composition of this commission would have on the EU as such but rather about how successful the Czech Republic was in obtaining a good seat, and whether Štefan Füle as Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy received an important position in the end or not. This Czechification is not merely a product of journalists since politicians also contributed to it. A clear example of this was the elections to the European Parliament in 2009. During the campaigns the political parties often referred to explicitly domestic topics without any connections to the work of the European Parliament. And sometimes this was the case even when journalists did their best to move the discussion to European topics.<sup>135</sup>

## CONCLUSION

There is continuity in the Czech EU policy if we look at the level of the government. The governments have considered the EU agenda their priority independent of their political colour. During the period the EU agenda received increased attention from the highest levels of the government, which is reflected in the changes in the working of the Committee on EU. In the government the largely euro-sceptical ODS had some problems with some of the party's backbenchers but generally took a pragmatic approach towards the broader issues of European integration. We also see a coherent

approach towards some issues that have been stressed during the period such as membership of the Schengen area, further liberalisation of the single market and energy security. Yet, at the same time the Czech political debate on the future of the EU and on the future of the Czech Republic in the European integration process is characterised by an almost total lack of consensus, which has been confirmed by several studies on the topic.<sup>136</sup> Especially the topic of the LT polarised the political elite.

During the studied three years a change can be identified regarding the borderline of the dispute over the EU within the political elite. The traditional dispute between the euro-sceptical ODS, on the one hand, and the pro-European parties – the ČSSD, the KDU-ČSL and the SZ – on the other, was largely replaced by an internal dispute within the ODS during the last year of the studied period – between a pragmatic party leadership and a euro-sceptical President and former party leader assisted by some senators and MPs.<sup>137</sup> Disputes over the EU were also one of the major reasons for why Klaus formally left the ODS at the end of 2008 and also a contributing reason for why some ODS MPs decided not to support the Topolánek government in March 2009. A Czech specificity here is that the very infected political debate on the EU among the political elite paradoxically does not correspond with the preferences of their voters. Among the voters ODS supporters tend to be more positive about European integration than their ČSSD counterparts.<sup>138</sup>

In the chapter we have identified the two main topics on the agenda during the period as the presidency and the Lisbon Treaty. Regarding the presidency the Czech Republic to a large degree took a rather ambitious road with its intentions of making an imprint on the EU. The Czech Republic wanted to present its priorities and also improve its position and reputation within the EU.<sup>139</sup> The Czech Republic managed to realise its priorities where these met with support within the EU and where these related to the existing agenda, e.g. the Eastern Partnership and energy security. On the other hand, on some issues the Czech Republic had a very outspoken approach which did not correspond to the EU consensus, e.g. the Western Balkans or Israel, and in these areas the presidency achieved less. The presidency also had to spend much time on issues which it could not plan for, primarily the global economic recession. However, regarding this task the presidency was largely evaluated rather positively.

The main failure of the presidency was on the level of its visibility and public image. The Czech Republic did not manage to fulfil the intention of using the double anniversaries – twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and five years after the 2004 enlargement – to present the country as a constructive and efficient partner within the EU.<sup>140</sup> There were primarily two reasons for this: 1) the fall of the government in the middle of the presidency and 2) the turmoil surrounding the Czech ratification of the LT, which was fuelled by the many radical comments of President Klaus.

In 2009, after the end of the presidency, the Czech approach towards the EU could return to normal. However, it seems that some of the institutional changes that were brought about by the presidency will remain. The meetings of the Committee for the EU take place on a higher level and more frequently than prior to the presidency planning period, and also the subdivision on European affairs within the Office of the Government so far remains the central unit for EU coordination.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> The authors would like to thank Jan Karlas for his work as co-author on the chapters on the European dimension in the 2007 and 2008 yearbooks. In some parts we draw extensively on work done by Karlas, and we recognise this.
- <sup>2</sup> Dlouhodobý program ČSSD [Long Term Programme of ČSSD], 2005.
- <sup>3</sup> For the opinion of Václav Klaus see, e.g., *Václava Klause v Evropském parlamentu* 19. 2. 2009. On-line: ([www.euroskop.cz/47/10874/clanek/projev-vaclava-klause-v-evropskem-parlamentu](http://www.euroskop.cz/47/10874/clanek/projev-vaclava-klause-v-evropskem-parlamentu)); for the opinion of the ODS and the KSČM, see, e.g., *Stenografický zápis 46. schůze Poslanecké sněmovny*. On-line: ([www.psp.cz/eknih/2006ps/stenprot/046schuz/s046057.htm](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/2006ps/stenprot/046schuz/s046057.htm)).
- <sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Beneš, Vít (2008): *Rozšiřování [Enlargement]*. In: J. Karlas (ed): *Jak předsedat Evropské unii? Návrh priorit předsednictví ČR v Radě EU v roce 2009*, pp. 49–67. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů; Král, David (2006): *Česká debata o perspektívách členství Turecka a Ukrajiny v EU*. Praha: Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM.
- <sup>5</sup> See Drulák, Petr (2008): *Česká zahraniční politika mezi internacionalismem a atlantismem*. In: M. Kořan et al.: *Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2007. Analýza ÚMV*. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, pp. 395–402.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid: p. 396
- <sup>7</sup> Speech in the Chamber of Deputies by Vlastimil Tlustý, *Stenografický zápis 46. schůze Poslanecké sněmovny*.
- <sup>8</sup> Zahradil, Jan–Plecitý, Petr–Adrián, Petr–Bednář, Miloslav (2001): *Manifest českého eurorealismu (dokument k ideové konferenci ODS)*. On-line: ([www.ods.cz/docs/dokumenty/zahradil-manifest.pdf](http://www.ods.cz/docs/dokumenty/zahradil-manifest.pdf)).
- <sup>9</sup> Kopecný, Petr and Mudde, Cass (2002): *The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe*. *European Union Politics*, 2002, Vol. 3, o. 3, pp. 297–326, page 302.
- <sup>10</sup> *Prohlášení Klause k rozhodnutí ÚS a ratifikaci lisabonské smlouvy*. 3. 11. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/prohlaseni-klause-k-rozhodnuti-us-a-ratifikaci-lisabonske-smlouvy/405912&id\\_seznam=](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/prohlaseni-klause-k-rozhodnuti-us-a-ratifikaci-lisabonske-smlouvy/405912&id_seznam=)).
- <sup>11</sup> *Stenografický zápis 46. schůze Poslanecké sněmovny*.
- <sup>12</sup> *Czech EU Presidency*. ČSSD, 2. 7. 2008. On-line: ([www.CSSD.cz/s14983/s18962/](http://www.CSSD.cz/s14983/s18962/)).
- <sup>13</sup> *Pozice vlády České republiky v rámci jednání o institucionální reformě Evropské Unie [Position of the government of the Czech Republic within the negotiations of the institutional reform of the European Union]*. Vláda ČR, 25. 4. 2007. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/assets/evropske-zalezitosti/dokumenty/Pozice\\_vlady\\_CR\\_final\\_25.4..pdf](http://www.vlada.cz/assets/evropske-zalezitosti/dokumenty/Pozice_vlady_CR_final_25.4..pdf)).
- <sup>14</sup> Interview with an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU General Affairs Department, 7. 2. 2008.
- <sup>15</sup> *Pozice vlády České republiky v rámci jednání o institucionální reformě Evropské Unie [Position of the government of the Czech Republic within the negotiations of the institutional reform of the European Union]*, op. cit.
- <sup>16</sup> See, for example, *Otázky Václava Moravce [Questions of Václav Moravec]*, Czech television (ČT1), 16. 3. 2008.
- <sup>17</sup> See the abstract of the *Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, 26. 11. 2008. On-line: ([angl.concourt.cz/angl\\_verze/doc/pl-19-08.php](http://angl.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/pl-19-08.php)).
- <sup>18</sup> Těsnopisecká zpráva z 6. schůze Senátu, 6. 5. 2009. On-line: ([www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/original/6384/6384](http://www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/original/6384/6384)).

- <sup>19</sup> *Prioritní oblasti předsednictví České republiky v Radě Evropské unie v prvním pololetí roku 2009* [Priority areas of the Czech Presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2009]. Government of the Czech Republic, 10. 10. 2007.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> *Work Programme of the Czech Presidency*. Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU, January 2009. On-line: ([www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=6226&down=yes](http://www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=6226&down=yes)).
- <sup>22</sup> *An unnerving Czech EU presidency*. Financial Times, 30. 10. 2008. On-line: ([blogs.ft.com/brussels-blog/2008/10/an-unnerving-czech-eu-presidency/](http://blogs.ft.com/brussels-blog/2008/10/an-unnerving-czech-eu-presidency/)).
- <sup>23</sup> Karlas, Jan (2010): *The executive co-ordination of the Czech presidency: unexpectedly effective*. In: Drulák, Petr–Šabič, Zlatko (eds): *The Czech and Slovenian EU presidencies in a comparative perspective*. In print.
- <sup>24</sup> *Switch-off ends Czech's life support presidency*. Financial Times, 16. 6. 2009. On-line: ([www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec98d840-5a95-11de-8c14-00144feabdc0,dwp\\_uuid=d8cc5c02-3164-11dd-b77c-0000779fd2ac.html](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec98d840-5a95-11de-8c14-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=d8cc5c02-3164-11dd-b77c-0000779fd2ac.html)); see also *Some wins, but Czech EU presidency seen as chaotic failure*. Earth-Times, 28. 6. 2009. On-line: ([www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/275171,some-wins-but-czech-eu-presidency-seen-as-chaotic-failure.html](http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/275171,some-wins-but-czech-eu-presidency-seen-as-chaotic-failure.html)); Fuksiewicz, Aleksander–Łada, Agnieszka (2009): *The Czech Presidency in the Council of the European Union – the view from Poland*. Warsaw: The Institute of Public Affairs. On-line: ([www.prezydencjaue.gov.pl/en/files/pliki/download/czechy\\_isp\\_en.plf.pdf](http://www.prezydencjaue.gov.pl/en/files/pliki/download/czechy_isp_en.plf.pdf)).
- <sup>25</sup> *Vaclav Klaus, trouble-fête de l'Europe*. Le Figaro, 1. 1. 2009. On-line: ([www.lefigaro.fr/international/2009/01/02/01003-20090102ARTFIG00001-vaclav-klaus-trouble-fete-de-l-europe-.php](http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2009/01/02/01003-20090102ARTFIG00001-vaclav-klaus-trouble-fete-de-l-europe-.php)); *Fears as Czech Republic takes over helm of EU*. The Guardian, 1. 1. 2009. On-line: ([www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/01/czech-republic-eu-persidency-helm](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/01/czech-republic-eu-persidency-helm)); *Grumpy Uncle Vaclav*. The Economist, 4. 12. 2008. On-line: ([www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story\\_id=12724780](http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=12724780)).
- <sup>26</sup> *Czech government falls, putting EU presidency at risk*. EUobserver.com, 24. 3. 2009. On-line: ([euobserver.com/9/27844](http://euobserver.com/9/27844)).
- <sup>27</sup> *EU Council President must manage national leaders, says Barroso*. EUobserver.com, 9. 10. 2009. On-line: ([euobserver.com/9/28807](http://euobserver.com/9/28807)).
- <sup>28</sup> Fuksiewicz, Aleksander–Łada, Agnieszka (2009): *The Czech Presidency in the Council of the European Union – the view from Poland*, op. cit., p. 30.
- <sup>29</sup> *Prioritní oblasti předsednictví České republiky v Radě Evropské unie v prvním pololetí roku*. Government of the Czech Republic, 10. 10. 2007.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup> Zemanová, Štěpánka–Abrahám, Josef (2010): *Achieving unachievable goals? Impartiality, effectiveness, crisis and economic priorities of the Czech Presidency*. In: Drulák, Petr–Šabič, Zlatko (eds): *The Czech and Slovenian EU Presidencies in a Comparative Perspective*. In print.
- <sup>32</sup> *Achievements of the Czech Presidency: Europe without Barriers*. Government of the Czech Republic, September 2009. On-line: ([www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=61211&down=yes](http://www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=61211&down=yes)); Král, David–Bartovic, Vladimír–Řiháčková, Věra (2009): *The 2009 Czech EU Presidency: Contested Leadership at a Time of Crisis*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.
- <sup>33</sup> Kratochvíl, Petr–Beneš, Vít (2009): (*Tschechischer Stolz und (bestätigte) Vorurteile. Eine Bilanz der tschechischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft*. Integration, Vol. 2009, No. 4, pp. 361–371; Král, David–Bartovic, Vladimír–Řiháčková, Věra (2009): *The 2009 Czech EU Presidency: Contested Leadership at a Time of Crisis*, op. cit.
- <sup>34</sup> *Česko hájí v Unii jadernou energii*. Hospodářské noviny, 23. 5. 2008. On-line: ([hn.ihned.cz/c1-24894350-cesko-haji-v-unii-jadernou-energii](http://hn.ihned.cz/c1-24894350-cesko-haji-v-unii-jadernou-energii)).
- <sup>35</sup> European Nuclear Energy Forum. On-line: ([ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/forum\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/forum_en.htm)); *Prague and Bratislava to host EU nuclear energy debates*. Euractiv.com, 21. 6. 2007. On-line: ([www.euractiv.com/en/energy/prague-bratislava-host-eu-nuclear-energy-debates/article-164841](http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/prague-bratislava-host-eu-nuclear-energy-debates/article-164841)).

- <sup>36</sup> *Evropský summit skončil úspěchem* [The European summit ended with a success], Czech news agency, 13. 12. 2008. On-line: ([www.euroskop.cz/38/9838/clanek/evropsky-summit-skoncil-uspechem/](http://www.euroskop.cz/38/9838/clanek/evropsky-summit-skoncil-uspechem/)).
- <sup>37</sup> *Light or dark? Freedom or dependence?* Speech by Mirek Topolánek at the Bled Strategic Forum: Strategic Challenges of Climate Change and Energy Security, 31. 8. 2008. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/en/za-premierem-a-vladou/speech-of-the-prime-minister-mirek-topolanek-on-the-blede-forum---strategic-challenges-of-climate-change-and-energy-security-31--8--2008-40767/](http://www.vlada.cz/en/za-premierem-a-vladou/speech-of-the-prime-minister-mirek-topolanek-on-the-blede-forum---strategic-challenges-of-climate-change-and-energy-security-31--8--2008-40767/)).
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> 'Gas to flow' after Moscow deal. BBC, 18. 1. 2009. On-line: ([news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7834796.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7834796.stm)).
- <sup>40</sup> *EU leaders clinch deal on five billion stimulus plan*. Euractiv.com, 20. 3. 2009. On-line: ([www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-leaders-clinch-deal-stimulus-plan/article-180502](http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-leaders-clinch-deal-stimulus-plan/article-180502)).
- <sup>41</sup> *EU strikes deal on energy market liberalisation*. Euractiv.com, 25. 3. 2009. On-line: ([www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-strikes-deal-energy-market-liberalisation/article-180603](http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-strikes-deal-energy-market-liberalisation/article-180603)).
- <sup>42</sup> *Liberalising the EU energy sector*. Euractiv.com, 7. 7. 2009. On-line: ([www.euractiv.com/en/energy/liberalising-eu-energy-sector/article-145320](http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/liberalising-eu-energy-sector/article-145320)).
- <sup>43</sup> Cf. Beneš, Vít (2009): *The Czech discourse on the EU's external activities*. In: Avery, Graham–Faber, Anne– Schmidt, Anne (eds): *Enlarging the European Union: Effects on the new member states and the EU*. Brussels: Trans European Policy Studies Association, pp. 47–50.
- <sup>44</sup> Beneš, Vít (2008): *Rozšiřování* [Enlargement], op. cit.; Sychra, Zdeněk (2006): *Perspektivy dalšího rozšiřování EU z hlediska zájmů ČR: dopady extenze počtu členů EU na pozici ČR v EU* [Perspectives of further EU enlargement in the light of the interests of the Czech Republic]. In: Dočkal, Vít–Fiala, Petr–Kaniok, Petr–Pitrová, Markéta (eds): *Česká politika v Evropské unii: Evropský integrační proces a zájmy České republiky*. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav.
- <sup>45</sup> *Prioritní oblasti předsednictví České republiky v Radě Evropské unie v prvním pololetí roku 2009*. Government of the Czech Republic, 10. 10. 2007.
- <sup>46</sup> Král, David (2006): *Česká debata o perspektivách členství Turecka a Ukrajiny v EU*, op. cit.
- <sup>47</sup> *Speech by the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Mirek Topolánek – Five Years of Success*. EU2009.cz, 2. 3. 2009. On-line: ([www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/speeches-interviews/speech-by-the-prime-minister-of-the-czech-republic-mirek-topolanek---five-years-of-success-11262/](http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/speeches-interviews/speech-by-the-prime-minister-of-the-czech-republic-mirek-topolanek---five-years-of-success-11262/)).
- <sup>48</sup> *Obama's rescue plan is 'road to hell', claims EU President*. The Guardian, 25. 3. 2009. On-line: ([www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/25/obama-rescue-eu-criticism](http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/25/obama-rescue-eu-criticism)).
- <sup>49</sup> *Praha chce uspořádat první summit EU–Izrael*. Euroskop.cz, 17. 6. 2008. On-line: ([www.euroskop.cz/38/1151/clanek/praha-chce-usporadat-prvni-summit-eu-izrael/](http://www.euroskop.cz/38/1151/clanek/praha-chce-usporadat-prvni-summit-eu-izrael/)).
- <sup>50</sup> Sere aso Král, David–Bartovic, Vladimír–Řiháčková, Věra (2009): *The 2009 Czech EU Presidency: Contested Leadership at a Time of Crisis*, op. cit., pp. 63–65.
- <sup>51</sup> *EU: nadšení i zdrženlivost ohledně Unie pro Středomoří*. Týden, 14. 3. 2008. On-line: ([www.tyden.cz/rubriky/zahranici/evropa/eu-nadseni-i-zdrzenlivost-ohledne-unie-pro-stredomori\\_49004.html](http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/zahranici/evropa/eu-nadseni-i-zdrzenlivost-ohledne-unie-pro-stredomori_49004.html)).
- <sup>52</sup> *Work Programme of the Czech Presidency*. Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU, January 2009. On-line: ([www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=6226&down=yes](http://www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=6226&down=yes)).
- <sup>53</sup> Fuksiewicz, Aleksander–Lada, Agnieszka (2009): *The Czech Presidency in the Council of the European Union – the view from Poland*, op. cit.
- <sup>54</sup> Interview with an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU Policies Department, 11. 11. 2007.
- <sup>55</sup> *The Schengen area and cooperation*. Summaries of EU legislation, 3. 8. 2009. On-line: ([europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/justice\\_freedom\\_security/free\\_movement\\_of\\_persons\\_asylum\\_immigration/133020\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/133020_en.htm)).
- <sup>56</sup> *The Czech Republic's Updated Euro-area Accession Strategy*. Government of the Czech Republic, 29. 8. 2007. On-line: ([www.zavedenieura.cz/cps/rde/xbcr/euro/Eurostrategy\\_CR\\_eng\\_2007.pdf.pdf](http://www.zavedenieura.cz/cps/rde/xbcr/euro/Eurostrategy_CR_eng_2007.pdf.pdf)).

- <sup>57</sup> ČSSD chce euro v roce 2012. Euroskop, 8. 11. 2008. On-line: ([www.euroskop.cz/38/9398/clanek/ČSSD-chce-euro-v-roce-2012/](http://www.euroskop.cz/38/9398/clanek/ČSSD-chce-euro-v-roce-2012/)); *Průmyslníci brojí proti koruně*. Mf Dnes, 11. 9. 2008.
- <sup>58</sup> *Czech Prime Minister says euro adoption would harm the advantages of the strengthening crown*. Forbes.com, 20. 11. 2007. On-line: ([www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/11/20/afx4359851.html](http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/11/20/afx4359851.html)).
- <sup>59</sup> *Vláda asi příští rok stanoví termín přijetí eura*. Euroskop, 9. 12. 2008. On-line: ([www.euroskop.cz/38/9802/clanek/vlada-asi-pristi-rok-stanovi-termin-prijeti-eura/](http://www.euroskop.cz/38/9802/clanek/vlada-asi-pristi-rok-stanovi-termin-prijeti-eura/)).
- <sup>60</sup> See the website *Zavedení eura v České*. Ministry of Finance. On-line: ([www.zavedenieura.cz/cps/rde/xchg/euro/xsl/index.html?rdeLocaleAttr=en](http://www.zavedenieura.cz/cps/rde/xchg/euro/xsl/index.html?rdeLocaleAttr=en)).
- <sup>61</sup> Interview with an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU Policies Department, 11. 11. 2007; *The Schengen information campaign was officially launched*. Euroskop.cz, 15. 8. 2007. On-line: ([www.euroskop.cz/8377/1314/clanek/18-07-2007---the-schengen-information-campaign-was-officially-launched/](http://www.euroskop.cz/8377/1314/clanek/18-07-2007---the-schengen-information-campaign-was-officially-launched/)).
- <sup>62</sup> Beneš, Vít–Jan Karlas (2009): *Evropský rozměr české zahraniční politiky*. In: Michal Kořan et al.: *Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2008. Analýza ÚMV*. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů.
- <sup>63</sup> *The Committee for EU*. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/cz/pracovni-a-poradni-organy-vlady/veu/vybor-pro-evropskou-unii-22560/](http://www.vlada.cz/cz/pracovni-a-poradni-organy-vlady/veu/vybor-pro-evropskou-unii-22560/)).
- <sup>64</sup> Interview with a representative of the Czech MFA, Praha, 11. 12. 2009.
- <sup>65</sup> For a detailed discussion, see Beneš, Vít and Jan Karlas (2008): *Evropský rozměr české zahraniční politiky*. In: Michal Kořan et al.: *Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2007. Analýza ÚMV*. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů.
- <sup>66</sup> Král, David–Bartovic, Vladimír–Řiháčková, Věra (2009): *The 2009 Czech EU Presidency: Contested Leadership at a Time of Crisis*, op. cit.
- <sup>67</sup> Interview with a representative of the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, Prague, 13. 1. 2010.
- <sup>68</sup> *Jednací řád vlády*. Úřad vlády ČR. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=26527](http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=26527)); see also the individual changes in the rules of procedure: *Usnesení vlády ČR č. 57 k návrhu změn Jednacího řádu vlády*, 17. 1. 2007. On-line: ([racek.vlada.cz/usneseni/usneseni\\_webtest.nsf/WebGovRes/36F648B9DBF88841C12572660045598C?OpenDocument](http://racek.vlada.cz/usneseni/usneseni_webtest.nsf/WebGovRes/36F648B9DBF88841C12572660045598C?OpenDocument)); *Usnesení vlády ČR č. 816 k návrhu změn Legislativních pravidel vlády a Jednacího řádu vlády*, 18. 7. 2007. On-line: ([racek.vlada.cz/usneseni/usneseni\\_webtest.nsf/WebGovRes/F2FECE77E7A090C1C125731A0045EC3E?OpenDocument](http://racek.vlada.cz/usneseni/usneseni_webtest.nsf/WebGovRes/F2FECE77E7A090C1C125731A0045EC3E?OpenDocument)).
- <sup>69</sup> Interview with a representative of the Office of the Government, Prague, 13. 1. 2010.
- <sup>70</sup> *Czech Government*. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/cz/jednani-vlady/jednaci-rad-vlady/jednaci-rad-vlady-26527/](http://www.vlada.cz/cz/jednani-vlady/jednaci-rad-vlady/jednaci-rad-vlady-26527/)).
- <sup>71</sup> *Statut Výboru pro EU*. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/cz/pracovni-a-poradni-organy-vlady/veu/vybor-pro-evropskou-unii-22560/](http://www.vlada.cz/cz/pracovni-a-poradni-organy-vlady/veu/vybor-pro-evropskou-unii-22560/)).
- <sup>72</sup> Interview with a representative of the Office of the Government, Prague, 13. 1. 2010.
- <sup>73</sup> *Jednací řád vlády*. Úřad vlády ČR. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=26527](http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=26527)).
- <sup>74</sup> Interview with a representative of the Czech MFA, Prague, 17. 10. 2007.
- <sup>75</sup> Interview with representative of the Czech MFA, Prague, 26. 11. 2008.
- <sup>76</sup> Interview with a representative of the Czech MFA, Prague, 11. 12. 2009.
- <sup>77</sup> *Zpráva o organizační přípravě a průběhu CZ PŘES na MZV, 2009*. Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR, Sekretariát pro přípravu předsednictví.
- <sup>78</sup> Interview with a representative of the Czech MFA, Prague 11. 12. 2009; results of the Czech presidency in the EU Council (a Europe without barriers).
- <sup>79</sup> Interview with a representative of the Czech MFA, Prague, 11. 12. 2009.
- <sup>80</sup> Interview with the representative of the Office of the President of the Republic, 1. 11. 2007.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>82</sup> *Czech President labels himself an EU dissident*. Czech Radio 7, 11. 11. 2008. On-line: ([www.radio.cz/en/article/110220](http://www.radio.cz/en/article/110220)).
- <sup>83</sup> *Czech President's meeting with MEPs ends in rift*. Aktuálně.cz, 5. 12. 2008. On-line: ([aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=624103](http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=624103)).

- <sup>84</sup> *Speech of the President of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus in the European Parliament*. 19. 2. 2009. On-line: ([www.klaus.cz/clanky/310](http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/310)).
- <sup>85</sup> *Klaus provokes walk-out in the Parliament*. EuropeanVoice.com, 19. 2. 2009. On-line: ([www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/02/klaus-provokes-walk-out-in-the-parliament/64053.aspx](http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/02/klaus-provokes-walk-out-in-the-parliament/64053.aspx)).
- <sup>86</sup> *Ten Years of Euro: A Reason for Celebration?* Financial Times, 12. 6. 2008.
- <sup>87</sup> *Czech President Calls EU Climate Measures ‘Tragic Mistake’*, 31. 1. 2008. On-line: ([www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1201779149.1/](http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1201779149.1/)).
- <sup>88</sup> *Press Statement by the President of the Czech Republic after the Senate Vote on the Lisbon Treaty*, 6. 5. 2009. On-line: ([www.hrad.cz/en/for-media/press-releases/6085.shtml](http://www.hrad.cz/en/for-media/press-releases/6085.shtml)).
- <sup>89</sup> See Article 49 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. On-line: ([www.senat.cz/informace/zadosti/ustava-eng.php?ke\\_dni=&O=7](http://www.senat.cz/informace/zadosti/ustava-eng.php?ke_dni=&O=7)).
- <sup>90</sup> *Czech parliament should approve guarantees for Ireland – Klaus*. Czech News Agency, 17. 6. 2009. On-line: ([magazin.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klaus-zaruky-pro-iry-by-v-cr-mel-schvalit-parlament/383183?id=383201](http://magazin.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klaus-zaruky-pro-iry-by-v-cr-mel-schvalit-parlament/383183?id=383201)).
- <sup>91</sup> *Klausův dopis Fischerovi o zárukách EU pro Iry*. Czech News Agency, 17. 6. 2009. On-line: ([magazin.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klausuv-dopis-fischerovi-o-zarukach-eu-pro-iry/383204](http://magazin.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klausuv-dopis-fischerovi-o-zarukach-eu-pro-iry/383204)); *Odpověď premiéra Fischera na dopis prezidenta Klause*. Vláda ČR, 17. 6. 2009. On-line: ([www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/odpoved-premiera-fischera-na-dopis-prezidenta-klausa-59332/](http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/odpoved-premiera-fischera-na-dopis-prezidenta-klausa-59332/)).
- <sup>92</sup> Šlosarčík, Ivo (2009): *The Treaty of Lisbon & the Czech Constitutional Court: Act II*. CEPS Policy Brief, No. 197/27 October 2009.
- <sup>93</sup> *Czech President’s new treaty snag*. BBC NEWS, 8. 10. 2009. On-line: ([news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8297757.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8297757.stm)).
- <sup>94</sup> *Statement of President Václav Klaus on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty*. 9. 10. 2009. On-line: ([www.hrad.cz/en/President-of-the-cr/current-President-of-the-cr-vaclav-klaus/selected-speeches-and-interviews/96.shtml](http://www.hrad.cz/en/President-of-the-cr/current-President-of-the-cr-vaclav-klaus/selected-speeches-and-interviews/96.shtml)); *Lisbon Treaty turmoil as Czechs demand opt-out*. The Guardian, 9. 10. 2009. On-line: ([www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/09/eu-lisbon-treaty-czech-republic](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/09/eu-lisbon-treaty-czech-republic)); *Klaus’ Lisbon request exposes divisions*. The Prague Post, 14. 10. 2009. On-line: ([www.praguepost.com/news/2499-klaus-lisbon-request-exposes-divisions.html](http://www.praguepost.com/news/2499-klaus-lisbon-request-exposes-divisions.html)).
- <sup>95</sup> *Czech politicians appreciate EU agreement on opt-out*. Czech News Agency, 30. 10. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/czech-politicians-appreciate-eu-agreement-on-opt-out/405278&id\\_seznam=2048](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/czech-politicians-appreciate-eu-agreement-on-opt-out/405278&id_seznam=2048)); *Klaus gets opt-out*. EuropeanVoice.com, 29. 10. 2009. On-line: ([www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/10/klaus-gets-opt-out/66305.aspx](http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/10/klaus-gets-opt-out/66305.aspx)).
- <sup>96</sup> Chmel, Marek–Syllová, Jindřiška (2009): *Listina základních práv Evropské unie a česká ‘výjimka’ z Listiny*. Parliamentary Institute, November 2009.
- <sup>97</sup> *Klaus signs Lisbon Treaty after Czech court’s verdict*. Czech News Agency, 3. 11. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/klaus-signs-lisbon-treaty-after-czech-court-s-verdict/405920](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/klaus-signs-lisbon-treaty-after-czech-court-s-verdict/405920)); *Klaus signature completes EU treaty ratification*. EUobserver.com, 3. 11. 2009. On-line: ([euobserver.com/9/28932](http://euobserver.com/9/28932)).
- <sup>98</sup> *Czechs’ Klaus signs EU treaty, enters force December 1*. Reuters, 3. 11. 2009. On-line: ([www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A212B20091103](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A212B20091103)).
- <sup>99</sup> *Lisbon may eventually take effect – reluctant Klaus in press*. Czech News Agency, 17. 10. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/lisbon-may-eventually-take-effect-reluctant-klaus-in-press/403166&id\\_seznam=8113](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/lisbon-may-eventually-take-effect-reluctant-klaus-in-press/403166&id_seznam=8113)); *Prezident kvůli ‘Lisabonu’ uvažoval o odstoupení*. Czech News Agency, 16. 11. 2009. On-line: ([magazin.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/prezident-kvuli-lisabonu-uvazoval-o-odstoupeni/407934&id\\_seznam=?id=407934](http://magazin.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/prezident-kvuli-lisabonu-uvazoval-o-odstoupeni/407934&id_seznam=?id=407934)); see also *Klaus may want CzechRep to renew sovereignty by leaving EU – Hajek*. Czech News Agency, 4. 11. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klaus-may-want-czechrep-to-renew-sovereignty-by-leaving-eu-hajek/406134&id\\_seznam=8113](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klaus-may-want-czechrep-to-renew-sovereignty-by-leaving-eu-hajek/406134&id_seznam=8113)).
- <sup>100</sup> Pítrová, Lenka–Coxová, Martina (2005): *Parlamentní kontrola agendy EU v Poslanecké sněmovně Parlamentu ČR*. In: *Parlamentní kontrola agendy EU*, Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR, Výbor pro evropské záležitosti, pp. 4–11.

- <sup>101</sup> See the website of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union. On-line: ([www.cosac.eu/en/](http://www.cosac.eu/en/)).
- <sup>102</sup> *XLI Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC)*. Parliament of the Czech Republic, 14. 5. 2009. On-line: ([www.parliament.cz/czpres2009/event/cosac-en/617-press/?id=68](http://www.parliament.cz/czpres2009/event/cosac-en/617-press/?id=68)).
- <sup>103</sup> *Sněmovna potvrdila nové předsedy tří sněmovních výborů*. Czech News Agency, 3. 4. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/snemovna-potvrdila-nove-predsedy-tri-snemovnich-vyboru/369181](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/snemovna-potvrdila-nove-predsedy-tri-snemovnich-vyboru/369181)).
- <sup>104</sup> For an overview of the main events in the ratification process see *Process of Ratification in the Czech Republic*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23. 11. 2009. On-line: ([www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign\\_relations/european\\_union/treaty\\_of\\_lisbon/process\\_of\\_ratification\\_in\\_the\\_czech.html](http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/european_union/treaty_of_lisbon/process_of_ratification_in_the_czech.html)).
- <sup>105</sup> *Sněmovna schválila Lisabonskou smlouvu, pojistila Benešovy*. iDNES.cz, 18. 2. 2009. On-line: ([zpravy.idnes.cz/snemovna-schvalila-lisabonskou-smlouvu-pojistila-benesovy-dekrety-lip-domaci.asp?c=A090218\\_082516\\_domaci\\_jw](http://zpravy.idnes.cz/snemovna-schvalila-lisabonskou-smlouvu-pojistila-benesovy-dekrety-lip-domaci.asp?c=A090218_082516_domaci_jw)).
- <sup>106</sup> *Czech Senate committee nods to EU-related special mandate of govt*. Czech News Agency, 15. 4. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/czech-senate-committee-nods-to-eu-related-special-mandate-of-govt/371236](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/czech-senate-committee-nods-to-eu-related-special-mandate-of-govt/371236)).
- <sup>107</sup> An interview with the Adviser of the Committee on European Affairs of the Senate, 21. 1. 2008.
- <sup>108</sup> Parliamentary Scrutiny of the EU Affairs in the Senate. EU Affairs Committee, the Senate, undated. On-line: ([www.senat.cz/evropa/nasenatu-eng.php](http://www.senat.cz/evropa/nasenatu-eng.php)).
- <sup>109</sup> Šlosarčík, Ivo (2009): *The Treaty of Lisbon & the Czech Constitutional Court: Act II*. CEPS Policy Brief, No. 197/27 October 2009.
- <sup>110</sup> See the abstract of the *Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, 26. 11. 2008. On-line: ([angl.concourt.cz/angl\\_verze/doc/pl-19-08.php](http://angl.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/pl-19-08.php)).
- <sup>111</sup> Usnesení Senátu č. 490 k návrhu senátního návrhu zákona o zásadách jednání a styku Poslanecké sněmovny a Senátu mezi sebou a navenek a o změně zákona č. 107/1999 Sb., o jednacím řádu Senátu, ve znění pozdějších předpisů (stykový zákon), navržený Stálou komisí Senátu pro Ústavu České republiky a parlamentní procedury, 18. 9. 2008.
- <sup>112</sup> *Czech Senate approves Lisbon Treaty*. Euractiv.com, 7. 5. 2009. On-line: ([www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/czech-senate-approves-lisbon-treaty/article-182063](http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/czech-senate-approves-lisbon-treaty/article-182063)).
- <sup>113</sup> *Czech Senate head rejects Klaus's criticism over Lisbon Treaty*. Czech news Agency, 11. 5. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/tema/zpravy/czech-senate-head-rejects-klaus-s-criticism-over-lisbon-treaty/376305&id\\_seznam=5240](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/tema/zpravy/czech-senate-head-rejects-klaus-s-criticism-over-lisbon-treaty/376305&id_seznam=5240)).
- <sup>114</sup> *Co je podstatou senátorské stížnosti na vázaný mandát*. Jiří Oberfalzer, 17. 9. 2009. On-line: ([www.oberfalzer.cz/novinky/co-je-podstatou-senatorske-stiznosti-na-vazany-mandat/](http://www.oberfalzer.cz/novinky/co-je-podstatou-senatorske-stiznosti-na-vazany-mandat/)).
- <sup>115</sup> Šlosarčík, Ivo (2009): *The Treaty of Lisbon & the Czech Constitutional Court: Act II*. CEPS Policy Brief, No. 197/27 October 2009.
- <sup>116</sup> *The Treaty of Lisbon is in conformity with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic and there is nothing to prevent its ratification*. Constitutional Court, 3. 11. 2009. On-line: ([www.usoud.cz/view/2144](http://www.usoud.cz/view/2144)).
- <sup>117</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>118</sup> *RHSD – Council of economic and social agreement of the Czech Republic*. European Economic and Social Committee. On-line: ([eesc.europa.eu/ceslink/08-en/03-czech-republic-rhsd/rhsd-council-of-economic-and-social-agreement-of-the-czech-republic-en.html](http://eesc.europa.eu/ceslink/08-en/03-czech-republic-rhsd/rhsd-council-of-economic-and-social-agreement-of-the-czech-republic-en.html)).
- <sup>119</sup> Interview with the representative of the Confederation of Industry, 10. 10. 2007.
- <sup>120</sup> Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Department of Coordination with EU, 8. 11. 2007.
- <sup>121</sup> *Ransdorf v Bruselu prosazuje zájmy ČEZ [Ransdorf promotes the interests of ČEZ in Brussels]*, iHNed, 26. 3. 2009. On-line: ([ekonomika.ihned.cz/c1-23583750-ransdorf-v-bruselu-prosazuje-zajmy-cez](http://ekonomika.ihned.cz/c1-23583750-ransdorf-v-bruselu-prosazuje-zajmy-cez)).

- <sup>122</sup> *No, minister. A mighty Czech power company runs into criticism.* The Economist, 8. 4. 2010. On-line: ([www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=15869464](http://www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15869464)).
- <sup>123</sup> *European Nuclear Energy Forum.* European Commission. On-line: ([ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/forum\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/forum_en.htm)).
- <sup>124</sup> *Czech Prime Minister resists business calls to set euro date.* Reuters, 16. 10. 2008. On-line: ([uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLG66905620080916](http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLG66905620080916)).
- <sup>125</sup> See, for example, *Contribution by the Region of South Bohemia to public consultations on 'Growing Regions, growing Europe'.* The Region of South Bohemia (CZ) – Permanent Office in Brussels, 30. 1. 2008. On-line: ([ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/conferences/4thcohesionforum/doc/contributions/pubcon\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/conferences/4thcohesionforum/doc/contributions/pubcon_en.pdf)).
- <sup>126</sup> Dočkal, Vít: *Trojrovninné pojetí EU a aktéři regionálních zájmů.* Politologický časopis, 1/2006: pp. 27–54; Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Department of Coordination with EU, 8. 11. 2007; Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU General Affairs Department, 7. 2. 2008; Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU Policies Department, 11. 11. 2007.
- <sup>127</sup> Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Department of Coordination with EU, 8. 11. 2007.
- <sup>128</sup> See, for example, *Priorities of environmental organisations for the Czech presidency of the European Council.* Green Circle, 2008. On-line: ([www.zelenykruh.cz/dokumenty/infolist-priority-nno-eng.pdf](http://www.zelenykruh.cz/dokumenty/infolist-priority-nno-eng.pdf)).
- <sup>129</sup> *Launch of the European Partnership for Democracy.* European Partnership for Democracy, 15. 4. 2008. On-line: ([www.epd.eu/launch-of-the-european-foundation-for-democracy-through-partnership](http://www.epd.eu/launch-of-the-european-foundation-for-democracy-through-partnership)).
- <sup>130</sup> *Aiding and reinforcing European democracy assistance across the world,* European Partnership for Democracy. On-line: ([www.eupd.eu/about/efdp-in-a-nutshell](http://www.eupd.eu/about/efdp-in-a-nutshell)).
- <sup>131</sup> Speech of Václav Havel. European Parliament, 11. 11. 2009. On-line: ([www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=1290\\_aj\\_projevy.html&typ=HTML](http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=1290_aj_projevy.html&typ=HTML)).
- <sup>132</sup> See, e.g., Král, David–Bartovic, Vladimír–Řiháčková, Věra (2009): *The 2009 Czech EU Presidency: Contested Leadership at a Time of Crisis*, op. cit.
- <sup>133</sup> See, e.g., Czech News Agency, 2. 1. 2009.
- <sup>134</sup> See, e.g., Czech News Agency, 23. 4. 2009.
- <sup>135</sup> E.g. *Otázky Václava Moravce Specíál*, 2. 6. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskatelevize.cz/program/409231100292001-otazky-vaclava-moravce-special-2-6-2009.html](http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/program/409231100292001-otazky-vaclava-moravce-special-2-6-2009.html)).
- <sup>136</sup> Drulák, Petr (2001): *Tschechien: Streit um Europa.* In: Timmermann, Heiner (ed): *Eine Verfassung für die Europäische Union*, pp. 257–264. Opladen: Leske + Budrich; Drulák, Petr–Beneš, Vít (2008): *České metafory Evropy: Havel vs. Klaus.* In: Novák, Miroslav–Brunclík, Miloš (eds): *Postavení hlavy státu v parlamentních a poloprezidentských režimech: Česká republika v komparativní perspektivě.* Praha: Dokořán.
- <sup>137</sup> *V reakci na rozhodnutí Senátu o Lisabonu vystupuje Páralová z ODS.* Czech News Agency, 6. 5. 2009. On-line: ([www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/czech-deputy-leaves-party-in-protest-against-eu-treaty-passage/375540?id=375523](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/czech-deputy-leaves-party-in-protest-against-eu-treaty-passage/375540?id=375523)).
- <sup>138</sup> Hanley, Seán (2004): *A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13–14 June 2003.* West European Politics, 27 (4), pp. 691–715; Kopecký, Petr (2004): *An Awkward Newcomer? EU Enlargement and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic.* In: Harmsen, Robert–Spiering, Menno (eds): *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration*, pp. 225–245. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi; Kopecký, Petr (2004): *Mass Attitudes towards the European Union in the Czech and Slovak Republics*, contribution to the Public Opinion about the EU in East-Central Europe. University of Indiana, Bloomington, April 2–3, 2004.
- <sup>139</sup> *Prioritní oblasti předsednictví České republiky v Radě Evropské unie v prvním pololetí roku 2009.* Vláda ČR, 10. 10. 2007.
- <sup>140</sup> Ibid.